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This research examined the conditions that contribute to the con­
sideration of education as a right; It also examined the situations/ 
conditions that have established education as an entitlement and a 
prl vl lege. 
Education has an established, historical precedent for being ele­
vated to "fundamental Interest" status. It enjoys public, political, 
and congressional support for consideration of elevation to a funda­
mental "right" status. Only the United States Supreme Court has failed 
to recognize education as possessing "fundamental right" status. 
Education has been pronounced by the United States Supreme Court 
In GOSS v. LOPEZ as an entitlement. This pronouncement was based 
upon the premise that rights, privileges, and entitlements are created 
outside of the federal areas, more specifically, outside of the federal 
Constitution. 
Education exists as a privilege owing to the broad police powers 
of the states; these state rights exist from an explicit Interpretation 
of the ninth and tenth amendments to the federal Constitution. 
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No nation that was worth perpetuation was ever disarmed by critical 
and analytic competence within Its population; but many civiliza­
tions which are extinct might well have been saved by such a 
population. (I) ... (T)hose who cannot read, or scarcely so, 
have little means to learn the history of past mistakes; few such 
people even know the chronicles of disappointment from one decade 
past. Lack of Information . . . seduces the Illiterate to seek 
liaison with the single group least able to respond. (2) A people 
that cannot read are without an argument; they are undefended and 
vulnerable In this world of high technology and rapid Information 
exchange mechanisms. (3) 
The words of Jonathan Kozol speak to the heart of the Issue, educa­
tion Is a necessary element for one to be able to participate In the 
society of the United States of America In the twentieth and twenty 
first centuries. Active participation In this society necessitates an 
education. The limits of an education are determined by the needs and 
desires of the Individual. In order to participate fully, an Individual 
must first acquire the fundamental skills of reading, writing, critical 
thinking, and speaking. 
Written and oral communication between literate Individuals Is 
vital. Communications cannot exist without giving and receipt of In­
formation. To be effective both giver and receiver must possess basal 
ski I Is. 
An Individual can view his own unique position within society more 
capably with an education. An Individual may choose to participate In 
society, or choose not; It Is an education that helps make this decision 
possible. An education merely provides tools, skills, or Information 
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that an Individual may or may not use; however, It Is the Individual 
who must utilize this Information to make decisions that affect his 
future. 
The Impetus for acquisition of an education originates within the 
Individual. From the requirements and Influence of Individuals, the 
state governments responded to a recognized need of Its citizenry. 
Individual states created mechanisms to provide the process of educa­
tion as well as a bureaucracy to administer It. 
Education of the entire population Is an ultimate goal of a 
civilized and highly technically sophisticated government of the twen­
tieth and twenty first centuries. Education at public expense Is and 
has been used for acclimating the population to an exploration and 
development of literate skills necessary for the perpetuation and 
development of that government, that civilization. Not to recognize 
the need and not to perpetuate the mores, knowledge, art, literature, 
and culture of the society Is an admission of a failure of civilization. 
In the United States of America, lawgivers and lawmakers demon­
strated a clear Intent from the onset that remained constant; these 
Ideas are consistent throughout our nation's history. Literate men 
from the early days of the American colonies to the present day recog­
nized the need that an education could fulfill. Franklin, Emerson, 
and Dewey are representative voices from different periods of time that 
speak of the Importance that education has had over the past two hun­
dred years. 
Benjamin Franklin In 1743 stated: 
But as from the extent of the country such persons are widely 
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separated, and seldom can see and converse or be acquainted with 
each other, so that many useful particulars remain uncommunlcated, 
die with the discovery, and are lost to mankind; It Is to remedy 
this Inconvenience for the future, proposed. That one society be 
formed of virtuosi or Ingenious men, residing In the several 
colonies, . . . who are to maintain a constant correspondence. (4) 
As Benjamin Franklin spoke for the Interests of the Intellectual, 
the aristocracy, the property class, and the landed gentry, Ralph Waldo 
Emerson spoke from the heart of America, the common man; In the early 
part of 1841, Emerson wrote: 
. . .  I  p r a i s e  N e w  E n g l a n d  b e c a u s e  I t  I s  t h e  c o u n t r y  I n  t h e  w o r l d  
where Is the freest expenditure for education. We have already 
taken, at planting of the Colonies (for aught I know for the first 
time In the world), the Initial step, which for Its Importance 
might have been resisted as the most radical of revolutions, thus 
deciding at the start the destiny of this country, - this, namely, 
that the poor man, ... Is allowed to put his hand Into the pocket 
of the rich, and say, You shall educate me, not as You will, but 
as I wl 11: tot alone In the elements, but, by further provision, 
In the languages, In sciences, In the useful and In elegant arts. 
The child shall be taken up by the State, and taught, at the public 
cost, the rudiments of knowledge, and at last, the ripest results 
of art and science. (5) 
John Dewey, a social reformer and an early advocate of a public 
education for the average citizen, wrote In 1897 that: 
Education Is the fundamental method of social progress and reform. 
. . . The community's duty to education Is, therefore, Its para­
mount moral duty. Sy law and punishment, by social agitation and 
discussion, society can regulate and form Itself In a more or less 
haphazard and chance way. But through education society can formu­
late Its own purposes, can organize Its own means and resources, 
and thus shape Itself with deflnlteness and economy In the direc­
tion In which It wishes to move. (6) 
Writers such as John I. Goodlad, Sara Llghtfoot, Diane Ravttch, and 
Johathan Kozol attest to the minor renaissance of education during the 
period of the 1980s. The Reagan Administration's United States Depart­
ment of Education through Its rhetoric has reaffirmed the existence of 
such a rebirth of the Importance of education; It stated: 
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Recent opinion polls confirm that the people know and understand 
the Importance of education to the Nation's material well-being 
and their own future. They are Indeed willing to act on the belief 
that education belongs at the top of the national agenda. (7) 
Although the United States has been Involved In many conflicts, 
three periods of war reflect the activity that demonstrate the difference 
between political rhetoric and action. Following three wars Involving 
the American people, Americans witnessed the massive Infusion of Ameri­
can government money to aid and promote education as a fundamental In­
terest: The American Revolution (1789 - 1800), The Civil War (1365 -
1884), and World War II (1944 - 1955). With the use of federal monies, 
the federal government has shown Its regard for education. 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
This is a study to determine whether public education In the United 
States of America Is a situational right, entitlement, and privilege. 
The research Is concerned with the situations that establish public edu­
cation In the United States as a fundamental Interest to the people. 
The research reflects the conditions that determine the definition and 
classification of the right, entitlement, and privilege to a public edu­
cation; and the possible consequences of the definition and classifica­
tion. 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS TO BE ANSWERED 
The study focused on examining education as a situational right, 
entitlement, and privilege. To facilitate the study, the following 
questions were explored: 
A. Under color of the Constitution, when Is education at public 
expense a "fundamental Interest?" 
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B. When Is education at public expense a "right?" 
C. When Is education at public expense an "entitlement?" 
D. When Is education at public expense a "privilege?" 
E. What situations must exist for education to be considered 
a right, an entitlement, or a privilege protected by the federal 
Constitution? 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The purpose of this study was an Investigation of education as 
a situational right, entitlement, and privilege. By examining legal, 
political, historical, and social precedents, this researcher sought 
to Identify In what situations Is education at public expense a consti­
tutionally protected right, entitlement, and privilege. 
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
From a cursory examination, educatton as a right, an entitlement, 
and a privilege appeared to be contradictory In theory and practice. 
It Is significant to have a clear understanding of when education Is a 
protected right, an entitlement, and/or a privilege. 
Education has variously been perceived as being a fundamental 
right, an entitlement, and a fundamental privilege; however, none of 
these perceptions of the role of education are mentioned specifically 
In the United States Constitution. Yet, education carries over two 
hundred years of public support unlike other unenumerated rights under 
the protection of the United States Constitution. 
Education as a right was predicated upon the concept that from the 
definition of a right, people established education on an equal par with 
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other historical rights. These rights appeared to vary with the group 
assessing the fundamental nature of the perceived right. However, educa­
tion appeared to have a common bond that was present In the historical 
rights mentioned specifically In the Constitution. The States of the 
Union have Included education In the Drovlslons of their Individually 
written constitutions as a protected right. Few state governments of 
the federal union have found education not possessing the necessary fund­
amental Interest status to be Included In their state constitutions. 
Education as an entitlement was explored from the point of view that 
state laws have mandated attendance of "school age children. ' The POP-
ulatlon was entitled to a free and public education In that the states 
have provided the mechanisms and bureaucracy for the public education; 
once the state has mandated a+tendance and provided provisions for non­
compliance, the population was entitled to participate In a public 
school education. 
Education as a privilege was examined on the basis of Ir?ga! preced­
ents. Education as a privilege extended to Include the premise that a 
free and public education was provided for the general population of a 
given state; It was perceived that It was an exercise that could have 
participation or the population could opt for private or sectarian school­
ing while maintaining the public school privilege to attend. 
The Importance of educa+Ion as a right, entitlement, and privilege Is 
the significance that the judiciary attaches to each classification. Each 
of the classifications of education carries varying weights of constitu­
tional protection; as the judiciary considers the weight of a right against 
an entitlement, the protected right has the greater value. As an entitle-
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merit Is balanced against a D r f v I I e g e .  the entitlement has greater weight. 
Establishing education as a protected right would require greater 
weight of responsibilities by the state governments. It Is therefore of 
considerable Importance to examine the classifications of education to 
determine which classification Is applicable. 
DEFINITION OF TERMS 
To permit a consistent and understandable discussion, St Is necess­
ary to provide a definition of terms that are used throughout this study. 
For the purpose of this study, the following selected terms are defined. 
ARBITRARY - A performance of an Issue In an "arbitrary manner" as 
something fixed or done capriciously or at pleasure, without adequately 
determined prlnclDle; not funded In the nature of things; not rational; 
not done or acting according to reason or judgment In law; deoendlng on 
the will of the Individual alone; absolutely In power. (8) 
CLASS ACTION - A lawsuit brought by representative members of a 
large group of Individuals on behalf of all the members of the group. (9) 
CONCURRING OPINION - An opinion, separated from that which embodies 
the views and decisions of the majority of the court, prepared and filed 
by a judge who agrees In the genera! result of the decision, and which 
either reinforces the majority opinion by the expression of the particu­
lar judge's own views or reasoning, or voices his disapproval of the 
grounds of the decision or the arguments on which It was based, though 
approving the final result. (10) 
CONTRACT - An agreement between two or more Individuals that affects 
their legal relatlonshlDS. (II) 
DEFENDANT - An Individual who Is sued and Is called upon to make a 
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satisfaction for a wrong complained of by another. (12) 
DICTUM - A statement, remark, or an observation made by a judge In 
a judicial odnlon that Is necessary for the resolution of the decision 
In the case. (13) 
DISSENTING OPINION - An opinion disagreeing with that of the majority 
of the court that Is given by one or more members of the court (14) 
DUF PROCESS - A law In the regular course of administration fhrouqh 
courts of justice, according to those rules and forms that have been 
established for the protection of private rights. (15) 
EDUCATION - It Is ''the knowledge and development resulting from an 
educational process;" It Implies that a process of Instruction Is utilized 
to promote an evolution of latent potential within the Individual. (16) 
EDUCATIONAL CLASS OF INDIVIDUALS - Children between the ages of 5 
and 18 years of age committed to attend an Institution of Instruction by 
the s^ate In order for the Individual to receive a state-mandated pres­
cribed educational program of Instruction. 
ENTITLEMENT - A complete right to something once a person shows 
that he or she meets the legal requirements to get ft. (17) 
FINDING - A decision of a court on the Issues of the facts present­
ed In the case to the respective court. 
MINIMAL EDUCATION PROGRAM - A program of Instruction that has been 
developed and financed by the state government and legislature to achieve 
minimal standards of academic achievement by the Educational Class. 
MINIMAL STANDARDS - An acceptable basis for judging the acquisition 
of skills and Information by the Educational Class of Individuals. 
PRIVILEGE - It Is an advantage that Is not enjoyed by all, equally. 
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It Is a "basic right that cannot be taken away; It Is a special advant­
age, as opposed to a right;" It may be said to be an exemption from a 
duty others must perform. (18) 
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS - Guarantees procedural fairness where the 
government would deprive one of his property or liberty. This requires 
that notice and the right to a fair hearing be accorded prior to a dep­
rivation. (19) 
PROPRIETARY FUNCTIONS - Those functions that are exercised by a 
municipality for the Improvement of the territory within the corporate 
limits, or the doing of such things as Inure to the benefit, pecuniarily 
or otherwise, of the municipality. Things not normally required by law 
or things not governmental In nature. (20) 
PUBLIC SCHOOL EDUCATION - A general and uniform system of free public 
schools provided throughout the state, wherein equal opportunities are 
provided for all students In accordance with the Individual state's consti­
tutional limitations. Tuition shall be free of charge to all children of 
the state. The Individual state prescribes the limits of the school year 
and of the school day. The state Is responsible for certifying the teach­
ers to teach and Is responsible for operating and maintaining the schools 
throughout the state. (21) 
RIGHT - Something that Is morally, ethically, or legally just In the 
body of common laws or that has been established by historical precedent. 
(22) 
STRICT - It Is something that Is exact, precise, or Is governed by 
exact rules. (23) 
STRICT CONSTRUCTION - An Interpretation by adherence to the literal 
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meaning. (24) 
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS - The constitutional safeguard that requires 
that all legislation, state or federal, must be reasonably related for 
the furtherance of a legitimate governmental objective. (25) 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - A pre-verdict judgment rendered by the court In 
response to a motion by a plaintiff or defendant, who claims that the ab­
sence of factual dispute on one or more tssues eliminates the need to 
send those Issues to the jury. (26) 
TERM OF COURT - A definite time period prescribed by law for a court 
to administer Its duties. (27) 
TRUST - A right of property, real or personal, held by one party for 
the benefit of another. (28) 
VACATE - A decision by the court which render an Issue null, having 
no legal standing, Is to set aside. (29) 
METHODOLOGY 
The researcher used three approaches In the Identification of data 
sources. The first approach concentrated on the Identification of data 
In primary sources relevant to the research topic. Three major primary 
sources were used for Information In the education law section, one for 
Supreme Court opinions, one for lower, federal and state court opinions, 
and the other from judicial papers. 
First source, Supreme Court opinions were Identified through the 
American Digest System, NOMEX, and a database search using the Western 
Carolina University's library computer. The Supreme Court opinions ex­
amined were up to and Including opinions handed down In 1987. From 
these sources, the researcher compiled a bibliography of case law clta-
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tlons. Using these citations, the researcher then located these cases 
In the appropriate volumes of U. S. Reports, and the Lawyer's Edition 
of the Supreme Court Reporter. 
Second source, lower federal and state court opinions were Ident­
ified through the NOLPE School Law Reporter, the United States Law Week 
Reporter, LOMEX, and a database search using the University of North 
Carolina at Ashevllle's library computer. The lower federal court.opln-
lons examined were up to and Including opinions handed down In 1987. 
From these sources, the researcher compiled a bibliography of case law 
citations. Using these citations, the researcher then located the cases 
In the appropriate volumes of the National Reporter System: the Federal 
Reporter, Second Edition; the Southeastern Reporter; the Federal Reporter; 
the Northeastern Reporter; the Pacific Reporter, Second Edition; and the 
California Reporter. 
Third source, relevant Judicial papers were obtained from the pub­
lished writings and autobiographical works of the present and past Jus­
tices of the Supreme Court. The writings of the present and past jus­
tices of the Supreme Court provided Insight to the Supreme Court's 
decision making process. These sources were located from a computer 
search of the database of the University of California at Los Angeles's 
Law School. Law school Journal articles on the Constitution and educa­
tion by justices of the Supreme Court were located using the computer 
database search at the Wake Forest University library. 
The second approach used In the Identification of data sources ex­
amined applicable secondary sources that provided general Information on 
the research topic. A search for the relevant literature was conducted 
using three sources. First, a complete search of Educational Resources 
Information Center (ERIC) files was conducted at Western Carolina Uni­
versity library; second, legal periodical articles were Identified 
through the Index Guide to Legal Periodicals. Finally, a computer data­
base search was conducted to cross-check the accuracy and completeness 
of the assembled bibliography from the first two sources; this was ac­
complished using the Toronto PRO-NET Communications, System One In 
Toronto, Canada. 
The general, philosophical aspects of the research topic were lo­
cated through ERIC and an examination of Dissertation Abstracts. 
Relevant, current statistical Information was obtained from publica­
tions of the National Center for Education Statistics. 
The. third approach used In the Identification of data sources ex­
amined secondary sources related to the questions raised by the study. 
Journal articles related to the research topic were located through the 
use of the Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature, the Education Index, 
the Index Guide to Legal Periodicals, and a computer database search us­
ing the computer at Western Carolina University library. Books, sections 
of books, educational newsletters, documents, pamphlets, newspaper arti­
cles, broadcasts of television and radio, and cassette tapes were exam­
ined. 
In order to verify that a complete bibliography of case law had been 
Identified, the researcher cross-checked for accuracy through the Year­
book of School Law and each of Its volumes corresponding to the time 
frame of this study, the NOLPE School Law Reporter was examined for cita­
tions of the most recent opinions on the subject, and a database search 
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was conducted using Western Carolina University's mainframe computer 
for an examination of the files on the research topic from the U. S. 
Database Index Files In Los Angeles, California. 
DELIMITATIONS 
The study examined legal questions Involved with the evolution of 
education as a right, an entitlement, and a privilege from BROWN I. 
(1954) to the present (1988). The study was restricted to an examlnar 
tlon of education In the United States of America, the territories, 
and trusts. Education, a right, an entitlement, and a privilege, was 
restricted to an exploration of the public realm, kindergarten through 
secondary school education. An examination of the area of education 
was limited to a narrow area to facilitate a clear discussion of educa­
tion as a right, an entitlement, and a privilege. 
ORGANIZATION OF THE REMAINDER OF THE STUDY 
The balance of the study was divided Into four major parts. Chapter 
Two provided an examination of reserach and literature concerned with the 
legal evolution of education as a fundamental Interest, a right, an en­
titlement, and a privilege. Chapter Three enlarged upon the legal aspects 
of the consideration of education as a constitutional, fundamental Inter­
est with accompanying rights, entitlements, and privileges. Chapter Four 
presented an analysis of other pertinent litigation decided In the area 
of pub 11c school education rights, entitlements, and privileges. Chapter 
Five presented a summary, conclusions, and recommendations drawn from the 
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CHAPTER TWO 
REVIEW CF THE LITERATURE RELATING TO EDUCATION AS A 
RIGHT, AN ENTITLEMENT, AND PRIVILEGE 
INTRODUCTION 
Education Is a life-long process that commences at birth and con­
tinues progressively until death. Education, therefore. Is a process of 
amassing Information over a oerlod of time, organizing It, analyzlno It, 
and ultimately understanding It. Learning, discovering, and passing In­
formation to future generations Is education. The orocess of education 
Is Individually motivated. The reasons for the acquisition of an educa­
tion may range from the simple, building a better mouse traD, to the 
more cerebral, discovering the reasons for the existence of man. 
To become educated Is: 
. . . (T)o realize our human potential. We alone of all creatures 
have the ability to break out of the narrow circle of the moment, 
and until we do, until we reach beyond ourselves, we are llrr.lf'jd 
and Immature. "To know nothing of what happened before you were 
born Is to remain forever a chlId," Cicero wrote. Or as Santayana 
put It, "When experience Is not retained, as among savages, Infancy 
Is perpetual." 3y reaching Into the past, we affirm our humanity. 
And we Inevitably come to the essence of It. ... The past also 
offers lessons, and although we shall surely dispute what they are, 
even as we do so we enlarge our perspective on the present. . . A 
system of education that falls to nur+ure memory of the past denies 
Its students a great deal: the satisfactions of mature thought, an 
attachment to abiding concerns, and a perspective on human exist­
ence. (I) 
(W)e put our sense of nationhood at risk by falling to familiarize 
our young Deople with the story of how the society In which they 
live come to be. Knowledge of the Ideas that have molded us and 
the Ideals that have mattered to us functions as a kind of civic 
gl ue. 
From 1607 until 1988, education has exerted a tremendous force upon 
the early settlers, citizens, and "new citizens," alike. The processes 
for the acquisition of an education, like the reasons, may range from 
the simple to the more sophisticated. Education of future generations 
of this republic Is an Important key to the perpetuation of democratic 
Ideals and of the republic, Itself. 
This chapter will contain a discussion of relevant background Infor­
mation and brief history of education, education as a right, an entitle­
ment, and a privilege. The chapter Is divided Into five major sections. 
These sections are: (1) A brief history of education In the United 
States; (2) Legal Evolution of Education; (3) Education as a right; (4) 
Education as an entitlement; and (5) Education as a privilege. 
The first section will trace the general development of education 
from 1640 to the present; It will concentrate on areas of significant 
development that lend support to education as a right, an entitlement, 
and a prlvl lege. 
The second section will address the concept of education placed 
within the framework of the United States Constitution. The section will 
establish working definitions from which to examine education as a legal 
Issue. 
The third section will examine education as a right; the section 
will concentrate on providing an examination of education as a right us­
ing relevant texts. This section will provide criteria to consider when 
examining education as a legal right. 
The fourth section will address education as an entitlement; this 
section will contain an examination of the available literature and court 
opinions as they relate to establishing education as an entitlement. 
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The fifth section will contain an examination of education as a pri­
vilege; the section will address education's being a protected privilege. 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF PUBLIC EDUCATION 
Public education In the United States has undergone many significant 
changes during the history of our republic. The history of education may 
be divided Into five distinct periods In which the population of the United 
States has been Influenced and affected. These are: 
Colonial Beginnings 1600 - 1840 
Civil War Period 1840 - 1900 
World War II Period 1940 - 1956 
Age of the Baby Boomers 1957 - I960 
The 21st Century and Beyond I960 - 2020 
The educational process has had three distinct Influences that have 
had an Impact, positive and/or negative, upon the learning process In Amer­
ican schools; they are: (1) religion, (2) science, and (3) technology 
and computers. 
In order to provide a cursory examination of the history of education 
and Its Impact on this unique American experience, several Initial points 
of reference must be made. These points provide a guldepost to use In 
trying to understand the full Impact that education has had upon the found­
ing of the republic and of the Impact that It has had upon the lives of 
the average citizen of the United States. 
First, the American colonial cultures were comprised primarily of 
an agrarian society. (3) Second, the United States Constitution was not 
directed to serve or protect the common man of the American colonies; It 
was directed to service the needs of the aristocracy who controlled and 
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operated the American government. (4) Third, education was considered 
to be a privilege of the wealthy aristocracy and Intelllgensla. (5) 
Fourth, education had assumed a more prominent place In the twentieth 
century society than In the seventeenth century. (6) Fifth, James Madi­
son saw education as a function of the state primarily due to the Influ­
ence of Thomas Jefferson. (7) Sixth, states were viewed as Individual 
soverlgn states that guarded their governmental authority jealously. (8) 
Seventh, education as a political force did not emerge significantly 
until after the end of World War II. (9) Finally, from the early 1600s, 
the Individual states were foreslghted enough to Include In their con­
stitutions education as a fundamental right. 
COLONIAL BEGINNINGS 
Early education history was centered prlmarl ly around the towns and 
villages that grew along the Atlantic seaboard. They were scattered with 
great distances between; therefore, education was neither well co-ordlnat 
ed nor consistent. The parents of children joined with the local clergy 
to provide Instruction In reading and arithmetic. The primary Intent of 
the Instruction was to enable the children to read the Bible. As early 
as 1642, Massachusetts required a type of mandatory public school educa­
tion. 
Our European origins may have provided some of the elements of 
modern education, but not the foundation of organization or of 
equality of educational opportunity. It was not until after the 
Colonial period In America that England began to be Interested In 
the education of the poor. Public funding of education was under­
standably not a part of an educational system which provided only 
for the wealthy, the privileged, the aristocratic. <10) 
Education throughout the thirteen colonies ranged from the good In 
the New England area to the non-existent In the southern Georgia area. 
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The types of school available ranged from Informal, small arrangements 
to quite formal and rigid academies. Instruction and the quality of In­
struction ranged from very poor to excellent. 
In New England, the Puritans, (Calvlnlsts) established and main­
tained an educational orientation of lasting Influence. They 
brought with them from England the strong Calvlnlst theory that 
piety was based on Intelligence. To them, education was an Instru­
ment of religious salvation, providing the means by which a person 
might study the Bible, Calvlnlst doctrine, and also the general laws 
of the Commonwealth. It was a rigid system based on their concept 
of the need for the training of the young, who were believed to be 
savage creatures, conceived In sin and treated as miniature adults. 
( 1 1 )  
From an historical point of view, the American colonies generally 
viewed education as a luxury Item for the families of the wealthy busi­
nessmen and the aristocracy. 
The New England attitude was a singular exception, both In this 
country and even abroad. Education was still generally considered 
to be a luxury, not a necessity. To be Illiterate was no reproach, 
and It was possible to follow many pursuits successfully with no . 
more education than that of dally work and experience. (12) 
A law was enacted In 1642 which required parents and guardians . . . 
to attend to their children's ability to read and understand the 
principles of religion and the laws of the Commonwealth. This 
law closely followed the English Poor Law of 1601 which required 
apprenticeship of pauper children. In 1647, the General Court en­
acted the famous 'Ould deluder, Satan Law' which required every 
town of 50 or more families to 'appoint one within their towne to 
teach all such children as shall resort to him to write and reade,' 
and the taw further provided that the teacher's 'wages shall be paid 
either by ye parents or masters of such children, or by ye Inhab­
itants In general ... .' (13) 
These law makers anticipated the future growth of education In the 
New England area. It had been suggested that: 
First, the state could compel education. The Law of 1642 provided 
this precedent, but It did not establish compulsory attendance at 
a school. Second, the state could require civil units to maintain 
teachers. This was done In the Law of 1647, but again there was 
no forced attendance, just 'such children as shall resort to him.' 
Third, both of these laws provided for the supervision and control 
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of education by clvlI authorities. Fourth, permission was granted, 
but no order given to use public funds to support education. Fifth, 
those public funds, If used, could be raised by common taxation of 
all property. (14) 
Although there existed historical precedent for education, It must 
be held that: 
Two other laws previously passed by the General Court In 1634 and 
1638. . . established the principle of common taxation of all prop­
erty for town and color benefits. (15) 
It must be constantly kept In mind that these schools were created 
primarily for religious reasons, especially for the ability to read 
and understand the principles of religion and the capital laws of 
this country. These schools were Indeed a beginning, but were 
severely restricted In matters of curriculum. (16) 
The history of public education In colonial Massachusetts Is es­
sentially the history of education In colonial New England. That 
commonwealth originally embraced what Is now Maine and New Hamp­
shire too, so their systems and practices were used throughout 
the major part of the section. (17) 
In the South and In the middle Atlantic States, the matter of 
education was almost strictly private. There was no school system 
In any colony south of Connecticut before the Revolution. (18) 
The modern belief In education for all, and education's paramount 
Importance Is simply not applicable to the period of the American 
Revolution. The founders of the Republic were educated men . . . 
They held the subject of education to be still a private matter, 
generally under the control of the church. (19) 
The end of the war saw a bankrupt government whose major concern 
was survival. The period from the surrender of Cornwall Is at York-
town In 1781 to the adoption of the Constitution In 1789 was crit­
ical. The Constitution Itself there Is no use of the word 'educa­
tion' nor Is there any reference to the subject. It Is Interesting 
to note that so far as there Is any record of the subject In the 
discussions at the constitutional convention, It was a single 
question relating to the power under the new Constitution to estab­
lish a national university. There was no question or discussion 
about public education. (20) 
The first substantial effort to acknowledge the Importance of educa­
tion came In 1783 with the proposal by Colonel Timothy Pickering that was 
years ahead of Its time and had a lasting Impression upon the citizens of 
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the mid-west. This proposal was the Land Ordinance of 1785 that, In 
part, stated: 
. . .all the surplus lands shall be common property for the State 
and be disposed of for the common good; as for laying out roads, 
creating public buildings, establishing schools and academies. (21) 
In 1787 came the Northwest Ordinance which declared, 
. . . religion, morality and knowledge being necessary to good 
government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of 
education shall forever be encouraged. (22) 
The men In Congress understood the value of education well: 
No state was ever admitted to the Union unless It made educational 
provisions (after 1800). (23) 
In 1802 with the passage of the Ohio Enabling Act which required that 
territory to Include an educational system within the provisions of Its 
constitution, Congress acted consistently with each subsequent state 
admitted to the Union. 
To resolve any ambiguities regarding the authority of the federal 
government regarding education, Presidents Jefferson and Madison 
supported constitutional amendments enunciating an active federal 
role at the elementary and secondary levels and providing for a 
national university. Similarly, In support of a national higher 
education system, James Monroe called for an amendment to provide 
'seminaries for all-Important purposes of diffusing knowledge.' 
Both John Adams and John Qulncy Adams also favored the establish­
ment of a national university. (24) 
Of the twenty-three states In the Union by 1820, only thirteen had 
made any mention of education In their state constitutions. Of 
these, seven - Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, 
New York, Ohio, and Vermont - had laws to provide for the Implemen­
tation of acceptable systems. These were the five Calvin1st New 
England states, plus those most Influenced by settlers from New 
England. (25) 
The common (or public) school movement did not gain hold until the 
I830's. The democratic urges spawned by the presidency of Andrew 
Jackson led to the belief that public education was the foundation 
of a strong democracy; It would permit citizens to be conversant 
with the Issues facing the new country and to make wise judgments; 
It would also be a guard against oligarchy and corruption. The 
South was at least twenty years behind the North and West In devel­
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oping public schools, and restricted educational opportunity only 
to white children. (26) 
THE CIVIL WAR PERIOD 
The second period In the history of education was the period of time 
just prior to the American Civil War to the early period of the 1900s. 
The Morrill Act of 1862 provided each state with land grants of 20,000 
acres per senator and member of Congress, the proceeds from the sale of 
these lands would be used to erect and support agricultural and mechan­
ical colleges. (27) 
The period from 1840 to 1944 produced only modest gains In the area 
of educational rights. The most significant movement noted during this 
period was the shift from education as a church responsibility to that 
of a state responsibility. A long series of wars In Europe during this 
period produced an almost endless wave of Immigrants fleeing the conflicts 
and the poverty associated with them. With each new wave of Immigrants, 
Individual states recognized the limited financial reserves and resources 
of the local churches and assumed more of the responsibilities for pro­
viding educational opportunities. (28) 
POST WORLD WAR I I 
The third period In the history of education was from 1940 - 1956. 
This period was noted for the growing Importance of education. In 1944, 
Congress passed the Servicemen's Readjustment Act, the G. I. Bill, which 
provided financial support for the returning veterans who sought to con­
tinue their education Interrupted by the war. 
In all, 7.8 million World War II veterans made use of the education­
al benefits of this program. . .They were followed by 2.275 million 
Korean War veterans. Most Important Is the precedent that the G. I. 
Bill set regarding federal support of higher education through the 
provision of broadbased student aid. Changed by successive Congresses, 
a descendant version remains as a major source of financial assist­
ance to today's post-secondary students. (29) 
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As the nation emerged from the Second World War, Its Idealism and 
aspirations raised high, the Inequitable features of American Educa­
tion seemed more unacceptable than at any time In the past, though 
the problem of unequal opportunity was no worse than before . , . 
(T)he American crusade against Ignorance required that the opport­
unity for education be made available to all young people, without 
regard to race, creed, national origin, sex, or family background. 
. . . Idealism and aspiration alone were not enough to shake loose 
the shackles of the past; not enough, perhaps, to win the day, but 
enough to stir the nation's opportunity until the right political 
and social circumstances made success possible. (30) 
. . .(A)s early as 1946 and 1947, It was clear that the fast-rising 
birthrate would produce a 'baby boom' that would overwhelm exist­
ing classroom capacity. No less Important than sheer physical need 
was awareness, at least among educational leaders, that the nation 
was entering an age of technological and scientific advance that 
required rising levels of education In order to maintain economic 
growth. (31) 
For the first time since the end of World War II, people of all 
political backgrounds agreed that the national Interest depended 
on Improving the quality of America's schools. (32) 
AGE OF THE BABY BOOMERS 
The fourth period In the history of education was the period of 
time following the launching of the Russian Sputnik In 1957. It has 
been termed th£ period of the "Baby Boomers" or the beginning of the 
"Space Age." This was a period of great turmoil In the schools and In 
education In general. 
The Soviet launch of the worlds' first artificial satellite on 
October 4, 1957 promptly ended the debate that had raged for sever­
al years about the quality of American education. (33) 
In popular parlance, Sputnik had happened not because of what the 
Russians had done but because of what American schools had failed 
to do. (34) 
A crash program was Initiated by Congress under the guise of the National 
Defense Education Act (NDEA) of 1958. Congress used exact language to de­
scribe Its Intent; It stated: 
. . the security of the Nation requires the fullest development of the 
mental resources and technical skills of Its young men and women. 
The present emergency demands that additional and more educational 
opportunities be made available. (35) 
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In 1963, Francis Keppel, U. S. commissioner of education, observed 
that In the past decade, 'more time, talent, and money than ever 
before In history have been Invested In pushing outward the front­
iers of educational knowledge, and In the next decade or two we may 
expect even more significant developments.' (36) 
In 1964 came the Higher Education Act which stated that: 
. . . (E)very child must be encouraged to get as much education as 
he has the ability to take. . . . Higher Education Is no longer 
a luxury, but a necessity. (37) 
During the decade after 1965, political pressures converged on 
schools and universities In ways that undermine their authority 
to direct their own affairs. ... In elementary and secondary 
schools, almost no area of administrative discretion was left un­
contested.... (38) 
Today, all fifty states of the United States mention education In their 
constitutions as being a fundamental Interest or as a right. (39) 
A general outline of the course which resulted In compulsory, free 
school education and therefore compulsory taxation can be divided 
Into four phases. First came the permissive legislation which rec­
ognized the school district as an administrative unit with taxing 
powers. In the second phase the state encouraged the formation of 
school districts by providing financial aid from permanent school 
funds which existed from the various funding plans ... . The 
third phase Introduced the factor or compulsion, but was not the 
last step toward free education. . . . The final phase was the 
passage of legislation providing for the establishment of compul­
sory and completely tax supported public education. (40) 
THE 21ST CENTURY AND BEYOND 
The fifth period In the history of education was the period of time 
at the close of the 1960s and extends Into the 2020s. In 1965, the El­
ementary and Secondary Education Act provided broad-based federal educa­
tion aid. It doubled and doubled again the proportion of the lower ed­
ucation dollar coming from the federal government. Title IV of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 required: 
. . . the assignment of students to public schools and within such 
schools without regard to their race, color, religion or national 
origin. (41) 
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According to Notre Dame University President, Fr. Theodore M. Hesburgh, 
the act, with Its: 
. . . bullt-ln sanctions was able to do (In five Years) what a 
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States was unable to 
do In ten years. (42) 
During the 1970s, a Department of Education was created at the cabinet 
level owing to the Influence of President James Earl Carter. 
From 1642 to 1988, education In the United States has undergone 
giant steps In providing the best access to Information for Its citizens. 
It has been one of the most novel experiments In the history of mankind; 
education was made available to every citizen and non-citizen alike re­
gardless of background, economical resources, abilities, or physical 
handicap. This experiment has not been attempted by any other nation 
on this planet on such a major scale. It appears that the experiment 
has been a tremendous success. It must also be observed that the success 
has not been achieved without conflict. 
From 1642 to 1988, education was witness to a complete change of 
life styles, values, job opportunities, social skills and language usage, 
technologies, sciences, the needs, demands, and organization of the 
various schools and school districts. Education In the American republic 
has witnessed the technological Innovations and progressions from wooden 
sailing ships to manned space exploration. Education has played a vital 
role In this movement by providing opportunities to explore and dream 
the posslbl11 ties. 
One has only to look back five years to observe the technological 
demands and changes In Information flow to appreciate the scope of change 
that has occurred In the last three hundred years. 
Education Is an active participant In the planning and anticipation 
of the Information needs of America's "new" population. The twentieth 
century has conditioned the present population to anticipate change and 
how to apply necessary pressure to obtain the new technology for use In 
the everyday life of the average American citizen. The business and 
Industrial communities are just beginning to experience the new technol­
ogies. 
Education during the twentieth century may be summarized as an experi­
ment In adjustment to constant change. With changes In language, and 
terminology, the sciences, as well as the new technology, education has 
been hard pressed to keep up with the new demands that these changes have 
requl red. 
An examination of education for the twenty first century Is like 
practicing the art of prognostication. Who really knows what will happen 
to education In the years following 2001? Marvin Cetron, In his futur­
istic work, wondered aloud about the future of education during the early 
part of the 20|0s. (43) 
Education In the twenty first century will have new demands and new 
organizations, and new sets of problems. The future, the twenty first 
century, will see: (I) an Age of Leisure. With the popularity and avail­
ability of the personal computer, the American people will have more 
leisure time; (2) an Information Revolution. With more leisure time, In­
dividuals will begin to demand more and more Information on an array of 
topics In various amounts; and (3) an Age of Service Oriented Society. 
The computer revolution has Illustrated clearly that there Is less em­
phasis on heavy Industry and a rapidly growing Importance of service or-
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fen+ed employment In the United States. (44) 
The three areas described have direct Implication for a reexam­
ination of the educational structure and needs of the American population 
and the Important role that education must play. Education In the twenty 
first century will be playing a key role In preparing citizens to function 
In the new society. 
LEGAL EVOLUTION OF EDUCATION 
In order to examine the concept of legal evolution, It Is Important 
to understand what legal means. It Is Important then to understand what 
Is the "law" In order to discover a beginning and to establish a stopping 
point. Legal evolution refers to evolution of laws passed by the Congress. 
It also refers to a body of natural laws that have evolved from the Inter­
actions of men living In a community together; some of these natural 
laws have been taken from England's common laws while others have been 
educed from the early days of the English colonies In North America. 
In the United States of America, the Constitution Is the law of the 
land. It, therefore, Is a document that contains this nation's most funda­
mental law. The Constitution created the Institutions of our government 
and their relationship to each other; It also enumerated the relative 
powers of each of the Institutions and established limits for these powers. 
The Constitution established the three branches of government and the con­
cept of checks and balances In order to prevent a usurpation of power by 
any of the three branches. 
The Constitution Is, In brief, the Instrument by which the consent 
of the governed - the fundamental requirement of any legitimate 
government - Is transformed Into a government complete with 'the 
powers to act and a structure designed to make It act wisely or 
responsibly.' Among Its various 'Internal contrivances' (as James 
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Madison called them) we find federalism, separation of powers, bi­
cameralism, representation, an extended commercial republic, an 
energetic executive, and an Independent judiciary. Together, these 
devices form the machinery of our popular form of government and 
secure the rights of the people. The Constitution, then, Is the 
Constitution, and as such It Is, In Its own words, 'the supreme 
Law of the Land.' (45) 
The law of the Constitution, or constitutional law, is a body of 
law that has resulted from the Supreme Court's adjudications Involving 
disputes over constitutional provisions or doctrines. Constitutional 
law, then, Is what the Supreme Court has Interpreted the Constitution 
to be when evaluating disputes before It. 
There are relatively few statutes that apply, Interpret, and enforce 
themselves; these statutes require officials from governmental bureau­
cracies to Interpret, to apply, and to enforce them. 
This process of Interpretation presents a conflict between the Inter­
preter and the author of the statute. 
The Interpretation of statutes Is . . . not simply a process of 
drawing out of the statute what Its maker put Into It but Is also 
... a process of adjusting the statute to the implicit demands 
and values of the society to which It Is to be applied. In this 
sense It may be said that no enacted law ever comes from Its legis­
lator wholly and fully made. . . . When a court Is confronted with 
contradictory statutes emanating from the same lawmaker It becomes 
Impossible to pretend that the judge (or judges) merely draws from 
the words of the law what the legislator put Into them, for In this 
case what the lawmaker has put Into them Is an unmanageable jumble 
of meaning. . . . (T)he Judge (or judges) must of necessity take 
his guidance from some principle not expressed In the statute them­
selves. (46) 
Alexander Hamilton addressing this unique problem of contradictions of 
the law passed by the legislatures stated: 
As It not uncommonly happens that there are two statutes existing 
at one time, clashing In whole or In part with each other, and neither 
of them containing any repealing clause or expression. In such a 
case It Is the province of the courts to liquidate and fix their 
meaning and operation. . . . . It Is a rule not enjoined upon the 
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courts by legislative provisions, but adopted by themselves, as 
consonant to truth and propriety, for the direction of their con­
duct as Interpreters of the law. They thought It reasonable that 
between the Interfering acts of an equal authority, that which was 
the last Indication of Its will should have the preference. THE 
FEDERALIST, No. 78. (47) 
Fuller stated It another way: 
We have previously pointed out how fallacious It Is to suppose that 
In Interpreting a statute the Judge simply draws out of Its text a 
meaning that the legislature has put there. . . .(T)he power of 
the courts to declare statutes unconstitutional ... Is nowhere 
explicitly conferred on the judiciary by the words of the Constitu­
tion. At best It can be seen as an oblique Implication of words 
primarily addressed to other subjects. The most secure foundation 
for the power does not, however, rest on the text of the Constitution, 
but lies rather In a necessity Implicit In the whole frame of govern­
ment brought Into existence by the Constitution. . . . The power 
had to be and therefore was. (48) 
The constitutional historian, Charles Warren stated that: 
(W)hat's most Important to remember Is that however the (Supreme) 
Court may Interpret the provisions of the Constitution, It Is still 
the Constitution which Is the law, not the decisions of the (Supreme) 
Court. (49) 
. . . (Constitutional Interpretation Is not the business of the 
(Supreme) Court only, but also, and properly, the business of all 
branches of government. (50) 
The Constitution, the original document of 1787 plus Its amendments, 
Is and must be understood to be the standard against which all laws, 
policies and Interpretations must be measured. It Is the consent of 
the governed with which the actions of the governors must be served. 
(51) 
And this also applies to the power of judicial review. For as Justice 
Felix Frankfurter stated: 
The ultimate touchstone of constitutionality Is the Constitution it­
self not what we (the Supreme Court justices) have said about It. (52) 
One of the roles of the United States Supreme Court Is to adjudicate 
state and federal conflicts arising with respect to state rights versus 
federal rights. Article 111 of the Constitution, In part, states: 
The judicial power shall extend to all cases, In law and equity, 
31 
arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States . . ; 
to controversies between two or more states; between a State and 
citizens of another state . . . , and between a State, or the citi­
zens thereof, and foreign States, citizens, or subjects. 
In all cases ... In which a State shall be party, the Supreme Court 
shall have original jurisdiction. In alt the other cases before men­
tioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as 
the law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations 
as the Congress shall make. (53) 
The Constitution also states: 
The enumeration In the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be 
construed to deny or disparage others retained to the States respec­
tively, or to the people. (54) 
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, 
nor prohibited by It to the States, are reserved to the States res­
pectively, or to the people. (55) 
The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to 
extend to any suit In law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against 
one of the United States by citizens of another State, or by citizens 
of any forelgh state. (56) 
. . . No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or Immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall 
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within Its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws. (57) 
Meese, addressing the role of law applied to the judiciary, stated: 
. . .(W)e must understand that the Constitution Is, and must be under­
stood to be, superior to ordinary constitutional law. This distinc­
tion must be respected. To confuse the Constitution with judicial 
pronouncements allows no standard by which to crltlze and to seek 
the overruling of what University of Chicago Law Professor Phillip 
Kurland once called the 'derelicts of constitutional law' - such 
cases as DRED SCOTT and PLESSY v. FERGUSON. To do otherwise, as 
(Abraham) Lincoln said, Is to submit to government by judiciary. 
But such a state could never be consistent with the principles of 
our Constitution. . . . (l)t would be utterly Inconsistent with the 
very Idea of the rule of law to which we, as a people, have always 
subscribed. (58) 
. . . (T)he rule of law Is still the very fundament of our civiliza­
tion, and the American Constitution remains Its crowning glory. (59) 
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Thomas Paine said: 
But If law Is to remain 'king' In America we must Insist that ev­
ery departmnet of our government, every official, and every citi­
zen be bound by the Constitution. That's what It means to be 'a 
nation of laws, not of men.' (60) 
Thomas Jefferson stated that: 
It Is jealousy and not confidence which prescribes limited constitu­
tions to bind down those whom we are obliged to trust with power. 
... In questions of power, then, let no more be heard of confi­
dence In man, but bind him down with mischief by the chains of the 
Constitution. (61) 
EDUCATION AS A RIGHT 
The consideration of a right or a non-right for education Is premised 
upon Implicit historical evidence similar to that of the judicial right to 
declare a state constitutional or unconstitutional. Neither of these 
rights are explicitly mentioned In the United States Constitution. The 
power of education as a constitutionally protected right' Is needed; there­
fore, It must exist. Education occupies a position today during the period 
of the "Information Explosion" as did the judiciary when It created the 
right to "Judicial review." 
In order to prepare Individuals for the conduct and performance of a 
representative form of government, It Is necessary to have a literate and 
competent population from which to draw replacement officials to govern. 
The presence of an Informed and educated population promotes a continuation 
of government and Informed decision making. 
The need Is present, therefore, the right must exist. The fifty states 
have established elaborate bureaucracies and enacted statutes for governing 
the educational processes. Governmental hierarchies are created to educate 
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future leaders and thereby ensure a future government. 
Few Issues bring about more accelerated, directional and Irrational/ 
rational passions than administrative decisions that affect a child In an 
educational setting. The 1987 teacher strikes In the Chicago City school 
system and In Arkansas are examples of passions that education can arouse. 
Trying to close a small school or closing a school with declining enroll­
ment brings about a state of heightened passions from citizens In the 
affected areas. Because they touch Issues that directly affect the family, 
a school or educational Issue cause parents of the school children to act 
and react In a state of heightened emotions. 
Mortimer J. Adler, citing the words of John Dewey, stated: 
. . .  a  d e m o c r a t i c  s o c i e t y  m u s t  p r o v i d e  e q u a l  e d u c a t i o n a l  o p p o r t u n i t y  
not only by giving to all Its children the same quantity of public 
education - the same number of years In school - but also by making 
sure to give to all of them, all with no exceptions, the same quality 
of education. (62) 
Adler stated further that: 
At the beginning of this century, fewer than 10 percent of those of 
an age eligible for high school entered such schools. Today, almost 
100 percent of our children enter ... . It has taken us the better 
part of eighty years to go halfway toward the goal our society must 
achieve If It Is to be a true democracy. The halfway mark was reach­
ed when we finally managed to provide twelve years of basic public 
schooling for all our children. At that point, we were closer to 
the goal that Horace Mann set for us more than a century ago when 
he said: 'Education Is the gateway to equality.' ... We are polit­
ically a classless society. Our citizenry as a whole Is our ruling 
class. We should, therefore, be an educationally cisssless society. 
(63) 
In 1817, long before democracy came to full bloom In this country, 
Thomas Jefferson made a proposal that was radical for his day. He 
advocated three years of common schooling at the public expense for 
all the children of Virginia. But he then divided the children Into 
those destined for labor and those destined for learning. Only the 
latter were to go on further to the local colleges of the time. The 
rest were to toll on the farms as hired hands or In the shops as 
apprentices. In the twentieth century, we demand twelve years of 
34 
common schooling at public expense for every child In the country. 
It Is no longer a radical demand. ... We believe . . . that all 
children are destined for learning, as most are destined for labor 
by their need to earn a livelihood. To live well In the fullest 
human sense Involves learning as well as earning. (64) 
Education Is a right; education Is a legal right. It Is an argu­
ment that has been examined by many scholars from various fields of 
study, van Gee I stated that: 
It Is a central and abiding characteristic of American thought to 
posit the existence of fundamental Individual rights and liberties 
that people simply have as people. These rights and liberties pre­
exist the law and are not rooted In or derived from positive law-
whether that law be the Constitution, the common law, or federal 
and state statutes. (65) 
. . . (N)elther the traditional version of the doctrine of natural 
rights nor the U. S. Constitution has much to say regarding the neg­
ative rights of children to be free from (I) parental vetos of the 
choices the child makes and (2) parental Intrusions Into the child's 
Interest, for Instance, mental and physical Integrity. Similarly, 
the natural rights tradition and the U. S. Constitution have little 
to say regarding a child's affirmative or positive rights to an ed­
ucation vls-a-vls the parents. . . . What we do not find In the 
judicial opinions Is any direct creation of an affirmative constitu­
tional right of children, for example, to an education to be suppli­
ed by their parents. The practical value of such a right would, of 
course, only arise In the unusual circumstance of a state that, 
under the Influence of IIbertarlanlsm, refused either to compel 
parents to educate their children, or, If It did compel some degree 
of formal education, failed to care about the adequacy of the parent­
al educational effort. (66) 
The colony of Massachusetts In 1642 passed the first compulsory ed­
ucation law - a statute that required all parents and masters to 
provide an education both In a trade and In the elements of reading 
to all children under their care. Massachusetts was also the site 
for the first general compulsory attendance law passed In 1852. 
. . Today all states have compulsory attendance taw In place. (67) 
Though serious and plausible constitutional questions may be raised 
about particular details of a state's compulsory education policy . 
. . the courts have teft no room to doubt that they wllI read the 
Constitution as permitting states to Impose legal duties on parent 
and child alike to see to It that the child attends some minimum 
amound of formal schooling. (68) 
Citing the court In STEPHENS v. BONGART, 15 N. J. Misc. 80, 189 A. 
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131 (Juv. 4 Dom. Rel. Ct. 1937), van Gee I Stated: 
If It Is within the police power of the state to regulate wages, 
to legislate respecting housing conditions In crowded cities, to 
prohibit dark rooms In tenement houses, to compel landlords to 
place windows In their tenements which will enable their tenants 
to enjoy the sunshine, It Is within the police power of the state 
to compel every resident of New Jersey so to educate his children 
that the light of American Ideals will permeate the life of our 
future citizens. (69) 
In DELCONTE v. NORTH CAROLINA, 308 S.E. 2d 898 at 904 (NC 1983), 
reversed on other grounds, 329 S.E. 2d 637 (NC 1983), the court stated 
that: 
. . . the State has no means by which to Insure that children who 
are at home are receiving an education. (70) 
In addressing the unique relationship between the federal and state 
governments, van Geel stated that: 
The judiciary has not stood In the way of Increased federal and 
state control of education, but had Instead recognized the constitu­
tional permissibility of Involvement, especially federal, In educa­
tion. ... Though the federal government Is In theory a govern­
ment of delegated, enumerated, and limited powers, state govern­
mental authority Is Inherent, not enumerated but plenary, and limit­
ed only by such external checks as the civil rights and liberties 
protected by the U. S. and state constitutions. States derive 
their authority from the tenth amendment ... . (71) 
Addressing the power of the state to govern the exercise of the 
process of educating the youth of the state, van Geel made several assump' 
tlons of the power of the state to control access to education. He 
stated that: 
State power over education Is part of the states' sovereign police 
powers that repose In and are exercised by the state legislature. 
Abundant judicial opinions support the proposition that It Is the 
state legislature that enjoys the preeminent authority to control 
public elementary, secondary, and higher education In the state by 
setting up a system of public educational Institutions and arrang­
ing for Its financing and regulation. It Is Important to stress 
that while the federal Constitution assumes state authority over 
education, It does not Impose an affirmative obligation on the state 
to establish a public school system; however, the people of all 
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states . . . have, through the states' own constitutions, Imposed 
just such a duty. (72) 
. . .  ( A )  R I G H T  I s  '  . . .  a n  I n t e r e s t  p r o t e c t e d  b y  l a w . '  C o u r t s  .  
. .will protect a 'fundamental Interest.' (73) 
It has generally been held that a right Is an Interest that Is morally, 
ethically, and legally just. A duty follows the creation of a right. 
The right carries with It an obligation to fulfill the Intent of the 
Interest. For the purpose of this study, It Is asserted that a "right" 
Is equivalent to an "Interest.'' With this Is Intended the assertion of 
a fundamental "right," or a "fundamental Interest" for an Individual 
cltlzen. 
Roscoe Pound Identified three classes of Interests which the Supreme 
Court has held are "legally protected." They are: (I) Individual In­
terests; (2) public Interests; and (3) social Interests. (74) 
All three classes seem to have a place for education; and some 
courts have held that education Is a 'fundamental Interest.' A 
RIGHT Is related to an INTEREST as the FORTRESS Is to the PROTECTED 
LAND.' (75) 
Rights which are specified In state and federal constitutions are 
said to be 'constitutionally secure,' and are given added protec­
tion by the courts. Interests which are characterized as 'fund­
amental' are likewise afforded this added protection. (76) 
Should not the rights retained by people under the ninth amendment be 
entitled to the same protection? 
The principal difference therefore between constitutional RIGHT and 
a 'fundamental Interest' Is that one Is specified In the constitution 
while the other Is not; the preferred treatment afforded both Is 
essentially the same. This led Justice Harlan to protest the prac­
tice of judges who 'pick out particular human activities, character­
ize them as fundamental, and then give them added protection under 
an unusually stringent equal protection test' - even where such act­
ivities are not shown to be arbitrary or Irrational and where they 
are 'NOT MENTIONED IN THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.' (77) 
EDUCATION AS A 'POWER' OF THE STATE OR THE PEOPLE: Those POWERS not 
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited 
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by 1+ to the States, are ' . . . reserved to the States respect­
ively, or to the people. The power over education Is not one of 
the powers delegated by the Constitution to the United States, 
nor Is It prohibited to the States; hence It Is one of the powers 
reserved to the States or to the people.' (78) 
RIGHTS retained by the people are enumberated In the Ninth Amend­
ment (to the U. S. Constitution): 'The enumeration In the Constitu­
tion of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or dls-
parange others retained by the people. (79) 
'Obtaining an education' Is not among the rights enumerated In the 
Constitution; hence, It may be one of the OTHER RIGHTS retained by 
the people . . . under the Ninth Amendment. (80) 
Obtaining an education as one of the fundamental rights retained by 
the people under the language of the ninth amendment to the United States 
Constitution Is not a new nor a recent concept. The following are a 
sample of Individuals and a university law review that have explored this 
Idea: Bertelsman (81), Black (82), Franklin (83), Franklin (84), Kunter 
(85), Temple University Law Note (86), Patterson (87), and Redllck (88). 
In PALMER v. THOMPSON, the court held that: 
Rights, not explicitly mentioned In the Constitution, have at times 
been deemed so elementary In our way of life that they have been 
labeled as basic rights ... . There Is of course, not a word 
In the constitution . . . concerning the right of the people to ed­
ucation or to work or to recreation by swimming or otherwise. Those 
rights, like the right to pure air and pure water may well be 
rights ' retained by the people' under the Ninth Amendment. (89) 
. . . (T)he Ninth Amendment ' . . . shows a belief of the Constitu­
tion's authors that fundamental rights exist that are not expressly 
enumerated In the first eight amendments, and an Intent that the 
list of rights Included there not be deemed exhaustive.' (90) 
The only reported 'case' ever to discuss a claim based solely on 
the Ninth Amendment was RYAN v. TENNESSEE. (91) However, the com1-
plalnt failed to present a factual situation to the court or to 
state a controversy or Issue between the parties, and contained as 
Its only prayer for relief a request that the court make an abstract 
ruling concerning the construction and effect of the Ninth Amend­
ment. The court therefore did not have the opportunity to explain 
the proper application of the amendment. (92) 
38 
The court In RYAN v. TENNESSEE said that: 
. . . (!)t cannot be presumed that any clause In the Constitution 
Is Intended to be without effect. (93) 
tn Interpreting the Constitution, . . real effect should be 
given to all the words It used." (94) 
An examination of the classification of Interests proposed by 
Pound provides an opportunity to discover elements that explain the 
nature of an Interest. It provides Insight to what elements must be 
present In an activity and the compelling nature of the activity to 
the Individual, the public, and the society that compels the Supreme 
Court to declare the activity to be of "fundamental Interest" status, 
or a protected "right." 
Pound held that Individual Interests, public Interests, and social 
Interests were three classifications that the Supreme Court has held as 
being legally protected. 
INDIVIDUAL INTEREST 
. . . (T)he right Is the liberty, not the value . . .to anyone of 
having or exercising that liberty. Thus In the view that rights 
entail liberties, the most liability rules can secure Is a level 
of welfare equal to the value of the right (or rights) bearer's 
Interest, Including even his Interest In his autonomy. (95) 
What then has convinced the Supreme Court to Identify and classify 
an Interest as being fundamental? What Is In the nature of the cases 
that render an Interest as being an Individual "fundamental Interest?" 
The following represent the thinking and rationale that the Supreme 
Court at that time used to justify the classification. The question of 
a "fundamental Interest" In: the nature of voting (96); the criminal 
process (97); the national origin (98); 
39 
guaranteed counsel for a prisoner (99); prohibition of comment from the 
court and prosecution against the accused's use of the fifth amendment 
(100); access to a counsel by an Indigent (101); the explanation of 
criminal rights (102); the federal court's deciding valid an Individual 
state statute (103); Invalidation of a university's soeclal admission 
program (104); custody of an Individual that does not Include Interroga­
tion (105); the right to have an abortion (106); the declaration that 
public schools are the most Important function of state and local govern­
ments (107); and the power of courts to determine functions of state 
governments (108) Is deserving of considerable examination. 
From the cited examples, the Supreme Court has not had an opportu­
nity to establish a clear procedure or theory that can be usee! to Ident­
ify consistently what Is a "fundamental Interest" or a "fundamental 
right," and what Is not. 
Perhaps the most striking example of the (Supreme) Court's acknow­
ledgement of Its fundamental Incapacity to 'resolve' Issues or de­
clare rules that can be consistently followed arose recently In 
GARCIA v. SAN ANTONIO METROPOLITAN TRANSIT AUTHORITY (1985). . . 
. The process of trying to do Justice In each case had led to a 
recognition of the uncertainty principle - THAT NO TEST COULD 
PRODUCE CONSISTENT, just RESULTS. Moreover, the (Supreme) Court 
concluded that no other test would produce better results. 
Graham and Kravltt attempted to explain the methodology that the 
Court had used In reaching a decision on classifying a "fundamental 
Interest." 
. . .  ( A )  s u s p e c t  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  o r  a  f u n d a m e n t a l  I n t e r e s t  .  .  .  
Is often sufficient to trigger a strict standard of review. The 
ability of one ... to compel more stringent review rests upon 
the . . . Importance of an Interest. While the (Supreme) Court's 
treatment suggests distinct dividing lines, In reality there exists 
continued use of suspectness and fundamental Ity. (110) 
Graham and Kravltt used "fundamentalIty of an Interest" and the 
"suspectness of a classification" to define a synerglstlcal function. 
From a contextual application, the following definitions aid In the 
discussion of fundamental Interest Issues. 
FUNDAMENTAL!TY OF AN INTEREST - Is the Importance the Interest holds 
for an Individual and the value that It holds for the total society In 
Its historical significance. 
SUSPECT OF A CLASSIFICATION - Is the stigma that Is attached to be­
ing placed Into a given classification; It Is also the resulting major-
Itarlan abuses as a result of this classification. 
SYNERGISTICAL FUNCTION - Is both Items, fundamental Ity and suspect, 
acting In conert to produce a total effect of fundamentalIty. 
. . . (T)he major rational la which serve both to justify and to 
define fundamental Ity of an Interest or the suspectness of a class­
ification function synerglstlcally. (Ill) 
Following the SERRANO decision, a two-tiered test had been evolved 
by the federal court for measuring legislative classifications against 
the Supreme Court's Interpretation of the language of the fourteenth 
amendment. 
The two-tiered test was: 
A LENIENT TEST -
Under this . . . lenient formula, not only Is legislation under 
review granted a presumption of constitutionality, but classif­
ications drawn by the challenged statute need only bear some 
rational relation to any Imaginable legitimate state purpose. (112) 
A STRICT SCRUTINY - Is a standard of active review thereby subjecting 
such classification to strict scrutiny. 
The state must prove not only that a 'compelling Interest' justifies 
the classification, but that the distinctions drawn are necessary 
to accomplish the statute's purpose. The state must demonstrate 
that there are no reasonable alternative means of accomplishing the 
stated purpose without discriminating, and that the classification 
Is neither Impermlsslvely overbroad nor underlnclus!ve. (II3) 
Strict Scrutiny . . . required faml liar judicial balancing; the 
Court must weigh (I) benefits accruing to society If the class­
ification Is sustained against (2) Importance of the Individual 
or group rights Infringed and (3) long term adverse effects on 
those Interests. (114) 
The Graham and Kravltt thesis Is germane. (115) If strict scrutiny 
examination Is required, what determines: 
(1) The benefits accruing to a society? Who Is to determine what 
these benefits are; who Is to determine the amount of the benefit and 
the distinct section of the society to be benefited? If a court Is to 
rely upon an expert testimony, who choses the expert? 
(2) Importance of the Individual or group rights Infringed? The 
Constitution makes no distinction; the perception of the Importance of 
one right having greater welght In judicial review Is a cyclical Inter­
pretation. What criteria are to be used to aid a court In determining 
soctal points affecting Individual rights within and without the frame­
work of the Constitution? 
(3) Long term adverse effect on these Interests? 
Schools are run for the benefit of children, not the professional 
s t a f f ,  a n d  t h e  p u b l i c  h a s  t h e  r i g h t  t o  e x p e c t  t h a t  e d u c a t o r s  w i l l  
take stern measures to protect children from Instructional mal­
practice. (116) 
The United States Supreme Court has noted that 'the ultimate wis­
dom ... of education Is not likely to be divined for all time 
even by the scholars who now so earnestly debate the Issues. (117) 
The education of children is of vital Importance; children are the 
future, the hope of the nation. 
PUBLIC INTEREST 
The Supreme Court has examined such diverse public Interests as 
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telephone, electricity, automobiles, highway access, employment, welfare 
benefits, mass transportation, libraries, and motion pictures; It has 
held that they hold an unique public Interest. The Supreme Court has 
held that they occupy an unique position that they may be considered 
holding special "fundamental Interest" status. 
There exists a similar argument for public Interest as was present­
ed for an Individual Interest. Pound held that there existed an equity 
In an examination of Individual and public Interests. TTie right to an 
education at public expense occupies a similar position to that of Inter­
state transportation when considered In relation to the public Interest. 
SOCIETAL INTEREST 
Pound holds that societal Interests require special consideration 
when viewed from the context of constitutional consideration to such a 
degree that they hold "fundamental Interest" status. Societal interests 
such as those contained In the areas of Immunization, Immigration, natur­
alization, desegratlon, voting, and welfare are viewed by the Supreme 
Court as occupying special and distinct consideration. They reflect the 
long term effect that certain Individual and publtc Interests have upon 
the future Interests of the greater portion of the American society. 
The Supreme Court In AMBACK v. NORWICK (118) held that education 
was ". . . the primary vehicle for transmitting 'the values on which our 
society rests.'" In BRANDON v. BOARD OF EDUCATION (119), the Court-
stated that "Schools Instill In kids' an appreciation of critical reason­
ing, a commitment to democratic Institutions, and a dedication to prin­
ciples of fairness.'" The Supreme Court In GRIFFIN v. COUNTY SCHOOL 
BOARD (120) held that " Whatever nonraclal grounds might support a 
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state's allowing a county to abandon public schools, the object must be 
a constitutional one . . ." 
Justice Felix Frankfurter summarized the feeling of societal Int­
erests In McCOLLUM v. BOARD OF EDUCATION. (121) The Court In ILLINOIS, 
ex. re!. McCOLLUM v. BOARD OF EDUCATION held that public schools were" . 
. . the symbol of our democracy and the most pervasive means for promot­
ing our common destiny." 
It Is valid to examine the case for educational rights or as a 
concept of "fundamental Interest" through the use of the Importance that 
education possesses regarding Individual, public, and societal Interests. 
The value of education to the Individual Is almost undeniable. It 
Is potentially an aid to any member of society In his attempt to 
succeed In a given career and In his development as a mature human 
being. Its ramifications are economic, social, and cultural. . . 
. (I)ts Immediate Impact Is often uncertain or even remote (owing 
to the process). Although It may be concluded that potentially 
education Is the most Important civil right, at any given moment 
one may not feel acutely Its presence or absence, or Its superior­
ity or Inferiority. (122) 
Cohen stated that: 
. . . (I)t would seem that as long as education functions to aid 
some groups In social advancement, and as long as current systems 
potentially can be restructured to aid more groups, It should not 
be written off as a tool for (social) reform. There Is no over­
abundance of social mechantsms to replace education as a means of 
securing social Integration and upwardmoblIIty for members of minor­
ity groups. (123) 
Coons, Clune, and Sugarman stated that: 
. . . education should be found at least as fundamental as the 
criminal process because children, as a class, are more deserving 
than criminal defendants . . (They) . . . raise the more rational 
argument that whatever the status of education as a fundamental In­
terest, or wealth as a suspect category, children, as a class, deserve 
constitutionally preferred treatment. (The authors) . . . begin with 
the proposition that as our ethical heritage treats children as be­
ing morally equal, each child deserves equal treatment. Turning 
to precedent, they observe that several lines of cases have seemed 
to carve out a 'welfare Interest' In children which the state may 
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protect even at the expense of curbing what would be considered 
Important-clvlI liberties to an adult. (124) 
Tradition Is no more unchanging than the society that generates 
It. In BROWN, Chief Justice Warren specifically rejected the claim 
that blacks' rights to equal educational opportunity must be 
measured In terms of society's conception of the Importance of ed­
ucation In 1868. The equal protection clause speaks to the role of 
education In society today. While one may read DANDRIDGE to say 
that the Supreme Court will not extend the principle of fundamental 
Interests to Include new rights, the very principles Its author ex-
pouses would seem to Imply that the concept both can and should be 
extended. (125) 
DANDRIDGE may thus be distinguished from education cases on the 
basis of the greater "tradition" of public education. While the 
notion of a right to education only began to gain popular accept­
ance In the nlnteenth century ( and only formally In state constitu­
tions, as opposed to the federal Constitution), the concept of a 
right to welfare Is of even more recent origin. Under Justice 
Stewart's criteria, therefore, education would possess a superior 
claim to fundamental Ity. It is also possible to distinguish educa­
tion from welfare by arguing that welfare's societal value Is less 
Integrative or preservative than that of education and In that 
sense Is less synergistic. (126) 
. . . (W)hlle there Is no controlling precedent, the logic of 
what precedents exist, with the exception of DANDRIDGE, and the 
Implications of the concept of a fundamental Interest necessitate 
making education an Interest equal to that of voting, criminal 
process, procreation, or travel. . . . (0)ne may not suffer the 
poignant personal detriment of being denied liberty or the ability 
to procreate, no doubt many feel a greater personal Interest In 
education than In voting or travel. . . . (T)he preservative and 
Integrative role of education for society has been amply demon­
strated. In this societal strand of . . . (demands created by 
that society) It would seem that only voting has a greater claim 
to superiority. (127) 
Both SERRANO and VAN DUSARTZ, therefore, have legitimately ex­
tended the concept of a fundamental Interest to Include a commodity -
education - of Increasing Importance In society. The Inclusion of 
education In the class of fundamental Interests Is the most signif­
icant addition to data, for while the previously recognized fund­
amental Interests have traditionally been thought of as rights, not 
commodities, education has often been both conceived of and priced 
by society as a commodity. If education Is a fundamental Interest, 
perhaps other commodities may likewise be elevated to that status. 
(128)  
The CAHILL court citing the California court decision In SERRANO v. 
PRIEST stated that: 
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The term "fundamental right" has not been defined. It Is urged 
that education was so denominated In BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION 
where the Court said that "Today, education Is perhaps the most 
Important function of state and local governments," and that "Such 
an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide It, Is a 
right which must be made available to all on equal terms." (129) 
The best argument for the Inclusion of education as a "fundamental 
Interest or right" Is found In SERRANO v. PRIEST, 487 p. 2d 1241 (1971). 
The court satisfied that the concept of acquiring an education was pos­
sessed of enough merit to be granted "fundamental Interest" or "fund­
amental right" status. The court stated that: 
We are convinced that the distinctive and priceless function of 
education In our society warrants, Indeed compels, our treating 
It as a "fundamental Interest." (130) 
The SERRANO court gave five valid reasons for this historic class­
ification of education as a fundamental right. They were: 
1. Education Is essential to maintaining democracy. 
First, education Is essential In maintaining what several com­
mentators have termed "free enterprise democracy" - that Is, pre­
serving an Individual's opportunity to compete successfully In 
the economic market place, despite a disadvantaged background. 
Accordingly, the public schools of this state (California) are 
the bright hope for entry of the poor and the oppressed Into the 
mainstream of American society. (131) 
2. Education Is relevant. 
Second, education Is universally relevant. Not every person 
finds It necessary to call upon the fire department or even the 
police In an entire lifetime. Relatively few are on welfare. 
Every person, however, benefits from education. (132) 
3. Education Is perpetual. 
Third, public education continues over a lengthy period of life -
between 10 and 13 years. Few other government services have such 
sustained, Intensive contact with the recipient. (133) 
4. Education molds the next generation. 
Fourth, education Is unmatched In the extent to which It molds the 
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personality of the youth of society. While police and fire pro­
tection, garbage collection and street lights are essentially 
neutral In their effect on the Individual psyche, public educa­
tion actively attempts to shape a child's personal development In 
a manner chosen not by the child or his parents but by the state. 
f(T)he Influence of school Is not oonflned to how well It can teach 
the disadvantaged child; It also has a significant role to play 
In shaping the student's emotional and psychological make-up." 
(134) 
5. Education has been made compulsory by the states. 
Finally, education Is so Important that the state has made It 
compulsory - not only In the requirement of attendance but also 
by assignment to a particular district and school. (135) 
All states of the United States have classified education as a 
"fundamental right" and a "fundamental Interest." The following are 
the state constitutional provisions that provide for the establishment 
and maintenance of public schools In the respective states. 
ALABAMA, Constitution article 14, section 256 (1819) 
ALASKA, Constitution article 7, section I (1959) 
ARIZONA, Constitution article II, section I (1912) 
ARKANSAS, Constitution article 14, section I (1836) 
CALIFORNIA, Constitution article 9, section 5 (1850) 
COLORADO, Constitution article 9, section 2 (1876) 
CONNECTICUT, Constitution article 8, section I (1788) 
DELAWARE, Constitution article 10, section I (1787) 
FLORIDA, Constitution article II, section I (1845) 
GEORGIA, Constitution article 8, section 8 (1788) 
HAWAII, Constitution article 9, section I (1959) 
IDAHO, Constitution article 9, section I (1890) 
ILLINOIS, Constitution article 8, section I (1818) 
INDIANA, Constitution article 8, section I (1816) 
IOWA, Constitution article 9, section 12 (1846) 
KANSAS, Constitution article 6, section I (1861) 
KENTUCKY, Constitution article section 183 (1792) 
LOUISIANA, Constitution article 12, section I (1812) 
MAINE, Constitution article 8, section I (1820) 
MARYLAND, Constitution article 8, section I (1788) 
MASSACHUSETTS, Constitution article part 2, chapter 5, section 2 (1788) 
MICHIGAN, Constitution article 8, section 2 (1837) 
MINNESOTA, Constitution article 8, section I (1858) 
MISSISSIPPI, Constitution article 9, section 201 (1817) 
MISSOURI, Constitution article 9, section la (1821) 
MONTANA, Constitution article II, section I (1889) 
NEBRASKA, Constitution article 7, section 6 (1867) 
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NEVADA, Constitution article II, section I (1864) 
NEW HAMPSHIRE, Constitution article part II, section 83 (1788) 
NEW JERSEY, Constitution article 8, section 4 (1787) 
NEW MEXICO, Constitution article 12, section I (1912) 
NEW YORK, Constitution article II, section I (1788) 
NORTH CAROLINA, Constitution article 9, section 2 (1789) 
NORTH DAKOTA, Constitution article 8, section 148 (1889) 
OHIO, Constitution article 6, section 2 (1803) 
OKLAHOMA, Constitution article 13, section I (1907) 
OREGON, Constitution article 8, section 3 (1859) 
PENNSYLVANIA, Constitution article 3, section 14 (1787) 
RHODE ISLAND, Constitution article 12, section I (1790) 
SOUTH CAROLINA, Constitution article II, section 12 (1788) 
SOUTH DAKOTA, Constitution article 8, section I (1889) 
TENNESSEE, Constitution article II, section 12 (1796) 
TEXAS, Constitution article 7, section I (1845) 
UTAH, Constitution article 10, section I (1896) 
VERMONT, Constitution article chapter 2, section 64 (1791) 
VIRGINIA, Constitution article 9, section 129 (1788) 
WASHINGTON, Constitution article 9, section 2 (1889) 
WEST VIRGINIA, Constitution article 12, section I (1863) 
WISCONSIN, Constitution article 10, section 3 (1848) 
WYOMING, Constitution article 7, section I (1890) (136) 
Education Is a "fundamental right" on a par with the rights of 
voting and procreation. It has been classified by the fifty states of 
the United States as a "right" so Important to have been Included as 
such In the fifty state constitutions. (137) 
EDUCATION AS AN ENTITLEMENT 
Onan defined the entitlement as a complete right to something once 
a person had shown that he or she had met the legal requirement to get 
It. (138) A legal entitlement Is predicated on the Individual state 
constitutions that clearly and legally specify the legal and constitutional 
position that educatton occupies at the state and local levels. However, 
on the federal level, the legal entitlement to an education Is tenuous 
at best. 
Calabresl and Me lamed described a framework from which to explore 
the method of securing legal entitlements. They discussed three ways of 
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protecting entitlements: (I) property rules; (2) liability rules: and 
(3) Inalienability rules. (139) 
PROPERTY RULES. 
(They) . . . enable the right bearer to enjoin others from reduc­
ing the level of protection the entitlement affords him, except 
as he may be willing to forgo It at a mutually acceptable prtce. 
(140) 
LIABILITY RULES. 
. . .  ( A )  n o n e n t l t l e d  p a r t y  m a y  r e d u c e  t h e  v a l u e  o f  t h e  e n t i t l e m e n t  
without regard to the right holder's desires, provided he compen­
sates ex post for the reduction In value. . . . (I)ndlvlduals who 
value entitlements more than those without ex ante negotiations. . 
. . . (T)he entitlement Is secured by the party who most values 
It, thus duplicating the outcome of the Coasean market exchange 
process. (In this market, the right to use a resource would have 
been secured ultimately by that party who would have paid the most 
for It.) (141) 
INALIENABILITY RULES. 
When a right Is protected by an Inalienability rule, transfers of 
any sort are prohibited. The right to one's freedom from servi­
tude and the right to vote are examples of rights protected by 
Inaltenablllty rules. On first blush, protecting a right by an 
Inalienability rule appears to be a decision foregoing efficiency 
In favor of promoting some oth«r social good. ... (A) willing­
ness to exchange a right, like freedom from servitude, for money 
may Indicate a lack either of fulI Information or of rationality. 
(142) 
Coleman and Kraus Indicated that courts have used the Calabresl-
Melamed framework and SPUR INDUSTRIES, INC. v. WEBB, 108 ARIZ. 178, 
494 P. 2d 700 (1972), as methods In establishing and securing legal 
entitlements. (143) 
A perfectly natural way of characterizing what It means to have a 
right to a resource or to property Is In terms of autonomy or 
control. Rights . . . demarcate a realm of liberty or control. 
Rights are secured or protected liberties. (144) 
This Is the view ... of Charles Fried: 'The regime of contract 
law, which respects the dispositions Individuals make of their rights, 
carries to Its natural conclusion the liberal premise that Individ­
uals have rights. (145) 
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The point of conferring an entitlement arguably Is to secure a 
domain of control, not to guarantee a particular level of welfare 
or utility. One who conceives of rights as securing a sphere of 
liberty does not believe that the concept of a right Is reducible 
to or otherwise Identifiable with a point on a right bearer's 
Indifference curve. The liberty attendant rights ownership Is 
not equivalent to any particular level of welfare . . . .(146) 
If rights entail or secure liberties, then It Is hard to see how 
liability rules protect them. . . . (L)lability rules protect 
something. Compensation under a liability rule Is for harm done 
and loss suffered. The loss Is the diminution In value of one's 
resources . . . one's property. In this sense the 'objective' 
value of one's holdings Is protected by liability rules; the 
value of the Interest Is left Intact. But a liability rule con­
fers no liberty or autonomy on an entitled party, and therefore 
secures no such liberty. . . . (T)he right Is the liberty, not 
the value (I. e. utility) to anyone of having or exercising that 
liberty. . . . CI)n the view that rights entail liberties, the 
most liability rules can secure Is a level of welfare equal to the 
value of the right bearer's Interest, Including even his Interest 
In his autonomy. . . . Rights secure a domain of autonomy. Lia­
bility rules permit others to act without regard to the right 
holder's autonomy over his holdings. . . . (A) right Is a domain 
of protected control, . . . liability rules protect rights. (147) 
The Supreme Court, In GOSS v. LOPEZ (148), held that education 
could be considered as a legal entitlement; the Supreme Court recog­
nized this entitlement to an education at the public's expense owing 
to the state's creation of an educational right. (149) 
EDUCATION AS A LEGAL PRIVILEGE 
Education Is a privilege. The privilege to obtain an education at 
pub lie expense Is conditioned upon an Individual state's constitutional 
provisions relevant to the fundamental status of a class of Individuals. 
By passage of compulsory attendance laws, forty nine states have created 
a special educational class; this class Is comprised of Individuals be­
tween the ages of six and eighteen years of age. All fifty states have 
confirmed the educational privilege upon this class and have enacted 
appropriate state-level legislation to facilitate the performance and 
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evaluation of this privilege. 
GlfIs stated that a privilege was: 
An advantage not enjoyed by all; 'a particular or peculiar bene­
fit enjoyed by a person, company, or class beyond the common ad­
vantage of other citizens; an exceptional or extroardlnary exemp­
tion; or an Immunity held beyond the course of the law. And, 
again. It Is defined to be an exemption from some burden or attend­
ance, with which certain persons are Indulged, from a supposition 
of the law that their public duties or services, or the offices In 
which they are engaged, are such as required all their time and 
care, and that therefore, without this Indulgence, those duties 
could not be performed to that advantage which the public good 
demands.' (150) 
van GeeI has maintained that the federal judiciary at all levels 
has not Impeded the Increased federal and state control and Involvement 
In education. He stated that the federal Judiciary has "... recog­
nized the constitutional permissibility of Involvement, especially 
federal, In education." (151) 
Graham and Kravltt stated that: 
If a court now determines that society has begun to recognize 
that denial of a new Interest such as education rivals the personal 
and societal detriment created by denial of more traditionally 
recognized rights, It would seem that the court should label such 
an Interest fundamental and treat It as a right. (152) 
William van Alstyne provided a description of the privilege con­
cept. He cited Justice Oilver WendelI Holmes' rlght-orlvllege distinc­
tion to provide an understanding of the privilege concept. He stated 
that: 
The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, 
but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman. (153) 
van Alstyne argued that since Justice Holmes first enumerated the 
rlght-prlvllege distinction In McAUUFFE v. MAYOR OF NEW BEDFORD, 
The Court has been seeking to refute the Implication that the 
government may arbitrarily regulate any Interest In which a 
citizen does not have specifically enumerated rights. He further 
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reasons that It has been most successful under the rubric of 
equal protection where It has, In effect, allowed the equal pro­
tection clause to swallow all of the old doctrines of substantive 
due process. Rather, the Court defines sufficiently Important 
private Interests, such as voting In REYNOLDS or felony appeals In 
DOUGLAS, and protects these from arbitrary governmental Interfer­
ence. He concludes that the extension of the private Interests that 
deserve protection Is Justified by the 'substantial Influence 
which expanded governmental activity gives the government over 
the private lives of Its citizenry.' (154) 
van Alstyne further stated that: 
As the structure of society has changed, so too have those Interests 
that deserve special protection. (155) 
Citing the work of Justice Holmes, van Alstyne stated that: 
Justice Holmes, speaking for the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court In McAULIFFE v. MAYOR OF NEW BEDFORD, 155 MASS 216, 29 N.E. 
517 (1892) . . . dispatched the petition of a policeman who had 
been fired for violating a regulation which restricted his politi­
cal activities: ' The petitioner may have a constitutional right 
to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a 
policeman.' (156) 
van Alstyne stated that: 
. . . Justice Holmes had occasion to confirm this conception of 
the scope of constitutional protection In upholding the conviction 
of a preacher who had violated a municipal ordinance In presenting 
a public address on the Boston Commons without securing a permit 
from the mayor. Holmes stated: 'For the legislature absolutely or 
conditionally to forbid public speaking In a highway or public 
park Is no more an Infringement of the rights of a member of the 
public than for the owner of a private house to forb'ld It In his 
house. When no proprietary rlqht Interferes, the Legislature may 
end the right of the public to enter upon the public place by 
putting an end to the dedication to public uses. So It may take 
the lesser step of limiting the public use to certain purposes.' 
(157) 
van Alstyne stated: 
Thus, It was as though Justice Holmes merely restated his earlier 
epigram: 'the defendant may have a constitutional right to talk 
religion, but he has no constitutional right to use the Boston 
Commons.' (158) 
It Is this distinction that William van Alstyne holds Is Important 
to consider. He stated that: 
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This tough-minded distinction between constitutionally protected 
rights of private citizens and unprotected governmental privileges 
has been applied to defeat a great variety of claims associated 
with government employment or other forms of largesse. (159) 
Using the epigram of Justice Holmes as a model, van Alstyne cited 
several examples to mark the clear distinction between a right and a 
privilege. He stated that: 
An Impoverished couple actually domiciled In a state should still 
have no complaint against a one-year residence required for wel­
fare recipients: one may have a right to equal protection, but 
he has no right to public welfare. And certainly public univer­
sity students summarily expelled or suspended should have no con­
stitutional grounds for reinstatement, for It must be equally clear 
that while petitioners may have a right to procedural due process, 
they have no right to be educated at public expense. (160) 
The state Is not bound by the federal Constitution to provide an 
education to Its citizens at the public's expense. In the rlght-prlv-
llege distinction applied to education, van Alstyne argued that the state 
chose to provide publcally funded education to Its citizens and did 
so under the jurisdiction of Its own laws not those of the federal govern 
ment. He provided several examples to consider; they are: 
(Compare HAMILTON v. REGENTS OF UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, 293 US 245 
at 262 (1934) - requirement to take military science course as 
condition of enrollment upheld, with DIXON v. ALABAMA STATE BOARD 
OF EDUCATION, 294 F. 2d 150 (5th Clr.), cert, denied, 368 US 930 
(1961) - procedural due process required for expulsion of students 
In good standing at tax-supported college.) (161) 
van Alstyne stated that: 
. . . (W)hen the petitioner's primary Interest In the public sector 
could not be characterized as a 'right1 entitled to protection on 
grounds of substantive due process, courts have nonetheless found 
some other Implicated right to sustain the claim. Alternatively, 
they have granted relief through recourse to constitutional provis­
ions which operate Irrespective of whether what Is Involved Is 
deem a privilege, rather than a right. (162) 
van Alstyne stated: 
As an 'exception' to the rlght-prlvllege distinction, the doctrine 
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(of unconstitutional conditions) seems to be a very broad one 
which Is subject only to one major limitation: the petitioner 
must demonstrate that the condition of which he complains Is un­
reasonable In the special sense that It prohibits or abridges 
the exercise of a right protected by an explicit provision In 
the Constitution. (163) 
In explaining the differences that he observed, van Alstyne 
stated that: 
There are all sorts of difficulties In trying to make sense of 
such a distinction, for reasonable persons may surely disagree 
as to which provisions are 'explicit.' But see UNITED STATES v. 
LOVETT, 328 US 303 at 321 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
One might also wonder why the doctrine of unconstitutional con­
ditions should be confined to rights which are more or less ex­
plicitly described, and why It does not extend equally to rights 
worked out by Implication from more general provisions such as 
the ninth amendment and the (substantive) due process clauses of 
the fifth and fourteenth amendments. The fact remains, however, 
that the doctrine has seldom been applied other than to explicit 
rights, notably freedom of speech. (164) 
van Alstyne stated that: 
Under . . . (the equal protection clause), It seemingly makes no 
difference that the threatened Interest Is a privilege rather than 
a right. Even a privilege, benefit, opportunity, or public ad­
vantage may not be granted to some but withheld from others where 
the basis of classification and difference In treatment Is arbit­
rary. (165) 
van Alstyne suggested that: 
. . . (T)he private Interest may be, as In WIEMAN v. UPDEGRAFF, 
344 US 183 (1952), primarily an Interest In a public job, or, as 
In BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION, 347 US 483 (1954), an Interest In 
a public education, or, as In DOUGLAS v. CALIFORNIA, 372 US 333 
(1962), an Interest In an appeal from a felony conviction - none of 
which Is a 'right' protected under the due process clause. (166) 
van Alstyne proposed that: 
. . .  I t  m i g h t  b e  a r g u e d  t h a t  a  m e a n i n g f u l  d i s t i n c t i o n  s t i l l  e x i s t s  
between claims of equal protection and claims of due process, In 
that the former can be disposed of any time government elects whol­
ly to withdraw a particular privilege, while the rights upon which 
substantive due process Is based cannot similarly be systematically 
destroyed. However, the likelihood of a state abandoning Its system 
of public education or Its appellate procedure, or withdrawing from 
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the field of public employment Is small. So long as the state 
continues to operate In the public sector, claims based on the 
equal protection clause should continue to avoid the rlght-
prlvllege problem. (167) 
Justice Holmes discussing the nature of a legal right suggested 
that: 
"(F)or legal purposes a right Is only the hypostasis of a prophecy-
the Imagination of a substance supporting the fact that the public 
force will be brought to bear upon those who do things said to con­
travene It - Just as we talk of the force of gravitation accounting 
for the conduct of bodies In space. One phrase adds no more than 
the other to what we know without It." (168) 
van Alstyne stated that: 
Thus Holmes himself readily admitted that to deny that a person 
had a 'right' to something was merely to announce the conclusion 
that a court would not give him any relief; but the denial Itself 
provides no reason whatever why such relief should be denied. (169) 
He further added that: 
The protection of an employee's job Interest, a student's Interest 
In public education, or a tenant's Interest In public housing would 
thus not depend upon the fortuitous Involvement of still other 
protected rights. These olher rights might enhance the Individual's 
claim and they might make It even clearer that the regulation In 
question Is constitutionally unreasonable, but they would not be 
Indispensable to the petitioner's success. (170) 
Citing the district court's opinion In KNIGHT v. STATE BOARD OF 
EDUCATION, 200 F. Supp. 174 at 178 (M.D. TENN. 1961), van Alstyne 
stated that: 
Whether the Interest Involved be described as a right or a privi­
lege, the fact remains that It Is an Interest of almost Incalcul­
able value, especially to those students who have already enrolled 
In the Institution and begun the pursuit of their college train­
ing. Private Interests are to be evaluated under the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not In terms of labels or 
fictions, but In terms of their true significance and worth. (171) 
The Supreme Court agrees with the KNIGHT decision In Its opinion 
In SLOCHOWER v. BOARD OF HIGHER EDUCATION, 350 US 551 at 555 (1956), 
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when It stated that: 
To state that a person does not have a constitutional right to 
government employment Is only to say that he must comply with 
reasonable, lawful, and nondiscriminatory terms laid down by 
the proper authorities. (172) 
In the summation to his work, van Alstyne stated that: 
. . . under appropriate circumstances one's Interest In his 
government Job, his publicly financed home, his food stamp 
meals, or his state university educational opportunities may 
Indeed be constitutional rights In the positive-1 aw sense 
ought no longer be denied. That these Interests may be regulat­
ed compatibly with other competing Interests need not be denied 
either, any more than It can be denied that Interests In pri­
vate property may be regulated by zoning ordinances, sanitation 
codes, building permits or antidiscrimination laws. Any per se 
constitutional distinction which would exclude governmental reg­
ulation of status In the public sector from constitutional re­
view would, to steal a phrase from Mr. Justice Holmes, reflect 
neither logic nor experience In the law. (173) 
The process of educating the special class of Individuals at 
public expense Is a privilege; this privilege Is a spectal advantage 
given to the special class of Individuals by the state. An advantage 
granted to any class of Individuals may be withheld at the discretion 
of the state legislatures. The states have this ability under the 
broad police powers granted to them by the tenth amendment to the 
United States Constitution. 
van Gee I stated that: 
State power over education Is part of the states' soverlgn police 
powers that repose In and are exercised by the state legislature. 
Abundant judicial opinions support the proposition that It Is the 
state legislature that enjoys the preeminent authority to control 
public elementary, secondary, and higher education In the state by 
setting up a system of public educational Institutions and arrang­
ing for Its financing and regulation. It Is Important to stress 
that while the federal Constitution assumes state authority over 
education, It does not Impose an affirmative obligation on the 
states to establish a public school system ... . (174) 
Following the United States Supreme Court decision In RODRIGUEZ, 
education was held to be a function of state and local governments. 
The states have chosen to provide children with an education; how­
ever, they can choose to remove this function. It Is highly unlikely 
that Individual states will opt to remove the funding of public ed­
ucation, but they do retain this right under the force of the tenth 
amendment to the United States Constitution. 
Relevant to the definition presented, education at public expense 
Is enjoyed by the special education class created by the states. This 
advantage Is confirmed upon this class for the general welfare benefit 
as the public good demands. As a privilege that the state has bestow­
ed, the state may decide to withhold the privilege If the public good 
demands such action. The key to education as a privilege resides In 
the concept that the state created a special advantage for a class of 
Individuals, therefore, the state may remove such an advantage as It 
deems necessary In service to the best Interest of the general popula­
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CHAPTER THREE 
EDUCATION AS A RIGHT, ENTITLEMENT, AND A PRIVILEGE 
INTRODUCTION 
In the United States, the Constitution Is the law of the land. 
It contains this nation's most fundamental law. The Constitution 
created the Institutions of our government and their relationship to 
each other, It also enumerated the relative powers of each of the In­
stitutions and established limits for these powers. The Constitution 
established The three branches of government and the concept of checks 
and balances In order to prevent a surreptltlous usuroatlon of power by 
any of the three. 
Edwin Meese, the current Attorney General, stated that: 
The Constitution Is, In brief, the Instrument by which the consent 
of the governed - the fundamental requirement of any legitimate 
government - Is transformed Into a government complete with 'the 
powers to act and a structure designed to make It act wisely or 
responsibly.' Among Its various 'Internal contrivances' (as James 
Madison termed them) we find federalism, separation of oowers, bi­
cameralism, republic, an energetic executive, and an Indeoendent 
judiciary. Together, these devices form the machinery of our pop­
ular form of government and secure the rights of the people. The 
Constitution, then, Is the Constitution, and as such It Is, In Its 
own words, 'the supreme law of the land.' (I) 
The Constitution and the Bill of Rights are the definitive declara­
tion, statement of the rights, Drlvlleges, and entitlements of every citi­
zen of the United States. But Justice William J. Rrennan, Jr. stated, the 
ambiguity, the vagueness, and the generality of the language of the Con­
stitution opens It to various Interpretations by the varied reader. (2) 
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The Constitution divides powers between the federal government and 
Individual states by assigning to the federal government all powers nec­
essary to enable It to act as a representative for all the states, and 
by reserving to the Individual states all other powers. Among the chief 
powers reserved to the states Is the power to regulate the actions and 
relationships of people residing within the states' respective borders. 
(3) 
The reservation by the Constitution to the States of the power to 
regulate the actions and relationships of the people within their 
borders promotes good government and preserves liberty. No cen­
tralized government far removed from the people can be as sensi­
tive or responsive to their needs as the government close to them. 
(4) 
In addition to vesting In the States and denying to Congress the 
power to define the legal rights and responsibilities of men and 
women residing within their respective borders, the Constitution 
empowers the courts of the States to determine the validity of 
their laws on this subject, except In the comparatively rare In­
stances when they violate some of Its specific provisions. (5) 
The Constitution Is not an exact and perfect document for alI 
people for ail times. It was never envisioned as being such. With 
the Inclusion of the first ten amendments, credence was given to the 
original authors' Intent for a flexibility of the Constitution. James 
Madison, with the guidance of Thomas Jefferson, saw the Constitution as 
a beginning, not an ending point. 
The establishment of education as a right, as an entitlement, or as 
a privilege Is predicated on an Implicit Intent of the words of the United 
States Constitution. It has been stated that education, as an Issue, 
does not appear In the language of the Constitution. This Is factual. 
Education, as a function of the federal government, Is not explicitly 
mentioned In the words of the United States Constitution. However, the 
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Issue of education, as a "fundamental Interest," has been perceived, 
generally, as being a basic and fundamental part of current American 
society since the early part of the 1960s. It has become more Important 
as American society has changed over the course of years from I960 
through 1988. In the early part of the 1960s, a new President and a 
very aggressive attorney general pressed for civil rights reform; this 
Is the primary reason for the selection of the early 1960s as a beginn­
ing point. 
The United States Supreme Court, In BROWN v. 30ARD OF EDUCATION, 
347 US 483 (1954), stated that: 
Today, education Is perhaps the most Important function of state 
and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the 
great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition 
of the Importance of education to our democratic society. It Is 
required In the performance of our most basic public responslbl 1-
Itles, even service In the armed forces. It Is the very foundation 
of good citizenship. Today, It Is a principal Instrument In awaken­
ing the child to cultural values, In preparing him for later pro­
fessional training, and In helping him to adjust normally to his 
environment. In these days, It Is doubtful that any child may 
reasonably be expected to succeed In life If he Is denied the op­
portunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state 
has undertaken to provide It, Is a right which must be made avail­
able to all on equal terms. (6) 
An educated population Is the mainstay of a democratic form of 
government. A people committed to maintaining this form of government, 
a democracy, must ensure that the nation's youth are prepared adequately 
to participate In this democratic form of government. To ensure the 
stability and continuity of a democratic, representative government, the 
youth of the nation must be education. . Education occupies a prominent 
position In the goal to provide for the continuation of this republic. 
Education has emerged as a "new right" consideration owing to the 
Intensified demand for Increased and advanced levels of skills from 
students In the areas of reading, arithmetical manipulation, and writ­
ing present In the public school's curriculum; education, the Issue, 
affects every family and household across the expanse of the United 
States. Education's Impact and long term effect Is as apparent as an 
Individual reading the morning paper, or the scanning of the label on 
a box of cornflakes. Education Is necessary for mere survival of an 
Individual In this age of Information. 
OVERVIEW 
This chapter will contain a discussion of education as a constitu­
tionally protected right, entitlement, and privilege. The chapter will 
explore situations that highlight a consideration of education as a 
right, an entitlement, and a privilege. More specifically, the discuss­
ion will address situations or conditions that establish education as 
a constitutionally protected right, entitlement, and prtvllege. The 
chapter will present working definitions of a right, an entitlement, and 
a privilege to an education. 
The chapter Is divided Into four major divisions to facilitate an 
understanding of the discussion on education as a situational right, 
entitlement, and privilege. The divisions are: (I) The Constitution; 
(2) Education as a Right; (3) Education as an Entitlement; and (4) Ed­
ucation as a Privilege. 
The first section of this chapter will present an examination of 
sections of the federal Constitution that treat the nature of a right, 
a non-right, and an unenumerated right to an education at public ex­
pense. This section will focus upon the position that one of the un-
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enumerated rights, a right to an education at public expense, occupies 
within the framework of the federal Constitution. 
The second section of this chapter will explore the nature, a brief 
history, and the role of the state and federal governments In support 
of education as a constitutionally protected right. This section will 
address the nature of a right to an education; It will utilize two 
judicial decisions to Illustrate the diverse and opposing legal points 
of view. This section will Involve a discussion of property, Individ­
ual, and social Interests In an exploration of education as a constitu­
tionally protected right. 
The third section of this chapter will examine education as a 
legally protected entitlement. The discussion In this section will 
emphasize the United States Supreme Court opinion In GOSS v. LOPEZ. 
The section will examine the paradigm of Calabesl and Melamed; the 
three parts of the model will be used to explore the consideration of 
education as an entitlement. 
The fourth section of this chapter will address education as 
a constitutionally protected privilege. The discussion of education 
as a privilege will utilize primarily the paradigm provided by William 
van Alstyne. The prime focus of the discussion will be to present a 




The Constitution Is the Law of the Land; In clear language, the 
document has stated this. AlI of the amendments added to the docu­
ment are legally a part of the Constitution. According to the Constitu­
tion, the federal government received Its power to exist from the 
people of the United States. The federal government therefore rep­
resents and reflects the Interests of the people and states. The state 
government received Its power from the people of the state. The state 
constitution reflects the organization, function, and power of the 
representative government of the state; this power Is given by the 
people of the state. 
Education Is a function of state government; the governor and 
state legislature act as agents of state government. Fifty states of 
the United States have classified education as being a "fundamental 
Interest," or as a constitutionally protected right. (7) 
STATE CONSTITUTIONS 
Law students of the University of Wisconsin In 1971 examined the 
constitutions of each of the fifty states for educational provisions. 
Their reserach reported that all held education to be a "fundamental 
Interest," or a right. (8) A follow-up random sampling of the Wisconsin 
Study by this researcher In 1988 revealed that education has remained 
a constitutionally protected right In each of the state constitutions 
examined In the sampling. (9) 
Fifty Individual state governments have viewed education to be a 
"right." This right owes to a basic and fundamentally held commit­
ment to provide for the general welfare of citizens In the state. 
Stanley Herr addressed the Issue of education as a legally rec­
ognized right; he stated that: 
Judicial decision-making Is not a comprehensive process ... 
Our children must not be deprived of educational opportunities 
until federal district courts of the fifty states have each 
ruled that their education Is a present constitutional right. (10) 
Herr reflected the attitude that was present In the legal community 
representing handicapped children across the United States. Education 
has been recognized as being a natural right by the general population 
of American society; this Idea has been supported by various Interest 
groups. (II) 
However, this position Is a social phenomenon, not a legally protected 
one. State governments have made their position clear. AH fifty states 
have Included education as one of the protected rights of their citizens. 
The Constitution of the State of North Carolina, as an example, pro-
vldes: 
The General Assembly shall provide by taxation and otherwise for 
a general and uniform system of free public schools, which shall 
be maintained at least nine months In every year, and wherein 
equal opportunities shall be provided for all students. (12) 
. . . (K)nowledge being necessary to good government and the happi­
ness of mankind, schools, libraries, and the means of education 
shall forever be encouraged. (13) 
The Constitution of the State of South Carolina, as another example, 
provides: 
The General Assembly shall provide for the maintenance and support 
of a system of free public schools open to all children In the State 
and shall establish, organize, and support such other public Insti­
tutions of learning, as may be desirable. (14) 
As an example of the Importance that the State of North Carolina 
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has placed upon education, the state government expends between one-
third and one-half of the total General Budget funds for education. 
The state commits nearly 80 cents of every tax dollar In Its 
general fund to education, over $2 billion a year, because It 
believes that education Is the foundation for cultural and 
Industrial growth. (15) 
This statement Indicated, In part, the Importance that the State of 
North Carolina has placed upon the value, the right of an education. 
POLICE POWER OF THE STATE 
The federal Constitution guarantees the state a constitutional 
right to govern. (16) Therefore, the state has a right to legislate, to 
regulate, and to administer the affairs of the state In order to 
guarantee and maintain conditions that contribute to the general wel­
fare of the citizens of the state. Thts right Is guaranteed by Art­
icle IV of the Constitution and amendments ten and eleven. This right 
of the state was tested as early as 1794 before the United States Sup­
reme Court (17); It ultimately resulted In the eleventh amendment to 
the Constitution restricting the power of the United States Supreme 
Court. (18) 
The Supreme Court In MEYER v. NEBRASKA gave an Interpretation of 
the state's exercise of police power. The Court stated that: 
Determination by the legislature of what constitutes proper ex­
ercise of police power Is not final or conclusive but Is subject 
to supervision by the courts. (19) 
This Interpretation by the United States Supreme Court was and Is a 
source of conflict In the South, specifically the Deep South; the 
southern states hold rigidly to the common law principle of state sov­
ereignty. The states of the Deep South are the most ardent supporters 
of this common law principle. (20) 
Tyll van Geel presented a discussion of the principle of States' 
Rights. He held that states maintain the right to legislate, pres­
cribe, and regulate statutes that directly affect public school educa­
tion; the United States Supreme court has given mixed reactions to this 
view. (21) 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., commenting on states' soverlgn-
ty, stated that: 
I do not think the United States would come to an end If we (the 
United States Supreme Court) lost our power to declare an Act of 
Congress void. I do think the Union would be Imperiled If we could 
not make that declaration as to the laws of the several States. 
For one In my place sees how often a local policy prevails with 
those who are not trained to national views ... . (22) 
The United States Supreme Court In CAREY v. P.S.I, stated that: 
Although 'the Constitution does not explicitly mention any right 
of privacy.' the Court has recognized that one aspect of the 
'liberty' protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment Is 'a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of 
certain areas or zones of privacy.' (23) 
The Supreme Court expanded Its position In CAREY that It had taken 
In PIERCE v. SOCIETY OF SISTERS, 268 US 510 (1925). In PIERCE, the 
Court Invalidated the state's compulsory public school attendance law. 
In 1988, forty-nine of the fifty states have compulsory public school 
attendance laws; the State of Mississippi Is the lone exception. (24) 
Several authors have examined education as a property right using 
the arguments contained In laws for state mandated compulsory public 
school attendance. (25) A consensus of the writings held that education 
was a property right. Glfls defined "property" as being: 
'every species of valuable right for Interest that Is subject to 
ownership, has an exchangeable value, or adds to one's wealth or 
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estate.' 107 A. 2d 274, 276. 'Property' describes one's ex­
clusive right to possess, use, and dispose of a thing, 202 P. 
2d 771, as well as the object, benefit, or prerogative which 
constitutes the subject matter of that right. 333 US I (26) 
Glfls defined 'common property' as: 
that which belongs to the citizenry as a whole, 7 P. 2d 868, . . 
.•or In some jurisdictions where designated by statute 
3 CAL 83 (27) 
Education, a state created right, Is a common property right that re­
quires further examination and discussion that Is not within the scope 
of this study. It must be stated that several recent United States 
Supreme Court opinions have supported the position that education Is a 
state-created property right. (28) 
AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
Several cpnstltutlonal amendments offered promise for the support 
of educational rights; they are the ninth amendment, the tenth amend­
ment, the fourteenth amendment, and the fifth amendment. 
NINTH AMENCMENT 
The ninth amendment states that: 
The enumeration In the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not 
be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people. 
(29) 
Citing the work of McDougal and Lelghton, Paust stated that: 
. . . there Is ... an Interdependency between universally shared 
values and our national values ... . (30) 
Paust stated further that: 
. . .  I f  b a s i c  h u m a n  v a l u e s  h a v e  n o t  b e e n  g u a r a n t e e d  t o  e a c h  m e m b e r  
of our society then all of us remain In an uncertain peace and pos­
sess tenuous liberties. (31) 
Addressing the Intent of the ninth amendment, Paust stated that: 
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The alternative basis for the protection of fundamental human 
values Is the ninth amendment ... .Its utility lies . . . 
In recognizing that basic human rights are already a viable part of 
the constitutionally guaranteed rights of Americans. . . . (I)t 
Is a true that our courts either have not recognized the exist­
ence of such a constitutional protection or have been unwilling 
to use It . . . . (32) 
Referring to the words of Hamlin, Kelsey, and Rogge, Paust stated 
that: 
It Is also a generally accepted truism that, 'It cannot be pre­
sumed that any clause In the Constitution Is Intended to be with­
out effect.' (33) 
It seems clear from the language of the Ninth Amendment that certain 
rights exist even though they are not enumerated In the Constitution, 
that these rights are retained by the people, and that by express 
command these unenumerated rights are not to be denied or dlsparged 
by any governmental body. (34) 
Paust stated that: 
. . . (T)he general boundaries and criteria necessary to discover 
the content of each type of right become Identifiable In different 
arenas of the legal process, they should be used by the courts to 
effectuate shared expectations of 'right' and should not simply be 
Ignored. . . . (T)he Declaration of Independence expressed to the 
world the expectation that all governmental bodies - and thus the 
members of the judiciary - were to function so as 'to secure these 
rights' which are fundamental to all. (35) 
It Is apparent . . . that our forefathers definitely expected that 
the rights of man would be guaranteed under the Ninth Amendment. 
... (A) more broadly documented enumeration of the rights of man 
Is now available for judicial discovery and use. (36) 
Citing the Pennsylvania constitutional declaration of rights In 1776, 
Paust stated that: 
Government Is, or ought to be, Instituted for the common benefit, 
protection and security of the people, nation or community; and not 
for the particular emolument or advantage of any single man, family 
or set of men, who are a part only of that community; and that the 
Community hath an Indubitable, unalienable and Indefeasible right 
to reform, alter, or abolish government In such manner as shall be 
by that community Judged most conducive to the public weal. (37) 
Paust maintained that from an examination of the framers' scheme of 
rights and powers there existed several assumptions. First, the ul­
timate authority for all power comes from the people. Second, the 
state retains certain powers not approachable by the federal govern­
ment. Thlrd, the purpose of all governmental units In the United 
States Is to secure the rights of the population. Fourth, there exists 
certain fundamental rights that are enumerated In federal and state 
Instruments; however, those not listed are retained by the people and 
are forbidden to the federal and state governments. (58) 
TENTH AMENDMENT 
The amendment states that: 
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, 
nor prohibited by It to the States, are reserved to the States res­
pectively, or to the people. (39) 
The tenth amendment prevented Intrusion of the federal government 
Into the area of States' Rights. It also supported the premise that al­
though education Is not explicitly mentioned In the Constitution; It 
was a right that was reserved to the people of the United States. The 
people have exercised their prerogative by Inclusion of education as a 
right Into the language of state constitutions. 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
The amendment states, In part, that: 
All persons born or naturalized In the United States, and subject 
to the Jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and 
of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce 
any law which shall abridge the privileges or Immunities of citizens 
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within Its Jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
(40) 
In the course of this study, the fourteenth amendment has been ex­
tensively examined; It Is therefore sufficient to state that the amend­
ment offers a methodology for the examination of education at public 
expense as a right. Since all fifty states have constitutional pro­
visions elevating education to a protected fundamental Interest, the 
fourteenth amendment may hold promise for supporting education as a 
rl ght. 
FIFTH AMENDMENT 
The amendment states, In part, that: 
No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for 
public use without just compensation. (41) 
The United States Supreme Court, and several federal and state courts, 
have held that public school students have certain protected rights; 
these Include such various rights as: speech (42), political expression 
(43), opposition to currlcular content (44), religious expression (45), 
and appearance (46). Education holds an established property and 
liberty right that Is fundamental Interest to the Individual citizen. 
Tyll van Geel maintained that public school employees have been 
able to secure the guarantee of property rights using the language of 
the fifth amendment. He stated that: 
Public employees have not only successfully found protection by 
Invoking specific constitutional amendments, but also by claim­
ing that the existence of an Implicit constitutional right to 
privacy protects them ... . (47) 
Educators, teachers and administrators, have been classified by 
state governments as being public employees, van Geel suggested that 
legal arguments could be made for certain educational provisions and 
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rights; also he held that these could be found protected by the fifth, 
fourteenth, and ninth amendments. (48) 
Education Is a "fundamental Interest" In the language of the con­
stitutions of the fifty states. The elevation of education by the states 
to a "fundamental Interest" status should add strength to the consider­
ation of education as a "fundamental Interest" on the federal level. 
The position of education In the constitutional provisions of the states 
recognizes the Importance of the ninth amendment; education Is one of 
the rights reserved to the states and to the people. If the states have 
elevated education to a "right" or "fundamnetal Interest" status, the 
federal government must recognize the united leadership and strength 
of the state governments In their collective effort. 
Education must be regarded with special, legal consideration for 
elevation to the position of "fundamental Interest" status equal, not 
superior, to the other rights that the United States Supreme Court has 
recognized as having fundamental status; yet, these rights are not con­
tained In the explicit language of the federal Constitution. Fifty 
states have declared Individually and collectively that education Is 
of such priority In Importance that It Is a "fundamental right" to the 
states. 
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EDUCATION AS A RIGHT 
Education has been established as a constitutionally protected 
"right" at the state level (49); however, the United States Supreme 
Court has held that education, on the federal level, Is not one of the 
rights protected by the federal Constitution. (50) 
To be considered as a right protected by the federal Constitution, 
It must be demonstrated that education exists as a protected "right" 
from an explicit or Implicit Interpretation of the federal Constitu­
tion. (51) 
No mention of education as a protected "fundamental Interest" Is 
to be found from an explicit Interpretation of the Constitution. Dalton 
and Coullard have suggested that this action was owing to the conditions 
that existed at the time of drafting of the federal Constitution; how­
ever, It remains as an "historical mystery." (52) 
Implicit Interpretation of the federal Constitution to establish 
a protected "right," education at public expense, Is a difficult task. 
Owing to the vague guidelines presently used to elevate an unenumerated 
right, methodology for the determination of the status of a "right" from 
an Implicit Interpretation of the federal Constitution Is a matter of In­
dividual choice. Tushnet, Cohen, and MIchelman have suggested that the 
judiciary generally has ruled favorably to consider an unenumerated 
right as a protected "fundamental Interest" when: 
( D a  d e p r i v a t i o n  o f  t h e  " p r o p o s e d  r i g h t "  w o u l d  r e s u l t  I n  a  s e v e r e  
Impairment to the Independent functioning of the Individual; 
(2) a deprivation of the right would trigger a "Strict Scrutiny" 
review by 1he United States Supreme Court; 
(3) the exercise of the "proposed right" would result In a sig­
nificant alteration of the conduct of the Individual's life style and 
the ability to gain meaningful employment; and 
(4) the exercise of the "proposed right" contributes to an aber­
rant conduct In the actions of the state or local government. (53) 
In the course of this study, a right and a fundamental Interest 
are considered to be equivalent terms. It Is recognized that actual 
differences exist between the two terms; however, the differences are 
not of significance to merit a separate consideration In this work. 
Mlchelman and Tushnet, drawing upon the work of Roscoe Pound, have 
characterized three classes of Intersts that the United States Supreme 
Court has protected as "fundamental Interests." The classes hold pro­
mise for a discussion of education as a legally protected right or fun­
damental Interest. (54) 
A right to an education at the public's expense Includes a special 
educational class of Individuals for the exercise of this "right." The 
special educational class Is comprised of children between the ages of 
six and eighteen. (55) This class has been created by state govern­
ments through their Individual compulsory public school attendance laws. 
The state, under Its broad police powers, has a constitutionally protect­
ed right to create this special class of Individuals; this right has been 
reenforced by the strength of the tenth and eleventh amendments. The 
fifty states have created a child's constitutionally protected right to 
an education. (56) 
By granting this unique position, Individual states have given educa­
tion the highest political, financial, economic, and social recognition. 
This right to an education Is a state-created right; however, the fed­
eral government has given sufficient financial and legislative support 
for making education a socially and politically recognized right with­
out making education a legally sanctioned right. (57) 
A DEFINITION OF A RIGHT 
The framers of the United States Constitution wrote a list of act-
Ions considered fundamental to the general welfare of the American cit­
izen; these "rights" were listed In the first eight amendments to the 
federal Constitution. The ninth amendment was Included to provide for 
any expansion of "New Rights" that the American people would deem 
worthy. 
The rights listed In the Constitution are not the definitive list­
ing of rights that a civilization would require for the survival of a 
people. The authors of the Constitution never viewed human rights as a 
time-locked list. A right must then be considered In terms of the great­
est social, economic, political, emotional, and philosophical benefit 
to the people within a specific period of time. 
Webster defined a 'right' as "Something to which one has a just 
claim; as the power or privilege to which one Is justly entitled." (58) 
Daniel Oran defined a 'right' as that which Is "Morally, ethically, or 
legally just." (59) 
Hogan stated that "... A RIGHT Is ' ... an Interest protected 
by law.' Courts . . .will protect a 'fundamental Interest.'" (60) 
THREE CLASSES OF INTERESTS 
Tushnet, relying upon the work of Mlchelman and Round, Identified 
three classes of Interests which the Supreme Court has held are "legally 
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protected." They are: (a) Individual Interests (61); (b) public Int­
erests (62); and (c) social Interests (63). 
All three classes seem to have a place for education; and some 
courts have held that education Is a 'fundamental Interest.' A 
RIGHT Is related to an Interest as the FORTRESS Is to the PRO­
TECTED LAND. (64) 
Rights which are specified In state and federal constitutions are 
said to be 'constitutionally secure,' and are given added protec­
tion by the courts. Interests which are characterized as 'funda­
mental' are likewise afforded this added protection. The princ­
ipal difference therefore, between a constitutional RIGHT and a 
'fundamental Interest1 Is that one Is specified In the Constitu­
tion while the other Is not; the preferred treatment afforded 
both Is essentially the same. This led Justice Harlan to protest 
the practice of judges who 'pick out particular human activities, 
characterize them as 'fundamental,' and then give them added pro­
tection under an unusually stringent equal protection test' -
even where such activities are not shown to be arbitrary or Ir­
rational and where they are 'NOT MENTIONED IN THE FEDERAL CONSTI­
TUTION. (65) 
EDUCATION AS A 'POWER' OF THE STATE OR THE PEOPLE: Those POWERS 
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohib­
ited by It to the States, are ' . . . reserved to the States respec­
tively, or to the people.' The power over education Is not one of 
the powers delegated by the Constitution of the United States, 
nor Is It prohibited to the States; hence, It Is one of the powers 
reserved to the States or to the people. (66) 
RIGHTS retained by the people are enumerated In the Ninth Amendment: 
'The enumeration In the Constitution of certain rights, shall not 
be construed to deny or dlsparge others retained by the people. (67) 
'Obtaining an education' Is not among the rights enumerated In the 
Cons It!tulon; hence, It may be one of the OTHER RIGHTS retained by 
the people . . . under the NINTH Amendment. (68) 
Citing the United States Supreme Court decision In SHAPIRO v. THOMP­
SON of 1975, Hogan stated that: 
Rights, not explicitly mentioned In the Constitution, have at times 
been deemed so elementary In our way of life that they have been 
labeled as basic rights ... . There Is of course, not a word In 
the Constitution . . . concerning the right of the people to educa­
tion or to work or to recreation by swimming or otherwise. Those 
rights, like the right to pure air and pure water may well be rights 
'retained by the people' under the NINTH Amendment. (69) 
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. . . (T)he Ninth Amendment ' . . . shows a belief of the Consti­
tution's authors that fundamental rights exist that are not ex­
pressly enumerated In the first eight amendments, and an Intent 
that the list of rights Included there not be deemed exhaustive.' 
(70) 
CLASSIFICATION OF FUNDAMENTAL INTERESTS 
Using Tushnet and Mlchelman's classification of Interests, It Is 
of Immense value to explore these three classifications to obtain a 
clear understanding of what elements are present In the consideration 
of a right, or an Interest that creates an Interest for the United 
States Supreme Court to have declared an Individual activity to be of 
such compelling value to the Individual, the public's activity, or to 
the present and future societal values that a right or an Interest to 
be of "fundamental Interest" or to be an "Individual right" when con­
sidering the Constitution. 
Mlchelman and Tushnet held that (a) Individual Interest (71), 
(b) public Interests (72), and (c) social Interests (73) were three 
classifications of Interests that the Supreme Court had held to be 
protected. 
INDIVIDUAL INTEREST 
. . .(t)he right Is the liberty, not the value . . .to anyone 
having or exercising that liberty. Thus In the view that rights 
entail liberties, the most liability rules can secure Is a level 
of welfare equal to the value of the right bearer's Interest, In­
cluding even his Interest In his autonomy. (74) 
It Is Instructive to examtne the construction of Interests that 
the United States Supreme Court has held to be fundamental. The Court 
has viewed "fundamental" Interests In the nature of voting (75); the 
rights of the criminal In the criminal process (76); the rights of al-
lens (77); the right of counsel for a prisoner (78); the prohibition of 
comment from court and prosecution against accused's use of the fifth 
amendment (79); the right of an Indigent to counsel (80); the explana­
tion of criminal rights (81); the right of the Court to order busing 
to force compliance with another court order (82); the power of the 
Court to draft a plan to achieve desegratlon (83); the federal court's 
power to decide on the validity of an Individual state statute (84); 
the Invalidation of a university's special admission program (85); the 
right of custody of an Individual does not Include Interrogation (86); 
the right of a woman to have an abortion (87); the declaration that 
public schools are the most Important function of state and local gov­
ernments (88); and the power of the Court to determine functions of 
the state governments (89). The previous examples of "fundamental 
Interests" are not contained In the explicit Interpretation of the 
United States Constitution. 
An examination of the above fourteen Supreme Court decisions In­
dicated that the Court used Implied Interests In Its Interpretation of 
the Constitution. The Court relied upon a perceived functioning of the 
Individual or of the state In social terms as a prime factor or reason­
ing In the finding of a fundamental Interest In the various Issues. An 
examination of the decisions also revealed the Court's difficulty In 
establishing clear criteria In determining "fundamental Interest." It 
can be stated that the discovery or failure to establish "fundamental 
Interest" status Is arbitrary and lacking In consistent application of 
procedures. 
As the concept of fundamental Interest has evolved, Its emphasis 
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has been primarily on extreme detriment to the Individual. How­
ever, Inclusion of voting within this category appears also to 
have validated the rationale that If the Interest under consid­
eration Is of particular value to society as a whole, accruing 
only secondarily to an Individual, It too may qualify as a fun­
damental Interest. If an Interest's qualifications rest exclus­
ively upon the severe detriment an Individual would Incur If he 
were denied the right, the degree of detriment does not have to be 
porportlonately as great. Where a given Interest rests upon both 
rationales, the combination would appear to be synergistic, for If 
to protect the Individual Is also to benefit society, then It 
becomes all the more desirable to protect the Individual. (90) 
PUBLIC INTEREST 
A public Interest relates to a service that promotes and provides 
for the general welfare In the Individual's life, liberty, pursuit of 
happiness, and acquisition of property. The United States Supreme Court 
has examined such diverse Interests as electricity, banking, automobiles, 
highway access and safety. Interstate transportation, employment, wel­
fare benefits, mass transportation, and libraries as holding "fundamen­
tal Interest" In the public's Interest. 
. . . (E)ducatlon means careers, ... It should enable those who 
partake of It to learn tangible skills and thus procure a better 
job In the marketplace. . . .(E)ducatlon Is the transmission of 
civilization and Its values. . . . <T)he fundamental significance 
of education lies In learning how to think. . . . (E)ducatlon 
(Involves) . . . teaching and Inculcating values. . . . 'The 
key goal of education should be Informed decision making ... 
Finally, . . . education . . . means personal development and 
social exchange with all the Inherent complexities Involved. (91) 
Education operates In the public forum; It reflects the good and 
the bad elements of public Interests. Valdosta, Georgia, and Oxnard, 
California, are cities that are representative of the diversity that ed­
ucation must address; one stresses athletic prowess and the other holds 
academic performance to be primary. There are no right or wrong public 
evaluations. Both cities perceive education from different expectations; 
the public's Interest Is served In both situations. 
To test the public's Interest In education, one might propose to 
close or consolidate a public high school or an elementary school. The 
resulting debate will demonstrate most vividly the Impact of education 
for the public Interest. 
SOCIETAL INTEREST 
Graham, Kravltt, and Tushnet held that societal Interests hold 
special consideration when viewed from the context of constitutional 
consideration to such a degree that they hold "fundamnetal Interest" 
status. (92) Societal Interests such as those contained In the areas 
of Immunization, Immigration, naturalization, desegregation, voting, 
and welfare are viewed by the Supreme court as occupying special and 
distinct consideration. They reflect the long-term effect that certain 
Individual and public Interests have upon the future Interests of the 
greater portion of American society at large. 
The United States Supreme Court has consistently ruled favorably 
for education's having societal Interest. The Court held that education 
was ". . . the primary vehicle for transmitting 'the values on which our 
society rests.'" (93) The Court In BRANDON v. BOARD OF EDUCATION stated 
that "schools Instill In kids 'an appreciation of critical reasoning, 
a commitment to democratic Institutions, and a dedication to principles 
of fairness.'" (94) The Court In GRIFFIN v. COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD held 
that "Whatever nonraclal grounds might support a state's allowing a 
county to abandon public schools, the object must be a constitutional 
one ... ." (95) Justice Felix Frankfurter summarized the feeling of 
the public's societal Interests In McCOLLUM v. BOARD OF EDUCATION. 
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In that decision, the Court held that public schools were "... the 
symbol of our democracy and the most pervasive means for promoting 
our common destiny." (96) 
It Is valid to examine the case for educational rights or as a 
concept of "fundamental Interests" through the use of the Importance 
that education possesses regarding Individual, public, and societal 
Interests. 
The value of education to the Individual Is almost undeniable. 
It Is potentially an aid to any member of society In his attempt 
to succeed In a given career and In his development as a mature 
human being. Its ramifications are economic, social, and cult­
ural. . . .(I)ts Immediate Impact Is often uncertain or even 
remove (owing to the process). Although It may be concluded 
that potentially education Is the most Important civil right, at 
any given mement one may not feel acutely Its presence or ab­
sence, or Its superiority or Inferiority. (97) 
Edwin S. Cohen In an address at the Harvard Center for Educational 
Policy Reserach on July 22, 1970 stated that: 
. . . (I)t would seem that as long as education functions to aid 
some groups In social advancement, and as long as current systems 
potentially can be restructured to aid more groups. It should 
not be written off as a tool for reform. There Is no overabund­
ance of social mechanisms to replace education as a means of secur­
ing social Integration and upwardmoblIIty for members of minority 
groups. (98) 
Graham and Kravltt gave added strength to the societal value that 
education possesses argument, they stated that: 
A quality common to all civil rights Is that they are so valuable 
to society In a subjective, qualitative sense, that society will 
not let them be priced. They are crucial to individuals In a per­
sonal sense, and because of their moral and ethical essence, they 
Increase - If only metaphysically - the total amount of the society 
that permits Its denial suffer severe detriments. (99) 
In BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION, the United States Supreme Court ex­
pressed dual nature of education and Its societal value. The Court 
he I d: 
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Today, education Is perhaps the most Important function of state 
and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the 
great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognit­
ion of the Importance of education to our democratic society. It 
Is required In the performance of our most basic public responsib­
ilities, even service In the armed forces. It Is the very found­
ation of good citizenship. Today It Is a principal Instrument In 
awakening the child to cultural values, In preparing him for later 
professional training, and In helping him to adjust normally to 
his environment. In these days It Is doubtful that any child 
may reasonably be expected to succeed In life If he Is denied the 
opportunity of an education. (100) 
Graham and KravJtt In analyzing BROWN and DANDRIDGE stated that: 
If a court now determines that society has begun to recognize 
that denial of a new Interest such as education rivals the person­
al and societal detriment created by denial of more traditionally 
recognized rights, It would seem that the Court should label such 
an Interest fundamental and treat It as a right. (101) 
Tradition Is no more unchanging than the society that generates 
It. In BROWN, Chief Justice Warren specifically rejected the 
claim that blacks' rights to equal educational opportunity must 
be measured In terms of society's conception of the Importance of 
education In 1868. The equal protection clause speaks to the role 
of education in society today. While one may read DANDRIDGE to say 
that the Supreme Court will not extend the principle of fundamental 
Interests to Include new rights, the very principles Its author 
espouses would seem to Imply that the concept both can and should 
be extended. (102) 
DANDRIDGE m&y thus be distinguished from education cases on the 
basis of the greater 'tradition' of public education. While the 
notion of a right to education only began to gain popular accept­
ance In the nineteenth century, the concept of a right to welfare 
Is of even more recent origin. Under Justice Stewart's criteria, 
therefore, education would possess a superior claim to fundament-
allty. It Is also possible to distinguish education from welfare 
by arguing that welfare's societal value Is less Integrative or 
preservative than that of education and In that sense Is less 
synergistic. (103) 
. . . (W)hlle there Is no controlling precedent, the logic of 
what precedents exist, with the exception of DANDRIDGE, and the 
Implications of the concept of a fundamental Interest necessitate 
making education an Interest equal to that of voting, criminal 
process, procreation, or travel. . . . (One may not suffer the 
poignant personal detriment of being denied liberty or the ability 
to procreate, no doubt many feel a greater personal Interest In 
education than In voting or travel. . . . (T)he preservative and 
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Integrative role of education for society has been amply demon­
strated. In this societal strand of the . . . (demands created 
by that society) It would seem that only voting has a greater 
claim to superiority. (104) 
TWO VIEWS OF EDUCATION AS A FUNDAMENTAL INTEREST 
SERRANO v. PRIEST (105) and SAN ANTONIO v. RODRIGUEZ (106) are 
two landmark decisions that have examined education as a ''fundamental 
Interest." The decisions examined the right to an education at the 
public's expense with fundamentally the same facts at hand; however, 
the two courts reached two different conclusions. While addressing 
education as a constitutionally Drotected right, the main Issue In both 
cases was a state's method of financing public education. 
SERRANO v. PRIEST 
The best argument for the recognition of education as a fundamental 
right Is found In the California supreme court decision, SERRANO v. 
PRIEST. The California court was convinced that the concept of acquir­
ing an education held enough merit to grant "fundamental Interest," or 
"fundamental right" status to education. The court stated that: 
We are convinced that the distinctive and priceless function of 
education In our society warrants. Indeed compels, our treating 
It as a 'fundamental Interest.' (107) 
The SERRANO court gave five reasons for the classification of ed­
ucation as a fundamental right. They were: 
First, education Is essential In maintaining what several com­
mentators have termed 'free enterprise democracy' - that Is, pre­
serving an Individual's opportunity to compete successfully In 
the economic marketplace, despite a disadvantaged background. Ac­
cordingly, the public schools of this state (California) are the 
bright hope for the entry of the poor and the oppressed Into the 
mainstream of American society. (108) 
Foshay gave additional support to this Idea. In a lecture delivered 
In Washington, D. C. , on February 13, 1987, he stated that six dis­
tinct themes have emerged for the purpose of providing an education 
for the American population. They were: (a) "To offer 'the best that 
has been thought and said In the world.'" Citing the work of Matthew 
Arnold. (109); (b) "To provide citizens for our democracy." Citing 
the words of Thomas Jefferson. (110); (c) "To provide manpower for the 
economy." Citing the words of the "man In the street." (Ill); (d) 
"To pass on civilization to the young." Citing the work of the Commit­
tee of Ten and others. (112 >; (e) "To serve the State." Citing all 
dictatorships and absolute monarchies. (113); and finally (f) "To 
promote self-realfzatlon." Citing the work of John Dewey and others. 
(114) 
Foshay further stated that: 
The purpose of education . . . Is to assist people In the process 
of self-realIzatlon. To put It differently, the purpose of educa­
tion Is to bring people to a realization of what ft Is to be a 
human being. (115) 
The SERRANO court stated: 
Second, education Is universally relevant. 'Not every person finds 
It necessary to call upon the fire department or even the do I Ice In 
an entire lifetime. Relatively few are on welfare. Every person, 
however, benefits from education. (116) 
An example of the universal relevancy of education Is readily perceived 
as an Individual reads the dally newspaper, the label of food products, 
or highway direction signs. 
Third, public education continues over a lengthy period of life -
between 10 and 13 years. Few other government services have such 
sustained, Intensive contact with the recipient. (117) 
Fourth, education Is unmatched In the extent to which It molds the 
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personality of the youth of society. While police and fire pro­
tection, garbage collection and street lights are essentially 
neutral In their effect on the Individual psyche, public educa­
tion actively attempts to shape a child's personal development In 
a manner chosen not by the child or his parents but by the state. 
'The Influence of school Is not confined to how well It can teach 
the disadvantaged child; It also has a significant role to play 
In shaping the student's emotional and psychological make-up.' 
( 1 1 8 )  
Finally, education Is so Important that the state has made It com­
pulsory - not only In the requirement of attendance but also by 
assignment to a particular district and school. (119) 
The SERRANO court reached three historic conclusions In Its unani­
mous decision. The court found that: (I) wealth Is a suspect class­
ification; (2) education Is a fundamental right; and (3) "fiscal neu­
trality" Is an acceptable method for Judging state financing of education. 
The California court's decision In SERRANO reflected the three class­
ification of Interests proposed by MIchelman, Tushnet, and Pound. 
INDIVIDUAL INTEREST 
The United States Supreme Court, lower federal and state courts 
have held that education was an essential element to the Interests of 
an Individual citizen. Education provided the tools necessary to provide 
an opportunity to reach self-real IzatIon. Education demonstrated to the 
Individual what Foshay said was "... a realization of what It Is to 
be a human being." (120) The judiciary has clearly recognized the valu­
able utility of obtaining an education to the Individual. 
PUBLIC INTEREST 
The decision In SERRANO recognized the value of having educated 
workmen to contribute to the success of American society. The public's 
Interest Is best served by an educated work-poo! to aid in the manage­
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ment and operation of the American economy; the political network, and 
governmental services. All of these elements are enhanced through ed­
ucation of the membership responslblle for their successful performance. 
SOCIETAL INTEREST 
Societal Interests are reflected by the California court's state­
ment that "... education Is unmatched In the extent to which It molds 
the personality of the youth of the society." (121) A nation's youth 
Is the future of the society. The public schools of the United States 
provide an education In the values, the goals, the philosophy, and the 
past of America. Educating the youth has a direct effect upon shaping 
the future with the key values of what It means to be an American. 
There Is no greater right or fundamental Interest than ensuring that the 
nation survives with Its values and Constitution Intact. 
The ultimate value of the SERRANO decision rested with the recog­
nition that education was a legal right. The SERRANO court acknowleg-
ed and added to the BROWN position on the value of education to the 
Individual and societal Interests. The period from 1954 to 1988 has 
lost none of the power and Influence of the United States Supreme Court 
decision In BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION; the Cburt In BROWN had stated 
that education was the most Important function of state and local govern­
ments. Supreme court decisions since BROWN and numerous lower federal 
and state courts have ruled favorably on segments of education; the jud­
iciary has recognized the vital part that educatton has played within 
American society. The SERRANO court placed each of these parts Into 
proper historical perspective and held that education was/Is a funda­
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mental right. 
The California Supreme Court's decision In SERRANO v. PRIEST ranks 
on a parity with the United States Supreme Court's decision In BROWN v. 
BOARD OF EDUCATION. Education from this point In history forward has 
been given a legal position; education was considered as being a leg­
ally protected right. 
Paust stated that: 
. . .  b y  f a l l i n g  t o  e f f e c t u a t e  t h e  b a s i c  h u m a n  r i g h t s  o f  a l l  
members of our society, we lay the ground work for a deprivation 
which can eventually destroy the very human values that we claim 
to cherish. (122) 
. . . (t)he Declaration of Independence expressed to the world the 
expectation that all governmental bodies . . . were to function so 
as 'to secure these rights' which are fundamental to all. (123) 
Paust captured the feeling and power of the SERRANO decision when he 
declared that education was a "fundamental right." 
RODRIGUEZ v. SAN ANTONIO INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT 
The RODRIGUEZ decision by the United States Supreme Court Is note­
worthy for three points made by the Court. They were: (I) wealth Is not 
a suspect classification; (2) education Is not a fundamental right pro­
tected by the federal Constitution; and (3) education occupies an Im­
portant place In American society. 
The RODRIGUEZ decision does not easily lend Itself to an analysis 
using Mlchelman's classification of Interest. 
INDIVIDUAL INTEREST 
The RODRIGUEZ opinion held that education was a state and local 
Issue, not a federal one. The Court held reservations about entering 
98 
Into an area that It lacked experience; the Court's opinion stated 
that: 
. . . (T)hls case also Involves the most persistent and difficult 
questions of educational policy, another area In which this court's 
lack of specialized knowledge and experience counsels against pre­
mature Interference with the Informed judgments made at the state 
and local levels. Education, perhaps even more than welfare assis­
tance, presents a myrald of 'Intractable economic, social, and 
even philosophical problems. (124) 
From this position, the RODRIGUEZ Court found that there was not a fed­
eral question relating to education having "fundamental Interest." 
The Court did recognize the singular Importance that education 
holds for American society; It stated that: 
This theme, expressing an abiding respect for the vital role of 
education In a free society, may be found In numerous opinions of 
justices of this Court writing both before and after BROWN was 
decided. . . . NoThlng this Court holds today In any way detracts 
from our historic dedication to public education. We are In com­
plete agreement with the conclusion of the three-judge panel below 
that 'the grave significance of education both to the Individual 
and to our society' cannot be doubted. (125) 
Individual Interests, the RODRIGUEZ Court believed, were best serv­
ed by the actions of state and local governments. The Court held that: 
The merit of local control was recognized (by the Court) ... 
'(D)Jrect control over decisions vitally affecting the education 
of one's children Is a need that Is strongly felt In our society.' 
(126)  
. . . (T)he Importance of a service performed by the State does 
not determine whether It must be regarded as fundamental for pur­
poses of examination under the Equal Protection Clause. (127) 
Citing the work of James Coleman, the Court stated: 
'The history of education since the Industrial revolution shows 
a continual struggle between two forces: the desire by members 
of society to have educational opportunity for all children, and 
the desire of each family to provide the best education It can 
afford for Its own children. (128) 
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PUBLIC INTEREST 
The RODRIGUEZ Court held firm to the conviction that education as 
a public Interest was best served by state and local actions. 
The ultimate wisdom as to these and related problems of education 
Is not likely to be divined for all time even by the scholars who 
now so earnestly debate the Issues. In such circumstances, the 
judiciary Is well advised to refrain from Imposing on the States 
Inflexible constitutional restraints that could circumscribe or 
handicap the continued research and experimentation so vital to 
finding even partial solutions to educational problems and to 
keeping abreast of ever-changing conditions. (129) 
The RODRIGUEZ Court recognized the value that education held for 
the public Interest; yet the Court held that this was Insufficient 
ground to declare education to be a 'fundamental interest' protected 
by the United States Consltltulon. The Court conveyed the Idea that 
the public's Interest could be best served by placing the decision­
making process affecting education at the state and local levels. 
SOCIETAL INTEREST 
In addressing the societal Interest of education, the RODRIGUEZ 
Court was most supportive. The Court stated that: 
It is not the province of this Court to create substantive consti­
tutional rights In the name of guaranteeing equal Drotectlon of 
the laws. Thus, the key to discovering whether education Is 
'fundamental' is not to be found In comparisons of the relative 
societal significance of education as opposed to subsistence or 
housing. Nor Is It to be found by weighing whether education Is 
as Important as the right to travel. Rather, the answer lies In 
assessing whether there Is a right to education explicitly or Im­
plicitly guaranteed by the Constitution. (130) 
Education, of course, Is not among the rights afforded explicit 
protection under our Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any 
basis for saying It Is Implicitly so protected. . . . (T)he un­
disputed Importance of education will not alone cause this Court 
to depart from the usual standard for reviewing a State's social 
and economic legislation. (131) 
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No area of social concern stands to profit more from a multi­
plicity of viewpoints and from a diversity of approaches than 
does, pub IIc education. (132) 
Justice William Brennan, In a dissenting opinion, stated that: 
. . . '(F)undamentalIty' Is, In large measure, a function of the 
right's Importance In terms of the effectuation of those rights 
which are In fact constitutionally guaranteed. Thus, 'as the 
nexus between the specific constitutional guarantee and the non-
const I tut I on a I Interest draws closer, the nonstltutlonal Interest 
becomes more fundamental and the degree of judicial scrutiny ap­
plied when the Interest Is Infringed on a discriminatory basis 
must be adjusted accordingly.' . . . Here, there can be no doubt 
that education Is Inextricably linked to the right to participate 
In the electoral process and to the rights of free speech and 
association guaranteed by the First Amendment. . . . This being 
so, any classification affecting education must be subjected to 
strict judicial scrutiny ... . (133) 
The Supreme Court In the RODRIGUEZ opinion made three primary 
points; they were: (I) education was a state Issue, not a federal one; 
(2) education was not a constitutionally protected right; and (3) 
wealth was not a classification of "fundamental Interest." The RODRIG­
UEZ opinion has received mixed reactions from legal commentators and 
writers. (134) 
From an educational position, the RODRIGUEZ decision was a signal 
to state governments to seek resolution of fiscal questions relating to 
education at the state level. The states have reaffirmed their positions 
that education Is a constitutionally protected right. 
Education as a right had elements that satisfied the three Interests 
that Mlchelman had described as being protected by the United States 
Supreme Court. Individual, public, and social Interests offered support 
to the position of education being considered as a constitutionally 
protected right on the federal level. The fifty state constitutions 
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added additional strength to the debate. The legislative and execu­
tive branches, although conceded to be only political rhetoric, offer­
ed support to education's being considered as more than a state-only 
Issue. 
EDUCATION AS AN ENTITLEMENT 
Daniel Oran defined an entitlement as a right to something once 
a person shows that he or she meets the legal requirement to get It. 
(135) Following Oran's definition, an entitlement, to an education 
at public expense, has been based upon individual state constitutions 
that clearly and legally state that education Is a constitutionally 
protected right. (136) At the federal level, the classification of 
education as an entitlement Is less clear. The United States Supreme 
Court has offered Its definition of an entitlement using three cases: 
GOSS v. LOPEZ, INGRAHAM v. WRIGHT, and MT. HEALTHY v. DOYLE. GOSS v. 
LOPEZ offered the first definition of education as an entitlement. 
In GOSS v. LOPEZ, the Supreme Court stated that education could 
be considered as a legal entitlement. (137) The Cburt stated that: 
The authority possessed by the State to prescribe and enforce 
standards of conduct In Its schools although concededly very 
broad, must be exercised consistently with constitutional safe­
guards. . . . (T)he State Is constrained to recognize a student's 
legitimate entitlement to a public education as a property Inter­
est which Is protected by the Due Drocess Clause and which may not 
be taken away. . . without adherence to the minimum procedures re­
quired by that Clause. The Due Process Clause also forbids arbit­
rary deprivations of liberty. 'Where a person's good name, reput­
ation, honor, or Integrity Is at stake because of what the 
government Is doing to him,' the minimal requirement of the Clause 
must be satisfied. (138) 
Justice Lewis Powell, In a dissenting opinion In GOSS, stated that: 
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The Court holds for the first time that the federal courts, rather 
than education officials and state legislatures, have the authority 
to determine the rules applicable to routine classroom discipline 
of children and teenagers In the public schools. (139) 
The United States Supreme court had based Its classification of an 
entitlement upon a state's law; the Court stated that: 
Here, on the basis of state law, appellees plainly had legitimate 
claims of entitlement to a public education. (140) 
The Court placed Its classification of education as an entitlement into 
state constitutional terms; the Court stated that: 
Although Ohio may not be constitutionally obligated to establish 
and maintain a public school system, It has nevertheless done so 
and has required Its children to attend. Those young people do 
not 'shed their constitutional rights' at the schoolhouse door. 
. . . 'The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, pro­
tects the citizen against the State Itself and all of Its creatures-
Boards of Education not excepted.' (141) 
Following the Supreme Court opinion, HAZELW00D SCHOOL DISTRICT v. KUHL-
MEIER, 56 USLW 4079 (I98S), a student has only limited rights while at­
tending a public school. 
The Supreme Court, In GOSS, recognized a state's authority to 
regulate governmental actions within Its borders, but the Court caution­
ed that these actions must be conducted with care. The Court stated 
that: 
The authority possessed by the State to prescribe and enforce stan­
dards of conduct In Its schools although concededly very broad 
must be exercised consistently with constitutional safeguards. (142) 
Among other things, the State Is constrained to recognize a student's 
legitimate entitlement to a public education as a property Inter­
est which Is protected by the Due Process Clause . . . (143) 
Thus the very legislation which 'defines' the rde minimis' of the 
student's entitlement, while providing a right to education gener­
ally, does not establish this right free of discipline Imposed In 
accord with Ohio law. Rather, the right Is encompassed in the en­
tire package of statutory provisions governing education In Ohio -
of which the power to suspend Is one. (144) 
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A legal entitlement to an education Is predicated on Individual 
state constitutions that legally specify the legal and constitutional 
position that education occupies at the state and local levels. (145) 
Calabresl and Melamed, In their work, described a framework from 
which to explore the method of securing and protecting legal entitle­
ments. They discussed three such ways: (a) property rules; (b) lia­
bility rules; and (c) InlalenabIIIty rules. (146) Each holds promise 
for protecting educational entitlements. 
PROPERTY RULES 
According to Calabresl and Melamed, property rules: 
. . .enable the right bearer to enjoin others from reducing the 
level of protection the entitlement affords him, except as he 
may be willing to forgo It at a mutually acceptable price. (147) 
LIABILITY RULES 
. . .  ( A )  n o n e n t l t l e d  p a r t y  m a y  r e d u c e  t h e  v a l u e  o f  t h e  e n t i t l e ­
ment without regard to the right holder's desires, provided he 
compensates ex post for the reduction In value. . . .(Individ­
uals who value entitlements more than those on whom the rights 
are Initially conferred can secure the entitlements without ex 
ante negotiations ... . The entitlement Is secured by the 
party who most values It, thus duplicating the outcome of the 
Coasean market exchange process. (In this market, the right to 
use a resource would have been secured ultimately by that party 
who would have paid the most for It.) (148) 
INALIENABILITY RULES 
When a right Is protected by an Inalienability rule, transfers of 
any sort are prohibited. The right to one's freedom from servi­
tude and the right to vote are examples of rights protected by 
Inalienability rules. (149) 
Coleman and Kraus Indicated that courts have used the Calabresl-
Melamed framework and SPUR INDUSTRIES, INC. v. WEBB, 108 ARIZ 178, 494 
P. 2d 700 (1972), as patterns to follow In establishing and securing 
entitlements. (150) 
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A perfectly natural way of characterizing what It means to have a 
right to a resource or to property Is In terms of autonomy or con­
trol. Rights . . . demarcate a realm of liberties. (151) 
The regime of contract law, which respects the dispositions Indiv­
iduals make of their rights, carries to Its natural conclusion the 
liberal premise that Individuals have rights. (152) 
The point of conferring an entitlement arguably Is to secure a 
domain of control, not to guarantee a particular level of welfare 
or utility. One who conceives of rights as securing a sphere of 
liberty does not believe that the concept of a right Is reducible 
to or otherwise Identifiable with a point on a right bearer's In­
difference curve. The liberty attendant rights ownership Is not 
equivalent to any particular level of welfare ... . (153) 
If rights entail or secure liberties, then, It Is hard to see how 
liability rules protect them. . . . (L)Iablllty rules protect 
something. Compensation under a liability rule Is for harm done 
and loss suffered. The loss Is the diminution In value of one's 
resources, . . . one's property. In this sense the 'objective' 
value of one's holdings Is protected by liability rules; the 
value of the Interest Is left Intact. But a liability rule confers 
no liberty or autonomy on an entitled party, and therefore secures 
no such liberty. (154) 
(T)he right Is the liberty, not the value (I.e. utility) to any­
one having or exercising that liberty. . . . (I)n the view that 
rights entail liberties, the most liability rules can secure Is a 
level of welfare equal to the value of the right bearer's Interest, 
Including even his Interest In his autonomy. . . . Rights secure 
a domain of autonomy. (155) 
Liability rules permit others to act without regard to the right 
holder's autonomy over his holdings. . . . (A) right Is a domain 
of protected control, . . . liability rules protect rights. Both 
claims are plausible, but apprently Incompatible. (156) 
Coleman and Kraus Indicated that: 
The point of conferring an entitlement arguably Is to secure a 
domain of control, not to guarantee a particular level of welfare 
or utlllty. (157) 
An entitlement to education, or a property right, Is conferred by the 
action of state government. Once the state has established a property 
right to an education, the entitlement to such a right gains legal 
standing In an examination by the judiciary. 
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The point of conferring an entitlement arguably Is to secure a 
domain of control, not to guarantee a particular level of welfare or 
utility. One who conceives of rights as securing a sphere of liberty 
does not believe that the concept of a right Is reducible to or other­
wise Identifiable with a point on a right bearer's Indifference curve. 
The liberty attendant rights ownership Is not equivalent to any par­
ticular level of welfare ... . (153) 
If rights entail or secure liberties, then It Is hard to see how 
liability rules protect them. . . . (L)Iablllty rules protect some­
thing. Compensation under a liability rule Is for harm done and 
loss suffered. The loss Is the diminution In value of one's resources 
. . . one's property. In this sense the 'objective' value of one's 
holdings Is protected by liability rules; the value of the Interest 
Is left Intact. But a liability rule confers no liberty or autonomy 
on an entitled party, and therefore secures no such liberty. (154) 
(T)he right Is the liberty, not the value (I.e. utility) to anyone 
having or exercising that liberty. . . . (I)n the view that rights 
entail liberties, the most liability rules can secure Is a level of 
welfare equal to the value of the right bearer's Interest, Including 
even his Interest In his autonomy. . . . Rights secure a domain of 
autonomy. (155) 
Liability rules permit others to act without regard to the right 
holder's autonomy over his holdings. ... (A) right Is a domain of 
protected control, . . . liability rules protect rights. Both 
claims are plausible, but apparently Incompatible. (156) 
Coleman and Kraus Indicated that: 
The point of conferring an entitlement arguably Is to secure a domain 
of control, not to guarantee a particular level of welfare or utility. 
(157) 
An entitlement to an education, or a property right, Is conferred by the 
action of state government. Once the state has established a property 
right to an education, the entitlement to such a right gains legal stand­
ing In an examination by the Judiciary. 
Rights . . . demarcate a realm of liberty or control. Rights are 
secured or protected liberties. (158) 
States have established education as a constitutionally protected 
right. The United States Supreme Court stated that: 
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tu+e for public schools.. . . . One's right to life, liberty, and 
property . . . and other fundamental rights may not be submitted 
to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections. . . . This 
Is not the moment In history for a state to experiment with Ig­
norance. When It does, It must expect close scrutiny of the ex­
periment. (164) 
Judge Joseph F. Wels, of the Court of Appeals for the Third Cir­
cuit, stated that: 
The financial assistance granted to educational Institutions by 
the federal government has led to Its (the federal government) 
ever-Increasing Influence In a> field which In times past was con­
sidered the domain of state, local or private activity. (165) 
Judge Wels, reviewing "The Equal Educational Opportunities Act," 
HB 13915, dated February 28, 1972, stated that Section 2, Subsection 
(a) held that: 
. . .(I)t (the Equal Educational Opportunities Act) holds to be 
the policy of the United States that all public school children are 
entitled to equal educational opportunity ... . Judicial 
zeal for Identity of educational methodology should not lead us 
to presume that Congress would Impose such limitations upon the 
nationwide teaching community by equivocation or Innuendo. (166) 
Johns and Morphet addressed the entitlement definition of Oran In 
their work; they stated that: 
Equality of educational opportunity Is an objective to which prac­
tically every American citizen has subscribed In theory for many 
years. Equality of educational opportunity for all does not mean 
that every student should have the same program of education. In­
stead, It means that every person should have the opportunity for 
the kind and quality of education that will best meet his needs 
as an Individual and as a member of the society In which he lives. 
. . . Many studies have shown, and numerous authorities have comm­
ented on, the tragedy Inherent In wasted human and natural re­
sources. There can be no doubt that the nation has been seriously 
handicapped by this neglect or that It cannot be afforded In the 
future. The maximum development of the human resources of the 
nation therefore should be the primary concern of all citizens. . 
. . Adequacy of opportunity Is as Important as equality, and the 
two must go hand In hand If civilization Is to flourish. (167) 
Johns and Morphet stated further that: 
The Income of the citizens of a state affects their potential ex-
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pendl+ure for education and other governmental services. The ex­
penditure for education on a state-wide basis seem to bear rather 
directly on the quality of education provided. . . . With the 
great mobility of population at the present time, Ft Is evident 
that Inadequate educational opportunities In a state not only 
handicap the people In that state but constitute a problem for 
other states to which some of these people migrate. It Is evi­
dent that under modern conditions, the nation cannot afford the 
losses resulting from the presence of the substantial members 
In the total population who have Inadequate educational opportun­
ity. (168) 
An entitlement Is a right to something once a person shows that he 
meets the legal requirement to get It. (169) Education, as an entitle­
ment, Is a protected right on the state level; using the analogy of 
Judge Wels, education has become more of a federal question because 
of the large Infusion of federal monies. With the acceptance and 
application of federal monies, there exists enhanced federal Involve­
ment and control. From this federal Involvement through Increased levels 
of federal spending on education and educational programs, Congress has 
stated that the " . . . policy of the United States shall be that all 
public school children are entitled to equal education opportunity . . " 
(170) 
Based on a consideration of the legislative activity and the judic­
ial decisions, an entitlement exists when: 
( 1 ) a  s t a t e  d e c l a r e s  t h a t  I t  I s  a  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y  p r o t e c t e d  a c t ­
ivity; 
(2) the Congress states that It Is a protected activity; and 
(3) the United States Supreme Court declares that It supports the 
state and federal positions. 
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EDUCATION AS A PRIVILEGE 
A privilege Is defined as "... an advantage not enjoyed by all." 
(171) Education Is conferred by the states upon a special class of In­
dividuals without having a federal mandate to do so. The fifty states 
have Independently chosen to grant the privilege of an education to the 
special class; the states, having chosen to grant the privilege, may 
select to terminate this condition. The special class, as created by 
the fifty states, Is children between the ages of six and sixteen years 
of age. (172) Through the use of compulsory attendance laws, the states 
have required the special class of Individuals to be In attendance. 
William W. van Alstyne stated that: 
The (Supreme Court) has been seeking to refute the Implication 
that the government may arbitrarily regulate an Interest In which 
a citizen does not have specifically enumerated rights. (173) 
Since the state Is not bound by the federal Constitution to provide an 
education to all of Its citizens, the state may choose to provide the 
educational privilege, or may select not to provide It. 
Under Its broad and general police powers, a state may create Insti­
tutions that promote and provide for the general welfare of Its citizens. 
Education at the public's expense Is one of these creations; a state has 
provided the Institution outside federal consideration of a constitution­
al "fundamental Interest." 
van Alstyne stated that: 
. . . (I)t seemingly makes no difference that the threatened Int­
erest Is a privilege rather than a right. Even a privilege, benefit, 
opportunity, or public advantage may not be granted to some but with­
held from others where the basis of classification and differences 
In treatment Is arbitrary. (174) 
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The Constitution specifies the powers of the federal government, 
and all of those not explicitly listed are reserved for the states. 
This great reservoir of power delegated by the federal system of 
government to the states creates the foundation for state and local 
governments. Education Is one of the powers and responsibilities 
reserved by Implication for state and local governments. (175) 
Webster defined a privilege as "A right or Immunity granted as a 
peculiar benefit, advantage, or favor." (176) Oran defined Drlvllege 
as "A basic right that cannot be taken away; special advantage, as op­
posed to a right." (177) 
Johns and Morphet stated that: 
. . . (T)he 'system' of education developed In the United States 
does not constitute a 'regular orderly arrangement of parts In a 
connected and Interrelated series of whole' and, therefore, should 
only be loosely referred to as a system. It was not developed by 
a national government as In many other countries, nor Is It control­
led by the federal government except In a few fundamental respects 
relating especially to the 'equal protection' provisions In the 
Constitution. Education, therefore, Is basically a responsibil­
ity of each state ... .(178) 
Each of the major levels of government In the United States -
federal, state, and local - has an Interest In the public school, 
and all are Involved In the financing ... . (179) 
Although education Is really a quasl-system nationally, the diver­
sity seems to have contributed substantially to Its development 
over the 200 years of our history. Moreover, a I I aspects of educa­
tion have been bonded together by a common belief among the citizens 
that education Is one of the most efficient and effective ways to 
ensure progress toward the better life. (180) 
Steven Glfls stated that a privilege was: 
. . . (A)n advantage not enjoyed by all; 'a particular or peculiar 
benefit enjoyed by a person, company, or class beyond the common 
advantages of other citizens; an exceptional or extroardlnary ex­
emption; or an Immunity held beyond the course of the law. And, 
again. It Is defined to be an exemption from some burden or attend­
ance, with which certain persons are Indulged, from a supposition 
of the law that their public duties or services, or the offices In 
which they are engaged, are such as required all their time and 
care, and that therefore, without this Indulgence, those duties 
could not be performed to that advantage which the public good 
demands. (181) 
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If a court now determines that society has begun to recognize that 
denial of a new Interest such as education rivals the personal and 
societal detriment created by denial of more traditionally recog­
nized rights, It would seem that the court should label such an 
Interest fundamental and treat It as a right. (182) 
William W. van Alstyne, In his work, argued that since Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. first enumerated the right-privilege dist­
inction In McAULIFFE v. MAYOR OF NEW BEDFORD: 
The Court has been seeking to refute the Implication that the govern­
ment may arbitrarily regulate any Interest In which a citizen does 
not have specifically enumerated right. He further reasons that It 
has been most successful under the rubric of equal protection 
where It has, In effect, allowed the equal protection clause to 
swallow all of the old doctrines of substantive due process. Rath­
er, the Court defines sufficiently Imporant private Interests, such 
as voting In REYNOLDS or felony appeals in DOUGLAS, and protects 
these from arbitrary governmental Interference. He concludes that 
the extension of the private Interests that deserve protection Is 
justified by the 'substantial Influence which expanded govern­
mental activity gives the government over the private lives of Its 
citizenry.' (183) 
van Alstyne further stated that: 
As the structure of society has changed, so too have those Interests 
that deserve special protection. (184) 
Education provides a particular benefit, a privilege, enjoyed by 
those Individuals who have attended any of the schools maintained by 
state or federal governments. American society has long recognized the 
benefits, Immediate, and future considerations, of one's possessing an 
education. Forty-nine of the fifty states have In place compulsory 
school attendance laws; possession of these compulsory attendance laws 
gives clear Intentions of the value that each of the states hold with 
regards to education at the public's expense. Succinctly stated, Dubllc 
education has been created by the fifty states without their having a 
federal mandate to do so; therefore, states, having created the public 
service, may remove It. The Supreme Court, lower federal, and state 
I! f 
courts have supported this concept; however, the courts have held that 
If the state does eliminate public education service, the states must 
anticipate strict judicial scrutiny. Courts have held that the state 
demonstrating a "Compelling State Interest" will have little effect 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ANALYSIS OF SELECTED MAJOR COURT DECISIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
Supreme Court decisions delivered during the oast sixty years Dro-
vlde a judicial record of the Court's response to auestlons asked of 
It. Decisions affecting education were selected as being representative 
of the different periods of change that the Court has undergone over the 
past sixty years. This span covered the upheaval and change within Am­
erican society that has Influenced the present function, operation, div­
ersity, and organization of education In the 1960s. The Supreme Court 
has been In the forefront of change, and the Court's constitutional In­
terpretations were the primary vehicle for changes that have affected 
present day education. (I) 
The late Senator Sam Ervln, In quoting from George Washington's 
Farewell Address, stated: 
If In the opinion of the people, the distribution or modification 
of the constitutional powers be In any particular wrong, let It be 
corrected by an amendment in the way which the Constitution desig­
nates. But let there be no change by usurpation; for though this, 
In one Instance, may be the Instrument of good, It is the custom­
ary weapon by which free governments are destroyed. The precedent 
must always overbalance In permanent evil any partial or transient 
benefit which the use can at any time yield. (2) 
The challenge by President George Washington was relevant and AD-
proprlate to the conditions present during the second Washington admin­
istration; It Is also appropriate and relevant to the three branches of 
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government of the Reagan administration, and to the future administra­
tions . 
Senator Ervln, an ardent United States Supreme Court watcher and 
a great lover of the Constitution, summarized the right and the awesome 
responsibility of the judiciary to Interpret the Constitution. He 
stated: 
The power to Interpret the Constitution Is an awesome power. This 
Is so because, In truth, constitutional government cannot exist In 
our land unless this power Is exercised aright. Chief Justice 
Harlan F. Stone (1941 - 1946) had this thought In mind when stat­
ing this truth concerning Supreme Court Justices; 'While uncon­
stitutional exercise of power by the executive and legislative 
branches of the government Is subject to judicial restraint, the 
only check upon our exercise of power Is our own sense of self-
restraint.' (3) 
The Dower to Interpret the Constitution, which has been a Noted 
to the Supreme Court, and the power to amend the Constitution, which Is 
assigned to Congress and the states acting In concert, are quite diff­
erent. The power to Interoret the Constitution Is the power to ascer­
tain Its meaning, and the power to amend the Constitution Is the power 
to change Its meaning. Justice 3enjam!n N. Cardozo (1932 - 1938) put 
the distinction between the two powers when he said: 
'We (the Supreme court justices) are not at liberty to revise 
while professing to construe.' (4) 
Justice George Sutherland (1922-1938) elaborated upon the distinc­
tion In another way: 
The judicial function Is that of Interpretation: It does not In­
clude the power of amendment under the guise of Interpretation. 
To miss the point of difference between the two Is to miss all that 
the phrase 'supreme law of the land' stands for and to convert what 
were Intended as Inescapable and enduring mandates Into mere moral 
reflections. (5) 
Since It Is a court of law, the Supreme Court acts as the Inter-
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prefer of the Constitution only In a litigated case whose decision of 
necessity turns on some provision tof that Instrument. As a consequence, 
the function of the Court Is to ascertain and give effect to the Intent 
of those who framed and rattfled the provision In Issue. If the pro­
vision Is plain, the Court must gather the Intent solely from Its lang­
uage, but If the provision Is ambiguous, the Court must place Itself 
as nearly as possible In that condition of those who framed and ratif­
ied It, and In that way determine the Intent the language was used to 
express. For these reasons, the Supreme Court Is duty bound to Inter-
Dret the Constitution. (6) 
Justice Robert H. Jackson (1941 - 1954) stated that: 
Rightly orworngly, the belief Is widely held by the practicing 
profession that this Court no longer resDects Impersonal rules of 
law but Is guided In these matters by personal Impressions which 
from time to time may be shared by a majority of the justices. 
Whatever has been Intended, this Court also has generated an Im­
pression In much of the judiciary that regard for precedents and 
authorities Is obsolete, that words no longer mean what they have 
always meant to the profession, that the law knows no fixed prin­
ciples. (7) 
The genius of the Constitution Is this: The grants of power It 
makes and the limitations It Imposes are Inflexible, but the oowers 
It grants extend Into the future and are exercisable, with lib­
erality on all occasions by the departments In which they are 
vested. (8) 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes (1902 - 1932) stated that: 
We live by symbols, and what shall be symbolized by any Image of the 
sight depends upon the mind of him who sees It. (9) 
The Court Is the symbol that our society has visualized to follow. 
The Supreme court has the obligation, the right, and the power to inter­
pret the Constitution; this Is established by the Constitution In clear 
language. What Is not clear Is the extent to which the limits of these 
powers extend. 
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Supreme Court decisions represent a pattern of constitutional law 
that are guidelines and Interpretations for Americans to examine. The 
Court's opinions provide a legal framework from which to plan and or­
ganize educational activities to ensure that the Intent of the Consti­
tution Is upheld. The past sixty years of judicial activity present 
an Increasing amount of judicial action affecting public education. 
OVERVIEW 
The selected review of the Supreme Court's opinions has been div­
ided Into four periods; each period reflected the Influence and leader­
ship of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court during that period. The 
selected opinions also reflected the Court's position on education 
as a right, entitlement, and privilege from four distinct periods: 
these periods of Supreme Court activity are: Judicial Constraint, Act­
ivist Period, Restraint Oerlod, and Retreat Period. (10) From a div­
ision of Supreme Court opinions, the researcher had an opportunity to 
examine developed and emerging patterns of Supreme Court behavior that 
affect education. 
The process of selecting United States Supreme Court opinions and 
lower federal and state court opinions Involved use of the following 
criteria: 
(!) Did the opinion have a significant Impact upon education? 
(2) What was the vote of the court on the decision? 
(3) Which justice wrote the majority opinion? Did he, or she 
represent the liberal, conservative, or middle section of the Court? 
(4) Did the minority opinion make a superior contribution than 
did the majority opinion? 
13! 
(5) What were the general comments of legal scholars and journal­
ists? 
(6) What was the public reaction to the decision? 
(7) What were the reactions of the lower federal and state Courts? 
Each of the divisions of Supreme Court activity had several dlcls-
lons that were representatlve of the positions that the Court had held; 
the following decisions are a selected sampling from each of these per­
iods. 
The Period of Judicial Constraint (1921 - 1953) was represented 
by: MEYER v. NEBRASKA, 262 US 390 (1922); and SKINNER v. OKLAHOMA, 316 
US 483 (1942). 
The Activist Period (1953 - 1968) was represented by: 3R0WN v. 
BOARD OF EDUCATION 347 US 483 (1954); and SHAPIRO v. THOMPSON, 394 US 
618 (1968). 
The Restraint Period (1968 - 1986) was represented by: TINKER v. 
DES MOINES, 393 US 503 (1969); SAN ANTONIO v. RODRIGUEZ, 410 US I 
(1973); GOSS v. LOPEZ, 419 US 656 (1975); COMMITTEE FOR PUBLIC EDUCA­
TION v. REGAN, 444 US 646 (1980); DLYLER v. DOE, 50 USLW 4655 (1982); 
and MUELLER v. ALLEN, 463 US 388 (1983) 
The Retreat Period (1986 - Present) was represented by: EDWARDS v. 
AGUILLARD, 55 USLW 4860 (1987). 
Several federal and state court decisions have been selected which 
demonstrate the effect that Supreme Court decisions have had upon the 
lower courts' decisions as well as the effect that these decisions have 
had upon the United States Supreme Court. All of the federal and state 
court decisions have been selected from the Activist Period of the Sup­
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reme Court's activity owing to the activity and exchange that had oc­
curred between the United States Supreme court and the lower federal 
and state courts. The selected federal and state court decisions were: 
(a) SERRANO v. PRIEST, 96 CAL R. 601, 487 P. 2d 1241 (1971) 
(b) BOARD OF EDUCATION v. OKLAHOMA, 409 F. 2d 665 ( 1969) 
(c) ROBINSON v. CAHILL, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A. 2d 273 (1973) 
(d) ZOLL v. ANKER, 414 F. Supp. 1024 (1976) - New York 
(e) H0RT0N v. MESKILL, 172 CONN 615, 376 A. 2d 359 (1977) 
THE PERIOD OF JUDICIAL CONSTRAINT - 1921 to 1953 
It was a period that was characterized by the leadership and 
Influence of four Chief Justices; they were: William H. Taft (1921 -
1930); Charles Evans Hughes (1930 - 1941); Harlan FIske Stone (194! -
1946); and Frederick Moore Vinson (1946 - 1953). This period had been 
witness to a notable period of judicial restraint and conservative act-
Ion toward Intervention Into the area of education. The Court had 
held a fairly consistent approach towards Interpreting the United States 
Constitution along the dictates of an Orlglnallst's Intent. 
MEYER v. NEBRASKA, 262 US 390 (1922) 
The Issue In MEYER v. NEBRASKA was the legitimate teaching of 
German, a language, to junior high school students. Owing to the con­
flict In Europe that had been concluded, Nebraska had passed an ordin­
ance forbidding the teaching of any courses of Instruction In any lang­
uage except English. An Instructor In Nebraska taught a ten year old 
student reading In the child's native language, German. 
The Supreme court stated that: 
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The relation to the common good of a law fixing a minimum of ed­
ucation Is readily perceived, but how one fixing a maximum - lim­
iting the field of human knowledge - can serve the public welfare 
or add substantially to the security of life, liberty, or the our-
sult of hapdness Is Inconceivable. (II) 
Justice McReynolds writing for the Court stated that: 
The hours whtch a child Is able to devote to study In the confine­
ment of school are limited. It must have ample time for exercise 
or play. Its dally capacity for learning Is comDaratlvely small. 
A selection of subjects for tts education, therefore, from among 
the many that be taught Is obviously necessary. (12) 
The Court saw that the State of Nebraska had a right to regulate the 
operation of Its established schools through oassaqe of statutes. 
The obvious purpose of this statute was that the English language 
should become the mother tongue of all children reared In this 
state. The enactment of such a statute comes reasonably within 
the DO I Ice power of the state. (13) 
The Court examined the rights of the Individual teacher against 
the "liberty Inte'rest" of the Fourteenth Amendment. It stated that: 
While this Court has not attemoted to define with exactness the 
liberty ... . Without doubt, It denotes not merely freedom from 
bodily restraint but also the right of the Individual to contract, 
to engage In any of the common occupations of life, to acquire 
useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, 
to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and 
generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized In common law 
as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. (14) 
Addressing directly the Important position that education occupied 
In this nation, the Supreme Court stated that: 
The American people have always regarded education and acquisition 
of knowledge as matters of supreme Importance which should be dilig­
ently promoted. The Ordinance of 1787 declares, 'Religion, moral­
ity, and knowledge being necessary to good government and the happi­
ness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall be forever 
encouraged.' Corresponding to the right of control, It Is the nat­
ural duty of the parent to give his children education suitable to 
their station In life; and nearly all the States, Including Nebras­
ka, enforce this obligation by compulsory laws. (15) 
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Practically education of the young Is only possible In schools 
conducted by especially qualified persons who devote themselves 
thereto. The calling (to become a teacher) always has been re­
garded as useful and honorable, essential, Indeed, to the public 
welfare. . . . (The teacher's) . . . right thus to teach and the 
right of parents to engage him so to Instruct their children, we 
think are within the liberty of the Amendment. (16) 
The Supreme Court specifically addressed the role of the State 
In providing the facilities and policies necessary for education of 
Its citizens. The Cburt stated: 
That the State may do much, go very far, Indeed, In order to Im­
prove the qualtty of Its citizens, physically, mentally and moral­
ly, Is clear; but the Individual has certain fundamental rights 
which must be respected. The protection of the Constitution ex­
tends to all, to those who speak other languages as well as to 
those born with English on the tongue. (17) 
The desire of the legislature to foster a homogeneous people with 
American Ideals prepared readily to understand current discussions 
of civic matters Is easy to appreciate. . . . The power of the 
State to compel attendance at some school and to make reasonable 
regulations for all schools, Including a requirement that they 
shall give Instructions In English, Is not questioned. Nor has 
challenge been made of the State's power to prescribe a curriculum 
for Institutions which It supports. (18) 
The Supreme Court In MEYER, recognizing the rights of the state, 
foreshadowed the BROWN and SERRANO decisions respecting education as 
a protected "fundamental Interest." The Court established a basis for 
the consideration of education from the "Liberty Interests" of the 
fourteenth amendment: yet, the Court In RODRIGUEZ rejected this analysis 
of the Interest and the BROWN argument. 
The MEYER court held that "Llbety Interests" could be defined as 
" ... to acquire useful knowledge ..." (at 400) and "... to en­
joy those privileges long recognized In common law as essential to the 
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." (at 400) 
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The key phrase from the MEYER decision Is . . . the means of ed-
ucatlon shall be forever encouraged.11 (at 40!) When compared to the 
RODRIGUEZ decision, the distinction between the two opinions of the 
Court Is perceptively apparent when viewed from the two periods of 
Supreme Court activity. (19) 
SKINNER v. OKLAHOMA, 316 US 535 (1942) 
The Issue In SKINNER v. OKLAHOMA was a statute passed by the State 
of Oklahoma that provided for the sterilization of habitual criminals. 
Although the SKINNER decision was not primarily an education, It does 
offer a clear definition of the rule of "Strict Scrutiny" that the United 
States Supreme Court had employed under the color of the fourteenth 
amendment. This rule has been used by courts that followed to make 
decisions affecting education. 
In SKINNER, the Court held that: 
i . . the Constitution does not require things which are differ­
ent In fact or ooIn Ion to be treated In law as though they were the 
same. ... We must remember that the machinery of government would 
not work If It were not allowed a little olay In Its joints. . . 
. For a state Is not constrained In the exercise of Its police power 
to Ignore experience which marks a class of offenders or a family 
of offenses for special treatment. Nor Is It prevented by the 
equal protection clause from confining 'Its restriction to those 
classes of cases where the need Is deemed to be clearest.1 ' . . 
. (T)he law does all that is needed when It does all that It can, 
Indicates a policy, apolles It to all within the lines, and seeks 
to bring within the lines all similarly situated so far and so 
fast as Its means allow. (20) 
This Is a clear definition of the equal protection clause of the 
fourteenth amendment. 
The Supreme Court Identified two ''rights" not mentioned In the words 
of the United States Constitution: It classified them as "fundament­
al rights." The Court stated that "Marriage and procreation are fund­
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amental to the very existence and survival of the race." (21) The.Con­
stitution made no mention of these two rights; however, they are viewed 
by the majority of the population of Americans to be so fundamental 
that It Is not necessary to have them spelled out In the wording of the 
federal Constitution. (22) 
We advert to them (the police power of the State) merely In empha­
sis of our view that strict scrutiny of the classification which a 
state makes In a sterilization law Is essential, lest unwittingly, 
or otherwise, Invidious discriminations are made against grouDs or 
types of Individuals In violation of the constitutional guaranty 
of just and equal laws. The guaranty of 'equal protection of the 
laws Is a pledge of the protection of equal laws. . . . When the 
Jaw lays an unequal hand on those who have committed Intrinsically 
the same quality of offense and sterilizes one and not the other, 
it has made as Invidious a discrimination as If It had selected a 
particular race or nationality for oppressive treatment. (23) 
Justice Stone, In a concurring opinion, stated that: 
. . . the most elementary notions of due process would seem to re-
qul re ft (the State) to take appropriate steps to safeguard the 
liberty of the Individual by affording him . . . some opportunity 
to show that he Is without such Inheritable tendencies. The state 
Is called on to sacrifice no Dermlsslble end when It Is required to 
reach Its objective by a reasonable and just procedure adequate to 
safeguard rights of the Individual which concededly the Constitu­
tion protects. (24) 
THE ACTIVIST °ERIOD - 1953 to 1968 
This particular period of the United States Supreme Court, led by 
the activist faction of the Court, produced some of the most revolut­
ionary concepts that the Supreme Court had produced to this point In the 
history of the Court. The rationale that the Court used for Its Innova­
tions was the Non-Orlgllal1st position of Interpretation of the United 
States Constitution. This Non-Orlglnal1st Interpretation of the federal 
Constitution began to move the Court toward Involvement In more social 
and political Issues. 
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BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION, 347 US 483 (1954) - BROWN I 
No other decision represented this period better than the Court's 
opinion In BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION; It has commonly been referred 
to as BORWN I. In BROWN 1, the Supreme Court consolidated desegregation 
cases from the States of Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and Dela­
ware. 
In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 
1868 when the (Fourteenth) Amendment was adopted, or even to 1856 
when PLESSY v. FERGUSON, 163 US 537 (1896) was written. We must 
consider public education In the light of Its full development 
and Its present place In American life throughout the Nation. Only 
In this wa can It be determined If segregation In public schools 
deprives these plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws. (25) 
The most often cited passage of BROWN I, as well as the most power­
ful and far reaching statement, stated that: 
Today, education Is perhaps the most Important function of state 
and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the 
great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition 
of the Importance of education to our democratic society. It Is 
required In the oerformance of our most basic public responsibil­
ities, even service in the armed forces. It Is the very foundation 
of good citizenship. Today It Is a prlnclDal Instrument In awak­
ening the child to cultural values, In preparing him for later 
professional training, and In helping him to adjust normally to 
his environment. In these days, It Is doubtful that any child may 
reasonably be expected to succeed In life If he Is denied the op­
portunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state 
has undertaken to provide It, Is a right which must be made avail­
able to all on equal terms. (26) 
These two key auotes point to the recognition of education as a con­
stitutionally protected right; however, they were rejected by the United 
States Supreme Court during Its Restraint Period. The Court stated In 
RODRIGUEZ v. SAN ANTONIO that: 
It Is not the province of this Court to create substantive constitu­
tional rights In the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the 
laws. Thus, the key to discovering whether education Is 'fundamental' 
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Is not to be found In comparisons of the relative societal signif­
icance of education as opposed to subsistence or housing. (27) 
SHAPIRO v. THOMPSON, 394 US 618 (1968) 
In SHAPIRE v. THOMPSON,. THE United States Supreme court gave ex­
pression to the Influence of the social sciences as It expanded the 
definitions of "rights" and "prlvfleges." In SHAPIRO, the Court cited 
the writing In UNITED STATES v. GUEST, 383 US 745 (1966). It stated 
that: 
. . . (T)he right (to travel from one State to another) finds no 
explicit mention In the Constitution. The reason, It has been 
suggested, Is that a right so elementary was conceived from the 
beginning to be a necessary concomitant of the stronger Union the 
Constitution created. In any event, freedom to travel throughout 
the United States has long been recognized as a basic right under 
the Constitution. (28) 
The Court In SHAPI R.Q stated that: 
If a law has 'no other purpose . . . than to chill the assertion 
of constitutional rights by penalizing those who choose to exercise 
them, then It Is patently unconstitutional. (29) 
Justice Harlan, in a dissenting opinion, stated that: 
. . . Congress has full power to define the relationship between 
citizens and the federal government. (30) 
The Supreme Court decision In SHAPIRO v. THOMPSON Is not prim­
arily an educational Issue; However, It does point out that although 
certain rljhts are not explicitly mentioned in the language of the 
United States Constitution, there can exist certain conditions that 
would constitute the rationale for the Suprsme Court giving strict con­
sideration to the Issue contending for the elevation of a "right." 
Education holds as much promise for the conslderation as a 'right" as 
does travel; both occupy a similar unenumerated rights position. Ed­
ucation does not hold a superior claim of right, It only deserves equal 
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consideration. 
The Activist Period of the Supreme court witnessed several Inno­
vative examinations of explosive social and political Issues. The 
decisions from the Activist per!od have produced a tremendous amount 
of academic and scholarly examination. The Supreme Court during this 
period exercised more of the Non-Original 1st Interpretation of the 
Constitution than any of the. Courts to this point In'the history of the 
Court. 
THE RESTRAINT PERIOD - 1968 to I9e6 
Under the leadership of Chief Justice, Warren Burger, the United 
States Supreme Court began to examine the Interpretation of the Consti­
tution from a more restrained, Original 1st point of view. This period 
of Supreme Court activity Is a contrast to the previous period. The 
period Is distinguished by two landmark decisions, TINKER and RODRIGUEZ. 
TINKER v. DES MOINES INDEPENDENT COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 393 US 503 
(1969) 
TINKER v. DES MOINES was a case Involving a student's use of an arm­
band as a form of protest arising from the Viet Nam War. The Court stat­
ed that: 
Any word spoken, in class, In the lunchroom, or on the campus, that 
dlvlates from the views of another person may start an argument or 
cause a disturbance. But our Constitution says we must take this 
risk . . .; and our history says that It Is this sort of hazardous 
freedom - this kind of openness - that Is the basts of our national 
strength end of the Independence and vigor of Americans who grow up 
and live In this relatively permissive, often disputatious society. 
(31) 
The Court confirmed legal status upon school officials, acting as repre-
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sentatlves of the state, when It stated that: 
In order for the State fn the person of school officials to just -
Ify prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, II must be 
able to show that Its actions was caused by something more than a 
mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always 
accompany an unpopular viewpoint. (32) 
The Supreme Court entered Into explicit discussions of educational 
behavior when It stated that: 
In our system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of totali­
tarianism. School officials do not possess absolute authority over 
their students. Students fn school as well as out of school are 
'persons' under our Constitution. They are possessed of fundament­
al rights which the State must respect. In our system, students may 
not be regarded as closed-circuit recipients of only that which 
the State chooses to communicate. They may not be confined to the 
expression of those sentiments that are officially aoproved. In 
the absence of a specific showing of constitutionally valid reasons 
to regulate their speech, students are entitled to freedom of ex­
pression of their views. (33) 
The Court cited Plato's reference to Institutions In MEYER and 
Justice Brennan's writing In KEYISHIAN v. BOARD OF REGENTS, 385 US 589 
(1967) In which Justice Brennan stated that: 
The vigilant orotectlon of constitutional freedoms Is nowhere more 
vital than In the community of American schools (SHELTON v. TUCKER, 
364 US 479 (I960). The Classroom Is percullarly the 'marketplace 
of Ideas.' The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through 
wide exposure to that robust exchange of Ideas which discovers 
truth ' out of a multitude of tongues, rather than through any kind 
of authoritative selection. ' (34) 
The most often cited passage of TINKER stated that: 
The principle of these cases Is not confined to the supervised and 
ordained discussion which takes place In the classroom. The prin­
cipal use to which the schools are dedicated Is to accommodate 
students during prescribed hours for the purpose of certain types 
of activities. Among those activities Is persona! Intercommunica­
tion among students. This Is not only an Inevitable part of the 
process of attending school; It Is also an Important part of the 
educational process. A student's rights, therefore, do not embrace 
merely the classroom hours. (35) 
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Under our Constitution, free speech ts not a right that Is given 
only to be so circumscribed that It exists In principle but not In 
fact. Freedom of expression would not truly exist If the right 
could be exercised only In an area that a benevolent government has 
provided as a safe haven for crackpots. The Constitution says 
that Congress (and the States) may not abridge the right to free 
Speech. This provision means what It says. We properly read It 
to permit reasonable regulation of speech-connected activities In 
carefully restricted circumstances. But we do not confine the 
permissible exercise of First Amendment rights to a telephone 
booth or the four corners of a pamphlet, or to supervised or or­
dained discussion in a school classroom. (36) 
Justice Hugo L. Black In a dissenting opinion In TINKER stated 
The original Idea of schools, which I do not believe Is yet ab­
andoned as worthless or out of date, was that children had not yet 
reached the point of exoerlence and wisdom which enabled them to 
teach all of their elders. It may be that the Nation has outworn 
the old-fashioned slogan that 'children are to be seen not heard,' 
but one may, I hope, be permitted to harbor the thought that tax­
payers send children to school on the premise that at their age 
they need to learn, not teach. . . . It Is not for us to enter­
tain conjectures In opposition to the views of the State and 
annul Its regulations upon disputable considerations of their 
wisdom or necessity. (3*7) 
Justice Black provided Insight when he stated that: 
Change has been said to be truly the law of life but sometimes 
the old and the tried and true are worth holding. The schools of 
this Nation have undoubtedly contributed to giving us tranquility 
and to making us a more law-abiding people. Uncontrolled and un­
controllable liberty Is an enemy to domestic peace. We cannot 
close our eyes to the fact that some of the country's greatest 
problems are crimes committed by the youth, too many of school 
age. (38) 
Turned loose with lawsuits for damages and Injunctions against 
their teachers as they are here, It Is nothing but wishful think­
ing to Imagine that young, Immature students will not soon believe 
It Is their right to control the schools rather than the right of 
the States that collect the taxes to hire the teachers for the 
benefit of the pupils. This case (TINKER); therefore, wholly 
without constitutional reasons In my judgment, subjects all the 
public schools In the country to the whims and caprices of their 
loudest-mouthed, but maybe not their brightest, students. I, 
for one, am not fully persuaded that school pupils are wise enough, 
even with this Court's expert help from Washington, to run the 
23,390 public school systems (Statistical Abstract of the United 
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States (1968), Table No. 578, p. 406) In our 50 states. I wish, 
therefore, wholly to disci aim any purpose on my part to hold that 
the Federal Constitution compels the teachers, parents, and elect­
ed officials to surrender control of the American public school 
system to public school students. (39) 
SAN ANTONIO INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT v. RODRIGUEZ, 411 US I  (1973) 
The United States Supreme Court placed education In a new category 
with Its decision In RODRIGUEZ. The Court, led by Chief Justice Burger, 
placed a wide distance between Its decision In RODRIGUEZ and the position 
of the Warren Court In BROWN I. The Influence of the RODRIGUEZ decis­
ion lasted almost one year then It was quietly disregarded. (40) 
Justice Powell wrote the opinion In RODRIGUEZ for the majority of the 
Court which was comprised of Justices Powell, Burger, Stewart, Rlackmun, 
and Rehnqulst; the dissenting opinions were f i led by Justices 3rennan, 
White, Douglas, and Marshall. The Court stated the problem: 
It Is this question - whether education Is a fundamental right, In 
the sense that It Is among the rights and l iberties protected by 
the Constitution - which has so consumed the attention of courts and 
commentators In recent years. (41) 
The Court recognized the efforts of lower federal courts and state 
courts that had held education to be a constitutionally protected ' 'r ight." 
It cited SERRANO v. PRIEST, van DUSARTZ v. HATFIELD, and ROBINSON v. 
CAHILL lower court decisions. 
The United States Supreme Court In PODRIGUEZ, citing BROWN I, 
stated: 
. . . education Is perhaps the most Important function of state 
and local governments . .. .(42) 
then stated that: 
. . . expressing an abiding respect for the vital role of education 
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a free society, may be found In numerous opinions of justices of 
this Court writing both before and after BROWN I was decided. (43) 
The Supreme Court In RODRIGUEZ gave a reason why education was not, 
In Its oplonon, a fundamental constitutional "right" under the language 
of the fourteenth amendment. It stated that: 
Nothing this Court holds today In any way detracts from our historic 
dedication to public education. We are In complete agreement with 
the conclusion of the three-judge oanel below that 'the grave sig­
nificance of educatton both to the Individual and to our society' 
cannot be doubted. But the Importance of a service performed by 
the State does not determine whether It must be regarded as fund­
amental for purposes of examination under the Equal Protection 
Clause. (44) 
The Court cited Justice Harlan In SHAPIRO v. THOMPSON In which 
he stated that: 
. . . virtually every state statute affects Important rights. 
. . (f)f the degree of judicial scrutiny of state legislation 
fluctuated, depending on a majority's view of the Importance of 
the Interest affected, we would have gone 'far toward making this 
Court a SUPER-LEGISLATURE. We would . . . then be assuming a 
legislative role and one for which the Court lacks both author­
ity and competence.' (45) 
Dr. Robert Bennett, the Dean of the Northwestern University Law 
School, stated that: 
The Court fn RODRIGUEZ characterized SHAPIRO and ROE (v. WADE) 
as recognizing Interests 'Implicitly' guaranteed by the Constitution. 
'Implicit' constitutional protection, however. Is always a matter 
of judgment, and the arguments for Implicit protection of travel 
or abortlonal privacy seem no stronger than those for education. 
Against this background the charge become plausible that the Court 
In RODRIGUEZ used the distinction between implicit constitutional 
Interests and those outside the document's protection as a shield 
to stave off an assault by the poor on the middle-class prerogative 
of well-fInanced public schools. (46) 
The logic that the Supreme Court used In RODRIGUEZ to justify Its 
reasoning for Its decision Is consistent with that used throughout the 
Period of Restraint. 
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It Is not the province of this Court to create substantive consti­
tutional rights In the name of guaranteeing equal protection of 
the laws. Thus, the key to discovering whether education Is 
'fundamental' Is not to be found In comparisons of the relative 
societal significance of education as opposed to subsistence or 
housing. Nor Is It to be found by weighing whether education Is 
as Important as the right to travel. Rather, the answer lies In 
assessing whether there Is a right to education explicitly or 
Implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution. (47) 
In a dissenting opinion In RODRIGUEZ, Justice William Brennan re­
jected the majority opinion. He stated that: 
. . .  I  a l s o  r e c o r d  m y  d i s a g r e e m e n t  w i t h  t h e  C o u r t ' s  r a t h e r  d i s ­
tressing assertion that a right may be deemed 'fundamental' for 
the purposes of equal protection analysis only If It Is 'explic­
itly or Implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution." . . .(0)ur 
prior cases stand for the Droposltlon that 'fundamental Ity1 Is, 
In large measure, a function of the right's Importance In terms 
of the effectuation of those rights which are In fact constitu­
tionally guaranteed. Thus, 'as the nexus between the specific 
constitutional guarantee and the non-const!tutlonaI Interest 
draws closer, the non-constltutlonaI Interest becomes mors fund­
amental and the degree of judicial scrutiny applied when the . 
Interest Is Infringed on a dlscrlmlnatory basis must be adjust­
ed accordingly.' . . . Here, there can be no doubt that education 
Is Inextricably linked to the right to participate In the elect­
oral process and to the rights of free soeech and association 
guaranteed by the First Amendment. . . . This being so, any 
classification affecting education must be subjected to strict 
scrutiny. (48) 
The decision process used by the United States SuDreme Court to 
admit education at public expense as being a "fundamental right" was 
difficult for the Court. The majority position was a narrow five to 
four advantage. 
GOSS v. LOPEZ, 419 US 565 (1975) 
In GOSS v. LOPEZ, the United States Supreme Court altered Its 
position about education and advocated the point of view that education 
could be considered an entitlement. The Court, In GOSS, was dealing 
with an educational administrative decision. 
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The Court pursued the administrative argument and stated that: 
. . . appeltants contend that because there Is no constitutional 
right to an education at public expense, the Due Process Clause 
does not protect against expulsions from the public school system. 
This position misconceives the nature of the Issue and Is refuted 
by prior decisions. (49) 
The Court held that the State of Ohio established education as a 
fundamental right within the language of the state constitution; there­
fore, 
. . .  o n  t h e  b a s i s  o f  s t a t e  l a w ,  a p p e l l e e s  p l a i n l y  h a d  l e g i t i m a t e  
claims of entitlement to a public education. (50) 
Having chosen to extend the right to an education to people of 
appellees' class generally, Ohio may not withdraw that right on 
grounds of misconduct, absent fundamentally fair procedures to 
determine whether the misconduct has occurred. (51) 
The Court stated that: 
Although Ohio may not be constitutionally obligated to establish 
and maintain a public school system, It has nevertheless done so 
and has required Its children to attend. Those young people do 
not 'shed their constitutional rlohts' at the school house door. 
(52) 
The Court defined the fourteenth amendment's limits by citing WEST 
VIRGINIA 30ARD OF EDUCATION v. BARNETTE, 319 US 62* (1943); It stated 
that: 
The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects 
the citizen against the State Itself and all of Its creatures -
Board of Education not excepted. (53) 
The authority possessed by the State to prescribe and enforce 
standards of conduct In Its school although concededly very broad, 
must be exercised consistently with constitutional safeguards. 
. . (T)he State Is constrained to recognize a student's legitimate 
entitlement to a public education as a property Interest which Is 
protected by the Due Process Clause and which may not be t~kon awry 
for misconduct without adherence to the minimum orocedures re-
aulred by that Clause. The Due Process Clause also forbids arbit­
rary deprivations of liberty. 'Where a person's good name, reputa-
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+Jon, honor, or Integrity Is at stake because of what the govern­
ment Is doing to him' the minimal requirements of the Clause must 
be satisfied. (54) 
The Court cited two cases as authority: WISCONSIN v. CONSTANTINEAU, 
400 US 433 (1971) at 437; and 30ARD OF REGENTS v. ROTH, 408 US 564 
(1972) at 573. 
The Court noted Its own admonitions; It stated that: 
Judicial Interposition In the operation of the Dubllc school system 
of the Nation raises problems requiring care and restraint. . . . 
By and large, public education In our Nation Is committed to the 
control of state and local authorities. (E°PERS0N v. ARKANSAS, 393 
US 97 (1968) at 104). (55) 
The Supreme Court defined the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth 
amendment to mean that: 
. . . there can be no doubt that at a minimum they reaulre that 
deprivation of life, liberty, or property by adjudication be pre­
ceded by notice and an ooportunlty for hearing appropriate to the 
nature of the case. . . .The fundamental reaulslte of due process 
of law Is the opportunity to be heard. . . . (A) right that 'has 
little reality or worth unless one Is Informed that the matter Is 
pending and can choose for himself whether to . . . contest.' (56) 
Justice Lewis Powell, In a dissenting opinion In GOSS, stated that: 
No one can foresee the ultimate frontiers of the new 'thicket' the 
Court now enters. Today's ruling appears to sweep within the pro­
tected Interest In educational process. 
The decision (In GOSS)- unnecessarlly opens avenues for judicial In­
tervention In the operation of our cub lie schools that may affect 
adversely the quality of education. The Court holds for the first 
time that the federal courts, rather than educational officials and 
state legislatures, have the authority to determine the rules applic­
able to routine classroom discipline of children and teenagers In 
the public schools. It justifies this unprecedented Intrusion Into 
the process of elementary and secondary education by Identifying a 
new constitutional right: the right of a student not to be suspend­
ed for as much as a single day without notice and a due Drocess 
hearing either before or promptly following the suspension. The 
Court's decision rests on the premise that, under Ohio law, educa­
tion Is a property Interest pro+ected by the Fourteenth Amendment's 
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Due Process Clause and therefore that any suspension requires not­
ice and a hearing. (57) 
Justice Lewis Powel! stated that: 
Thus the very legislation which 'defines' the 'dimension' of the 
student's entitlement, while providing a right to education gen­
erally, does not establish this right free of discipline Imposed 
In accord with Ohio law. Rather, the right Is encompassed In the 
entire package of statutory provisions governing education In 
Ohio - of which the power to suspend Is one. (58) 
Justice William H. Rehnqulst, In a dissenting opinion In CLEVELAND 
BOARD OF EDUCATION v. LaFLEUR, 4|4 US 632 (1974) at 659, provided some 
Insight on the Supreme Court's examination of rights and non-rights. 
He stated that: 
. . . the 'liberty' protected by the Due Process Clause of the Four­
teenth Amendment covers more than those freedoms explicitly named 
In the Bill of Rights ... . It requires no argument to show 
that the right to work for a living In the common occupations of 
the community Is of the very essence of the personal freedom and 
opportunity that It was the purpose of the Amendment to secure. 
. . (T)hls right to pursue an occupation Is presumably on the 
same lofty footing as the right of choice In matters of family 
life (59) 
In GOSS v. LOPEZ, the United States Supreme Court established the 
concept that education may be considered an entitlement under the language 
of the state constitution and supported by the federal Constitution. 
The Court addressed the 'liberty' Interest of the first section of the 
fourteenth amendment. 
COMMITTEE FOR PUBLIC EDUCATION AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY v. REGAN, 444 US 
646 (1980) 
In COMMITTEE FOR PUBLIC EDUCATION AND RELIGIOUS LI3ERTY v. REGAN, 
the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of church-state re­
lations In education. The Court stated that: 
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. . .any aid to even secular education functions of a sectarian 
school will be forbidden, and said that Its decisions relating to 
such aid tended to avoid categorical Imperatives and absolutist 
approaches at either end of the range of possible outcomes from 
permissible to Impermissible aid to religiously oriented schools. 
(60) 
The Supreme Court has ruled that a state law providing for the 
Issuance of revenue bonds to assist education Institutions In 
the construction, financing, and refinancing of projects did not 
run afoul of the First Amendment's establishment of religion 
clause Insofar as It benefited a sectarian college. (61) 
The Court In REGAN took a moderate approach to the position that 
religion occupies within the framework of an educational settlnq. The 
Court remained consistent In Its position that a wall of separation 
existed between religious activity and governmental actions. The Court 
supported the best educational benefit for the child position. 
PLYLER v. DOE. 50 USLW 4655 (1982) 
In PLYLER v. DOE, the United States Supreme Court held that to deny 
funds to a school district for the purpose of educating "Illegal aliens" 
violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. (62) 
Justice Prennan wrote for the majority of the Court comprised of Justices 
Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens; the minority was com­
prised of Justices Burger, White, RehnquJst, and O'Connor. 
From an examination of the PLYLER opinion, the Supreme Court demon­
strated a softening of Its position towards the constitutional position 
that education had occupied; previous United States Supreme Court decis­
ions had stated that education was not a constitutionally protected right. 
The Court stated that: 
Public education Is not a 'right' granted to Individuals by the 
Constitution. . . . But neither Is It merely some governmental 
'benefit' Indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare leg­
islation. Roth the Importance of education in maintaining our basic 
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Institutions, and the lasting Impact of Its deprivation on the 
life of the child, mark the distinction. The 'American people 
have always regarded education and the acquisition of knowledge 
as matters of supreme Importance.' ... We have recognized 
'the public school as a most vital civic Institution for the 
preservation of a democratic system of government,' . . . and 
as the primary vehicle for transmitting the 'values on which our 
society rests.' ... As noted early In our history, 'some de­
gree of education Is necessary to prepare citizens to participate 
effectively and Intelligently In our open political system If we 
are to oreserve freedom and Independence.' . . . And these histor­
ic 'perceptions of the public schools as Inculcating fundamental 
values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political sys­
tem have been confirmed by the observations of social scientists.' 
(63) 
The last part of Justice Brennan's statement returned to the contri­
butions of the social scientists to the BROWN I decision. 
Justice William Brennan presented an arcument for the Inclusion of 
education Into the "fundamental rights" status. A closer examination of 
Justice Brennan's writing reveals that he was expanding his argument In 
his dissenting oolnlon In RODRIGUEZ. 
Justice Brennan stated that: 
In addition, education provides the basic tools by which Individuals 
might lead economically Droductlve lives to the benefit of us all. 
In sum, educatlon has a fundamental role In maintaining the fabric 
of our society. We cannot Ignore the significant social costs borne 
by our Nation when select groups are denied the means to absorb the 
values and skills upon which our social order rests. (64) 
Justice Brennan continued: 
In addition to the pivotal role of education In sustaining our pol-
lltlcal and cultural heritage, denial of education to some Isolated 
group of children poses an affront to one of the goals of the Equal 
Protection Clause: the abolition of governmental barriers present­
ing unreasonable obstacles to advancement on the basis of Individ­
ual merit. Paradoxically, by depriving the children of any disfavor­
ed groups of an education, we foreclose the means by which that group 
might raise the level of esteem In which It Is held by the majority. 
But more directly, 'education prepares Individuals to be self-reliant 
and self-sufficient participants In society. (65) 
Justice William Brennan captured the heart of the Issue to consider 
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education as a "fundamental right" when he stated that: 
Illiteracy Is an erfdurlnq disability. The Inability to read and 
write will handicap the Individual deprived of a basic education 
each and every day of his life. The Inestlmeable toll of that 
deprivation on the social, economic, Intellectual, and psychol­
ogical wel I-belng of the Individual, and the obstacle It poses to 
Individual achievement, makes It most difficult to reconcile the 
cost or the principle of a status-based denial of basic education 
with the framework of equality embodied In the Equal Protection 
Clause. What we said 28 years ago In BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION, 
247 US <*83 (1954), still holds true: 'Today, education Is perhaps 
the most Important function of state and local governments. Com­
pulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for 
education both demonstrate our recognition of the Importance of ed­
ucation to our democratic society. ... In these days, It Is 
doubtful that any child may reasonably be exoected to succeed In 
life If he Is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an 
opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide It, Is a 
right which must be made available to all on equal terms.' (66) 
Moreover, the significance of education to our society Is not lim­
ited to Its political and cultural fruits. The public schools are 
an Important socializing Institution, Imparting those shared 
values through which social order and stability are maintained. 
. . (A) state need not justify by compelling necessity every varia­
tion In the manner In which education Is provided to Its popula­
tion. (67) 
Justice Brennan concluded his opinion with: 
If the State Is to deny a discrete group of Innocent children the 
free public education that It offers to other children residing 
within Its borders, that denial must be justified by a showing 
that It furthers some substantial state Interest. (68) 
Justice Thurqood Marshall, In a concurring opinion, stated that: 
I continue to believe that an Individual's Interest in education Is 
fundamental, and that this view Is amply suoported ' by the unique 
status accorded public education by our society, and by the close 
relationship between education and some of our most basic constitu­
tional values. ... It continues to be my view that a class-
based denial of public education Is utterly Incompatible with the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (69) 
Justice Harry fBlackmun, In a concurring opinion, stated that: 
. . . doubts about the judiciary's ability to make fine distinc­
tions In assessing the effects of complex social policies, led the 
Court In RODRIGUEZ to articulate a firm rule: fundamental rights 
are those that 'explicitly or Implicitly are guaranteed by the 
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ConstftutIon.' ... It therefore squarely rejected the notion 
that 'an ad hoc determination as to the social or economic Im­
portance' of a given Interest Is relevant to the level of scrutiny 
accorded classifications Involving that Interest, . . . and made 
clear that 'It Is not the province of this Court to create sub-
stantlve constitutional rights In the name of guaranteeing equal 
protection o£ the laws. (70) 
Justice Blackmun stated that: 
In my view, when the State provides an education to some and denies 
It to others, It Immediately and Inevitably creates class dist­
inctions of a type fundamentally Inconsistent with those purposes.. 
... of the Equal Protection Clause. Children denied an education 
are placed at a permanent and Insurmountable competltfve disadvan­
tage ... . But the classifications involving the complete 
denial of education are In a sense unique, for they strlke at the 
heart of equal protection values by Involvlng the State In the 
creation of permanent class distinctions. . . (D Jen la I of an 
education Is the analogue of denial of the right to vote: the 
latter places him at a permanent political disadvantage and the 
former relegates the Individual to second-class social status. 
. . mt does not take an advanced degree to predict the effects of 
a complete denial of education upon those children targeted by 
the State's classification. (71) 
Justice Lewis Powell, In a concurring opinion In PLYLEP, clarified 
the distinction between education for ''Illegal aliens" and the state's 
resident children; the justice presented the state's obligation to pro­
vide a free public education to al! of Its citizens. He stated that: 
The classification at Issue deprives a group of children of the op­
portunity for education afforded all other children simply because 
they have been assigned a legal status due to a violation of law by 
their parents. These children thus have been singled out for a 
lifelong penalty and stigma. A legislative classification that 
threatens the creation of an underclass of future citizens and jres-
I dents cannot be reconciled with one of the fundamental purposes of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. In these unique circumstances, the Court 
properly may require that the State's Interests be substantial and 
that the means bear a 'fair and substantial relation' to these In­
terests. . . . In my view, the State's denial of education to these 
children bears no substantial relation to any substantial state 
Interest. (72) 
The justice cited the lack of federal guidance and the state's res­
ponsibility to education as he stated that: 
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9y contrast, there ts no comparable federal guidance In the area 
of education. No federal law Invites state regulation; no fed­
eral regulations Identify those aliens who have a right to attend 
public schools. . . . The State provides free public education to 
all lawful residents whether they Intend to reside permanently In 
the State or only reside In the State temporarily. ... Of course 
a school district may require that Illegal alien children, like any 
other children, actually reside In the school district before ad­
mitting them to the schools. A requlrement of de facto residency, 
uniformly applied, would not violate any prlncTole of equal pro­
tection. (73) 
Chief Justice Warren Burger, In a dissenting opinion In the minor­
ity position, stated that: 
Were It our business to set the Nation's social policy, I would 
agree wlthout hesitation that It Is sense Iess_for an enlightened 
society to deprive any children - Including Illegal aliens -of 
an elementary education. I fully agree that It would be folly -
and wrong - to tolerate creation of a segment of society made up of 
Illiterate persons, many having a limited or no command of our lang­
uage. However, the Constitution does not constitute us as 'Plat­
onic Guardians' nor does It vest In this Court the authority to 
strike down laws because they do not meet our standards of desir­
able social policy, 'wisdom,' or 'common sense.' . . . We._t.res_-
pass on the ass Igned fun ct]on_ of the political branches under our 
structure of 11ml ted and separated powers when we assume a polIcy -
maklng role as the Court does today. The Court makes no attemDt 
to disguise that It Is acting to make up for Congress' lack of 
'effective leadership' In dealing with the serious national prob­
lems caused by the Influx of uncountable millions of Illegal aliens 
across our borders. . . . The Court's holding today manifests 
the justly criticized judicial tendency to attempt speedy and 
wholesale formulation of 'remedlts' for the failures - or simply 
the laggard pace - of the political processes of our system of 
government. The Court employs, and In my view abuses, the Four­
teenth Amendment In an effort to become an omnipotent and omni­
scient problem solver. The motives for doing so are noble and 
compassionate does not alter the fact that the court distorts 
our constitutional function to make amends for the defaults of 
others. (74) 
Chief Justice Burger restated In PLYLER the position that he had 
taken In RODRIGUEZ when he stated that: 
In SAN ANTONIO SCHOOL DISTRICT . . . Justice Powell, speaking for 
the Court, expressly rejected the prooosltlon that state laws deal­
ing with public education are subject to special scrutiny under 
the Equal Protection Clause. Moreover, the Court points to no 
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meaningful way to distinguish between education and other govern­
mental benefits In this context. Is the Court suggesting that ed­
ucation Is more 'fundamental' than food, shelter, or medical care? 
The Equal Protection Clause guarantees similar treatment of simil­
arly situated persons, but It does not mandate a constitutional 
hierarchy of governmental services. Justice Powell . . . put It 
well In stating that to the extent this Court raises or lowers the 
degree of 'judicial scrutiny' In equal protection cases accord­
ing to a transtent Court majority's view of the societal Importance 
of the Interest affected, we 'assume a legislative role and one for 
which the Court lacks both authority and competence.' Yet that Is 
precisely what the Court does today. . . . Modern education, like 
medical care, Is enormously expensive, and there can be no doubt 
that very large added costs will fa|I on the State or Its local 
school districts as a result of the Inclusion of Illegal aliens 
In the tultlon-free public schools. . . . The Constitution does 
not provide a cure for every social 111, nor does It vest judges 
with a mandate to try to remedy every social problem. . . . 
Moreover, when this Court rushes In to remedy what It perceives to 
be the fallings of the political processes, It deprives those pro­
cesses of an opportunity to function. When the political Institu­
tions are not forced to exercise constitutionally allocated pow­
ers and responsibilities, those powers, like muscles not used, tend 
to atrophy. Today's cases, I regret to say, present yet another 
example of unwarranted judicial action which In the long run tends 
to contribute to the weakening of our political processes. . . . 
Yet Instead of allowing the political processes to run their course 
- albeit with some delay - the Court seeks to do Congress' job for 
It, compensating for congressional Inaction. It Is not unreasonable 
to think that this encourages the political branches to pass their 
problems to the judiciary. (75) 
The United States Supreme Court, In the PLYLER decision, had placed 
Itself In a position to accept the premise that education Is an entitle­
ment. The Supreme court had softened Its perception that education was 
not a right: with the leadership of Justices Brennan and Powell, the 
Court demonstrated an 'Intent* to move away from Its position In ROD­
RIGUEZ relating to education. 
MUELLER v. ALLEN, 453 US 388 (1983) 
In MUELLER v. ALLEN, the United States Supreme Court reinforced Its 
commitment to a "Standard of Neutrality" In this church-state first 
amendment case. The Court stated Its position with regards to the 
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state's responsibil ity to education. It stated that: 
A State's decision to defray the cost of educational expenses 
incurred by oarents - regardless of the type of schools their 
children attend - evidences a purpose that Is both secular and 
understandable. An educated populace ts essential to the pol­
it ical and economic health of any community, and a state's ef­
forts to assist paronts In mooting the rising cost of educational 
expenses plainly serves this secular purpose of ensuring that 
the State's citizenry Is well educated. . . . 'Parochial 
schools, quite apart from tholr sectarian purpose, have provided 
an educational alternative for mill ions of young Americans . . . 
The State has. moreover, a legitimate Interest In facl11tatlng '  
education of the highest quality for all children within Its 
boundaries, whatever school their parents have chosen for them. 
(76) 
The words of Justice Lewis ^well Indicated the softening aoproach 
that the United States Supreme court had taken towards education; this 
was recognizing education to be possessing a more favorable "funda­
mental" constitutional position. In MUELLER, the Court recognized the 
Importance that education, within the governmental function of the 
hierarchy of the state, occupied. 
Justice Lewis Dowell, writing for the majority position In MUELLER, 
addressed directly the relationship between public and private schools: 
he stated that: 
Parochial schools, quite apart from their sectarian purpose, have 
provided an educational alternative for mill ions of young Americans; 
they often afford wholesome competition with our public schools; 
and In some states they relieve substantially the tax burden In­
cident to the operation of public schools . .. . (77) 
Justice Thurgood Marshall In a dissenting opinion In MUELLER, with 
Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens joining, stated that: 
The sole question Is whether state aid to these schools (In Mlnnesso-
ta) can be squsred with the dictates of the Religion Clauses. Un­
der our system the choice has been made that government is to be 
entirely excluded from the area of religious Instruction . .. 
The Constitution decrees that religion must be a private rx.tter for 
the Individual, the family, and the Institutions of private choice, 
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and that while some Involvement and entanglement are Inevitable, 
lines must be drawn. (78) 
From BROWN I to MUELLER, the United States Supreme Court consis­
tently recognized the unique and "fundamental" status that education 
has occupied and currently occupies at the state level; however, the 
Court over a period of years began to soften Its position on recognition 
of education as a federal question. 
From 9RCWN I to MUELLER, the United States Supreme Court has stop­
ped just short of acknowledging education as holding "fundamental right" 
status. The Court, based uoon a consideration of prior opinions, has 
placed Itself In a position to elevate education to "fundamental right" 
status. 
RETREAT PERIOD - 1986 to the Present 
Little Is known about the oosltlons and functioning of the present 
membership of the Rehnqulst Court; however, many analysts have attempted 
to try to olace the Court In the OriginalIst's Interpretation of the Con­
stitution. (79) This would place the Rehnqulst Court In the conserva­
tive oosltlon. Curtis J. SItomer stated that: 
So far, In 69 opinions, the justices have followed a general trend 
of economic conservatism and leaned toward affording states maxi­
mum autonomy In making choices where the federal Interest Is now 
overriding. (80) 
Observers see this court, so far, as following the moderate-to-
conservatlve course established by Its predecessor under the lead­
ership of Chief Justice Warren Burger although Chief Justice 
Rehnqulst Is Ideologically more to the political right than Mr. 
Burger. Many believe, however, that the Rehnqulst court has not 
yet been fully tested on certain 'litmus' Issues. Including those 
In the church-and-state area. Next term the justices will hear a 
New Jersey case to determine whether a state-mandated 'moment of 
silence' In public classrooms violates the clrst Amendment. (81) 
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EDWARDS v. AGUILLARD, 55 USLW 4960 (6-16-87) 
The United States Supreme Court In EDWARDS, under the leadership of 
justice William H. Rehnqulst, examined: 
. . . whether Louisiana's 'Balanced Treatment for Creation-
Science and Evolution-Science In Public School Instruction' Act 
(Creatlonlsm Act) ... Is facially Invalid as violative of the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. (32) 
The opinion was written by Justice William Brennan and joined In the 
majority position by Justices Marshall, ^lackmun, °owefl, Stevens, 
O'Connor, and White; the minority position consisted of Justices ScaHa 
and Rehnqulst. It was Important to note that Chief Justice Rehnqulst 
held the minority position; he wrote the dissenting opinion joined by 
Justice Seal la. 
Justice Brennan, wrltlnq for the majority In EDWARDS, cited the 
Court's previously held positions relative to education. He stated 
that: 
The Court has been particularly vigilant In monitoring compliance 
with the Establishment Clause In elementary and secondary schools. 
Families entrust public schools with the education of their child­
ren, but condition their trust on the understanding tha+ the class­
room will not purposely be used to advance religious views that 
may conflict with the private beliefs of the student and his or her 
family. Students In such Institutions are Impressionable and their 
attendance Is Involuntary. . . . The State exerts great author­
ity and coercive power through mandatory attendance requlrements, 
and because of the students' emulation of teachers as role models 
and the children's susceptibility to peer pressure. . . . Further­
more, 'the public school Is at once the symbol of our democracy and 
the most pervasive means for promoting our common destiny. In no 
activity of the State !s It more vital to keep out divisive forces 
than In Its schools ... .' (83) 
Justice William Brennan used GRAND RAPIDS SCHOOL 0ISTRICT v. BALL, 473 
US 373 (1985); WALLACE v. JAFFREE, 472 US 38 (1985); and MEEK v. PETTEN-
GER, 421 US 349 (1975); and ABINGTON SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SCHEMPP, 374 
US 203 (1963), to support his point on the Importance of education and 
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necessity for harmony within the classroom setting. 
Justice Brennan stated that: 
Such a historical approach Is not useful In determining the proDer 
roles of church and state In public schools, since free public ed­
ucation was virtually nonexistent a+ the time the Constitution 
was adopted. (WALLACE v. JAFFREE, 472 US 38 (1985) at 80, Justice 
O'Connor In a concurring opinion.) . . . The potential for undue 
Influence Is far less significant with regard to college students 
who voluntarily enroll In courses. 'This distinction warrants a 
difference Tn constitutional results.' (84) 
We find no merit In the State's argument that the 'legislature may 
not have used the terms 'academic freedom' In the correct legal 
sense.' (85) 
The Court of Appeals stated that: 'academic freedom embodies the 
principle that Individual Instructors are at liberty to teach that 
which they deem to be appropriate In the exercise of their profess­
ional judgment.' (86) 
The goal of providing a more comprehensive science curriculum 
Is not furthered either by outlawing the teaching of evolution or 
by requiring the teaching of creation science. (87) 
. . . (T)he Act does not serve to protect academic freedom, but 
has the distinctly different purDOse of discrediting 'evolution by 
counterbalancing Its teaching at every turn with the teaching of 
c r e a t i o n  s c i e n c e  . . .  .  ( 8 8 )  
Out of many possible science subjects taught In the public schools, 
the legislature chose to affect the teaching of the one scientific 
theory that historically has been opposed by certain religious sects. 
. . . The 'overriding fact' that confronted the Court In EPPERSON 
was 'that Arkansas' law selects from the body of knowledge a Dart-
Icular segment with ... a particular Interpretation of the Book 
of Genesis by a particular religious group.' (89) 
. . . (C)reatlon science (was defined by certain members of the 
religious group) as 'origin through abrupt aDpearance In complex 
form' and allege that such a viewpoint constitutes a true scientific 
theory. (90) 
Justice Brennan summarized the oplnton of the Court; he stated that: 
The Louisiana Creatlonslm Act advances a religious doctrine by re­
quiring either the banishment of the theory of evolution from public 
school classrooms or the presentation of a religious viewpoint 
that rejects evolution In Its entirety. The Act violates the Estab­
lishment Clause of the First Amendment because It seeks to employ 
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the symbolic and financial support of government to achieve a 
religious purpose. (91) 
Justices Lewis Powell and Sandra Day O'Connor wrote, In a concur­
ring opinion, that: 
I write separately to note certain aspects of the legislative his­
tory, and to emphasize that nothing In the Court's opinion dimin­
ishes the traditionally broad discretion accorded state and local 
school officials In the selection of the public school curriculum. 
. . . The starting point In every case Involving construction Is 
that, unless otherwise defined, words will be Interpreted as taking 
thelr ordinary, contemporary, common meaning. . . . The 'doctrine 
or theory of creation* Is commonly defined as 'holding that matter, 
the various forms of life, and the world were created by a trans­
cendent God out of nothing.' WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL 
DICTIONARY - Unabridged 1981, p. 532). 'Evolution' Is defined as 
'the theory that the various types of animals and plants have 
their origin In other preexisting types, the distinguishable 
differences being due to modifications In successive generation.' 
(WEBSTER'S, p. 799). . . . 'Concept's concerning God or a supreme 
being of some sort are manifestly religious ... . These con­
cepts do not shed that rellglouslty merely because they are pre­
sented as a philosophy or as a science.' (Cltlnq N'ALNAK v. YCY^I, 
440 F. Supp. 1284 (N.J. 1977) at 1322, aff'd per curiam, 592 F. 
2d 197 (CA 3d 1979). . . . The Act contains a statement of pur­
pose: to 'protect academic freedom.' . . . This statement is 
puzz11ng. Of course, the 'academic freedom' of teachers to pre­
sent Information In public schools, and students to receive It Is 
broad. But It necessarily Is clrcumscrlbed by the Establishment 
Clause. 'Academic Freedom' does not encompass the right of a 
legislature to structure the public schoo'l curriculum In order to 
advance a particular religious belief. (92) 
Justice Lewis Dowel! stated that: 
. . .  I  a d h e r e  t o  t h e  v i e w  ' t h a t  t h e  S t a t e s  a n d  l o c a l l y  e l e c t e d  
school boards should have the responsibility for determining the 
educational policy of the public schools. (CItlna BOARD OF EDUCA­
TION v. PICO, 457 US 853 (1982) at 893 - Justice Powell In dissent.) 
(93) 
In a summary statement, Justice Powell stated that: 
Although the discretion of state and local authorities over public 
school curricula Is broad, 'the First Amendment does not permit the 
State to require that teaching and learning must be tailored to the 
principles or prohibitions of any religious sect or dogma. (94) 
Justice Ryron White, In a concurring opinion, stated that: 
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We usually defer to the Court of Appeals on the meaning of a State 
statute, especially when the District Court has the same view. . . 
But If the meaning ascribed to a State Statute by a court of appeals 
Is a rational construction of the statute, we normally accept It. 
. . . We do so because we believe 'that district courts and courts 
of appeals are better schooled In and more able to Interpret the 
laws of their respective states. (95) 
The United States Suoreme Court demonstrated In EDWARDS Its reliance 
upon state and local governments to make decisions affecting public ed­
ucation. Justice White's statement that . . district courts and 
courts of apoeals are better schooled In and more able to Interpret the 
laws of their resDectlve states . . . ''(96) demonstrated that the Supreme 
Court was not willing to take an active Dart In the day-to-day regulation 
of public school affairs. The EDWARDS decision, although not primarily 
an educational rights Issue, permitted the Court to restate Its view of 
the unique position that education occupied. This position supported 
the continued conservative approach to public education that the Supreme 
Court has held since RCDRIGIJEZ In 1973. 
The Period of Retreat is the current period of Supreme Court act­
ivity; this period will require additional time for scrutinizing dec­
isions of the Court to discover trends or direction. The leadership of 
Justice William Brennan and the retirement of Justice Lewis °owell are 
factors that will have an Impact on the direction of the Court. Justice 
Sandra Day O'Connor occuDles a position of great Influence. With the 
addition of Anthony Kennedy, the Court will undergo additional changes. 
The Period of Retreat of the Supreme Court Is a period of anticipation 
and change. (97) 
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SELECTED LOWER FEDERAL AND STATE COURT OPINIONS 
An examination of the opinions of the United States Supreme Court 
would not be complete without exploring, generally, the Impact that 
Supreme Court decisions have had upon federal and state court opinions. 
Several random court decisions have been selected which demonstrated 
this point; the decisions have been selected from the Activist Period 
of the Supreme Court owing primarily to the tremendous amount of activ­
ity and exchange between the United States Supreme Court and the lower 
federal and state courts. 
The following federal and state court decisions reflected the amount 
of variety that existed at the lower judicial level. The selected de­
cisions were: 
(a) SERRANO v. PRIEST, 487 p. 2d 1241, 96 CAL R 601 (1971); 
(b) BOARD 0<=" EDUCATION v. OKLAHOMA, 4C9 F. 2d 665 (1969); 
(c) ROBINSON v. CAHILL, 303 A. 2d 273, 62 N. J. 473 (1973); 
(d) ZOLL v. ANKER, 414 F. Suoo. 1024 (1976) - New York; 
(e) NORTON v. MESKILL, 376, A. 2d 359, 172 CONN 615 (1977). 
From all of the federal and state court decisions examined from 
1971 to 1988, SERRANO I was the most Important of the cases; It directly 
addressed the "'fundamental right" Issue of education from a state con­
stitutional point of view. It was also a federal court decision which 
rejected the United States Supreme Court's opinion that education was 
not a constitutional ly protected "right."' SERRANO v. PRIEST had been ad­
judicated on three separate occasions reaching the same conclus tons. 
The Court held that education was a constitutionally protected "right." 
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SERRANO v. PRIEST, 96 CAL. RPTR 601, 487 P. 2d 1241 (197!), (SERRANO I): 
135 CAL RPTR 345, 557 P. 2d 929 (1977), (SERRANO II); and 226 CAL RPTR 
584 (CAL. APP. 2 DIST.) (1986), (SERRANO III) 
SERRANO I examined three constitutional areas: (a) the California 
method of financing public education allowed substantial disparities 
among the vartous school 'districts In the amount of revenue available 
for education, thereby, denying students equal protection of the laws 
under the color of the United States Constitution and the State of 
California constitution; (b) wealth was a "suspect classification." 
Parents were reaulred to pay taxes at a higher rate than taxpayers In 
other districts In order to provide the same or lesser educational 
opoortunltles for their children; (c) the most Important element of 
SERRANO I was Its historical proclalmatlon that education was a 
"fundamental Interest" that was protected under the language of the 
United States Constitution; but more specifically, It was a "funda­
mental right" that was protected under the language of the California 
constitution. 
SERRANO II affirmed the trial court's finding In SERRANO I that the 
California school finance system was unconstitutional. It reaffirmed 
the original findings of the SERRANO I court: (a) the system of financ­
ing of public education In California was unconstitutional, thereby, 
denying students equal protection of the law under the color of the 
United States Constitution and the State of California constitution. 
Under this standard, which the court called ''fiscal Neutrality," the 
quality of a child's education could not be based upon the wealth of 
the child's local school district, but rather had to be based upon the 
wealth of the state as a whole. This standard of review provided the 
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court, as wel I. as other federal courts, with a manageable standard for 
judicial review: It signaled the states to be more responsible for the 
management of educational Issues within the states. 
SERRANO III examined: (a) education as a fundamental Interest for 
purposes of determining proper standards for equal protection review; 
(b) funding for categorical aid should be excluded from comparing public 
school funding by district for purposes of determining wealth related 
disparities; and (c) wealth-related disparities had been reduced to 
acceptable and justifiable levels by stressing legitimate state Interests. 
What was noteworthy about SERRANO I, II, and I I I was that the 
California courts held that education was a protected "fundamental Inter­
est" and an Individual "right" on three separate opportunities: 1971, 
1977, and 1986. 
BOARD OF EDUCATION v. OKLAHOMA, 409 F. 2d 665 (1969) 
This case examined similar Issues to that of SERRANO. The State 
of Oklahoma claimed sovereign Immunity; therefore, the Issues were moot. 
In OKLAHOMA, the suit had addressed: (a) 'wealth" as a "suspect classif­
ication;'' (b) the system of financing of public education In OKLAHOMA 
was unconstitutional, thereby, denying students equal Drotectlon of 
the law under the color of the United States Constitution and the State 
of Oklahoma constitution: and (c) education was a protected "privilege." 
ROBINSON v. CAHILL, 303 A. 2d 273, 62 N.J. 473 (1973) 
ROBINSON was decided six months after the United States Supreme 
Court's decision In RODRIGUEZ; the New Jersey court took judicial not­
ice of the RODRIGUEZ decision but did not find the opinion a control!Tnq 
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precedent. The federal court held that education was a constitutional­
ly protected "fundamental Interest." In ROBINSON, the court held that: 
(a) wealth was a "suspect classification;*' and (b) education was a 
"fundamental Interest" In the State of New Jersey and In the language 
of the state constitution. The federal court stated that the quality 
of educational opportunity did not depend upon the amount of dollars 
Invested In education. The court In ROBINSON took special note of the 
United States Supreme Court's decision In RODRIGUEZ. The federal court 
stated that the "fundamental right" conceDt discussed by the Supreme 
Court was not he!ofuI because the Supreme Court had not defined the 
term, "fundamental rfght," In sufficiently clear terms and limits to 
make the term judicially useful. 
ZOLL v. ANKER, 4|4 F. Supp. 1024 (!976) 
The New York court In ZOLL examined education as a protected "right 
or entitlement" under the color of the federal Constitution. The 
federal court acknowledged the United States Supreme Court's RODRIGUEZ 
opinion; however, It held that education possessed a unique position 
that was constltutlonaIly protected as a "fundamental Interest." The 
court stated that: 
Common sense alone Indicates that 'the rfght to enjoy a full ed­
ucation' Is defined by contours more broad than the number of 
minutes In a school day. (98) 
HORTON v. MESKILL, 172 CONN 515, 376 A. 2d 359 (1977) 
The state court In MESKILL held that the United States Supreme 
Court decision In RODRIGUEZ was not a controlling Drecedent. It held 
that In the State of Connecticut, the right to an education was so 
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basic and fundamental that any Infringement of that rlcht would be 
strictly scrutinized. The court held that pupils In the public schools 
were entitled to equal enjoyment of the ''right to elementary and second­
ary education." It held that a system of financing education , which 
depended on local property tax base without regard to disparity In the 
financial ability to finance an educational program and with no signif­
icant equalizing state support, could not pass the test of "strict 
judicial scrutiny" as to Its constitutionality. Finally, the court 
held that the state's method of financing educational programs was not 
"appropriate legislation" to be In agreement with the state's consti­
tutional requirement for a free and appropriate education. 
The decisions from the tower federal and state courts reflected 
the. Importance and position that the states had placed upon education. 
One United States Supreme Court opinion, BROWN I, was significant 
and was present by Its controlling Influence In a majority of the lower 
federal court opinions. It stated that: 
Such an opportunity of education, where the state has undertaken 
to provide It, Is a right which must be made available to all on 
equal terms. (99) 
Lower federal and state courts reenforced the meaning of these 
words. The state courts of Arizona (100), Arkansas (101), California 
(102), Connecticut (103), Maryland (104), Washington (105), Alaska (106), 
Massachusetts (107), Illinois (108), and Pennsylvania (109) have held 
that education was a "fundamental right" under the color of the state 
constitution and the federal Constitution. 
From 1985 to 1988, there have been four lower court decisions 
that have addressed the "fundamental right" to an education. These 
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cases are: 
!. RIDGEWAY v. MONTANA HIGH SCHOOL ASSOCIATION (D. MONTANA 1986), 
633 F. Supp. 1564 (1986). The court held that there was no constitution­
al requirement that schools provide students with extracurrlcular act­
ivities. 
2. BENNETT v. CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT OF NEW ROCHELLE (D. NErf YORK 
1985), 497 N.Y.S. 2d 72, 114 A.D. 2d 58 (1985). The court held that 
the right to free, public education was not classified as a "fundament­
al constitutional right" that was entitled to special protection. The 
lower court relied almost entirely upon the RODRIGUEZ decision. 
3. DISTRICT 27 COMMUNITY SCHOOL BOARD by GRAN IERER v. BOARD OF 
EDUCATION OF CITY OF NEW YORK (D. NEW YORK 1986), 502 N.Y.S. 2d 325 
(1986). The court held that a public education was not a "fundamental 
right" granted to Individuals by the United States Constitution. The 
court relied completely upon the RODRIGUEZ decision. 
4. CRAIG v. BUNCOMBE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION (NORTH CAROLINA 
A. 1986), 343 S. E. 2d 322, 80 NC AP° 683 (1986), review denied, appeal 
dismissed, 343 S. E. 2d 138, 318 NC 28! (1986). The court held that 
the county board of educatfon's ban on the use and possession of tobacco 
products by students In the county schools did not deorlve the students 
who smoke of "fundamental rights'* to an education. The court had cited 
U.S.C.A. Constitutional Amendment I and the State of North Carolina 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
. . . (H)tstorlcally there have been clear connections between our 
democratic society and the U. S. education, a condition which gave 
schools a sense of purpose and Identity. (I) 
Education, the process and the service, Is an Integral part of the 
American society. To perpetuate the principles of this representative 
democracy, education Is the key element; education concentrates upon the 
preparation of present and future leaders of this republic. 
Hatch and Conrath, citing the work of Thomas Jefferson, stated that: 
The people themselves therefore, are (the government's ) only safe 
depositories. And to render even them safe, their minds must be 
Improved to a certain degree. (2) 
Education, therefore, Is the process of one generation of people as­
suming responsibility for the preparation of future generations. 
Implementing education alms for a democracy ... Is not an easy 
task and results might not be evident Immediately. It Is Import­
ant to note that the human processes Involved In establishing alms 
that bring meaning . . .have value In and of themselves. Working 
toward alms that connect society and schools can regenerate a sense 
of Integrity among educators and refocus the . . . Identity of our 
schools. (3) 
Society Is bound together with common goals and values; promoting 
the good of the nation or the American society, as a whole, Is one of 
the alms of education - the vehicle Is the public school. The process 
of education Is a learning process, a training process, and a practice 
session for the young mind. Education offers an opportunity. (4) 
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Education exists as a service to the future generations of a 
nation; more specifically It provides the general tools to aid Inquiry 
and critical thinking for the nation's school-age children. Education 
offers opportunity, It does."not guarantee a successful career, profess­
ional development, or Intellectual prowess. Education offers an oppor­
tunity for the Individual to acquire general skills, to practice, and 
to hone these skills. 
Education, Issue and process, Involves the three branches of govern 
ment directly. The executive, legislative, and Judiciary of the feder­
al government actively contribute to the operation of the educational 
process. State and local governments offer major support for education 
as a "fundamental Interest." 
The executive branch can offer administrative leadership In sup­
port for education and educational Issues. The quality of this leader­
ship exists In Intensity and substance from the dynamic and personal 
charisma of the President of the United States. Presidents Roosevelt, 
Truman, Elsenhower, Kennedy, and L. B. Johnson represent the high points 
In dynamic styles of leadership In support of education. 
The legislative branch has reacted to aggressive leadership from 
the executtve branch; It has responded positively and negatively to act­
ive leadership In support of education and educational Issues. Congress 
In "The Equal Educational Opportunities Act," stated that: 
. . . CI)t Is the policy of the United States that all public 
school children are entitled to equal educational opportunity 
without regard to race, color, sex, or national origin. (5) 
The key element that Congress presents Is fiscal support to present and 
ongoing educational programs. 
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The judicial branch of the federal government presents the most 
unknown and confusing quality of the three branches. The United States 
Supreme Court has walvered from a positive support In 1954 to a denial 
of "fundamental" status In 1973. Yet, throughout the four periods of 
U.S. Supreme Court activity over the past sixty years, the Court has 
consistently maintained that education Is one of the most Important func­
tions of state and local governments. The following United States Sup­
reme Court opinions offer examples of the social and political Import­
ance of education that the Court has maintained. 
The United States Supreme Court In EDWARDS v. AGUILLARD In 1987 
stated that: 
The public school Is at once the symbol of our democracy and the 
most pervasive means for promoting our common destiny. (6) 
However, the U.S. Supreme Court In SAN ANTONIO v. RODRIGUEZ In 1973 
stated that: 
Education, of course, Is not among the rights afforded explicit 
protection under our Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any basis 
for saying it Is Implicitly so protected. . . . (T)he undisputed 
Importance of education will not alone cause this Court to depart 
from the usual standard for reviewing a State's social and economic 
legislation. (7) 
The U. S. Supreme court In BROWN v.lBOARD OF EDUCATION In 1954 
stated that: 
Today, education Is perhaps the most Important function of state 
and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the 
great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition 
of the Importance of education to our democratic society. (8) 
The U. S. Supreme Court In TINKER v. DES MOINES in 1969 stated that: 
In our system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of totali­
tarianism. School officials do not possess absolute authority over 
their students. Students In school as well as out of school are 
'persons' under our Constitution. They are possessed of fundamental 
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rights which the State must respect. (9) 
The U. S. Supreme Court In PLYLER v. DOE In 1982 stated that: 
Public education Is not a 'right' granted to Individuals by the 
Constitution. . . . But neither Is It merely some governmental 
'benefit' Indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare 
legislation. Both the Importance of education In maintaining our 
basic Institutions, and the lasting Impact of Its deprivation on 
the life of the child, mark the distinction. The 'American people 
have always regarded education and the acquisition of knowledge as 
matters of supreme Importance.' ... We have recognized 'the 
public school as a most vital civic Institution for the preserva­
tion of a dmeocratlc system of government,' . . . and as the prim­
ary vehicle for transmitting 'the values on which our society 
rests.' ... As noted early In our history, 'some degree of educa­
tion Is necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively 
and Intelligently In our open political system If we are to pre­
serve freedom and Independence.* . . . And these historic 'percep­
tions of the public schools as Inculcating fundamental values nec­
essary to the maintenance of a democratic political system have 
been confirmed by the observations of social scientists. (10) 
Justice Potter Stewart, In a concurring opinion, In ROE v. WADE In 
1982 stated that: 
. . . (T)he 'liberty' protected by the Due Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment covers more than those freedoms explicitly 
named In the BUI of Rights ... . (II) 
Justice Thurgood Marshall, In a concurring opinion, In PLYLER v. 
DOE In 1982 stated that: 
I continue to believe that an Individual's Interest In education 
Is fundamental, and that this view Is amply supported 'by the un­
ique status accorded public education by our scolety, and by the 
close relationship between education and some of our most basic 
constitutional values. ... It continues to be my view that a 
class-based denial of public educatTon Is utterly Incompatible 
with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (12) 
Justice Harry Blackmun, In a concurring opinion, In PLYLER v. DOE 
In 1982 stated that: 
. . . (D)enlal of an education Is the analogue of denial of the 
right to vote: the latter places him at a permanent political 
disadvantage and the former relegates the Individual to a second-
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class social status. . . . (I)t does not take an advanced degree 
to predict the effects of a complete denial of education upon those 
children targeted by the State's classification. (13) 
Justice Lewis Powell, In a concurring opinion, In PLYLER v. DOE In 
1982 stated that: 
. . . (T)here Is no comparable federal guidance In the area of ed­
ucation. No federal law Invites state regulation (of alien child­
ren); no federal regulations Identify those aliens who have a right 
to attend public schools. . . . The State provides free public ed­
ucation to all lawful residents whether they Intend to reside per­
manently In the State or only reside In the State temporarily. (14) 
Justice Lewis Powell, In a dissenting opinion, In BOARD OF EDUCA­
TION v. PICO In 1982 stated that: 
. . . (T)he States and locally elected school boards should have 
the responsibility for determining the educational policy of the 
pub IIc schools. (15) 
The judicial support for education as a constitutionally protect­
ed "right' from the United States Supreme Court Is an unknown quality. 
The lower federal and state courts present a different and known 
quantity for support of education as a constitutionally protected 
''right." 
The United States Court of Appeals In JOHNSON v. NEW YORK STATE 
EDUCATION DEPARTMENT In 1972 stated that: 
In New York State, as elsewhere In the United States and In most 
other developed countries, the government has arrogated to Itself 
responsibility for administering and enforcing a formal and public 
system of education. It has done so both by the requirement of 
law that all children receive schooling until they reach a speci­
fied age and by providing schools, free to their users, supported 
by tax revenues. Courts have been alert to the potential for un­
warranted Incursions by the states Into constitutionally protect­
ed spheres of Individual liberty - which are nothing less than 
rights to self-education and self-dlrection - Inherent In compul­
sory and public education. (16) 
Joseph F. Wels, Jr., Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Third 
Circuit, In a majority opinion, In VORCHHEIMER v. SCHOOL DISTRICT OF 
179 
PHILADELPHIA In 1976 stated that: 
Children receive schooling until they reach a specified age and 
by providing schools, free to their users, supported by tax rev­
enues. Courts have been alert to the potential for unwarranted 
Incursions by the states Into constitutionally protected spheres 
of Individual liberty - which are nothing less than rights to 
self-education and self-direction - Inherent In compulsory and 
pub Itc education. (17) 
The California Supreme Court In SERRANO v. PRIEST In 1971 stated 
that: 
We are convinced that the distinctive and priceless function of 
education In our society warrants, Indeed compels, our treating 
It as a 'fundamental Interest.1 (18) 
Joseph F. Wels, Jr., Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, 
In a majority opinion, In VORCHHEIMER v. SCHOOL DISTRICT OF PHILADELPHIA 
In 1976 stated that: 
The financial assistance granted to educational Institutions by 
the federal government has led to Its ever-Increasing Influence In 
a field which In times past was considered the domain of state, 
local or private activity. (19) 
The United States District Court, Eastern District In Louisiana, 
In HALL v. ST. HELENA PARISH SCHOOL BOARD In a unanimous decision In 
1961 stated that: 
Grants-tn-ald, no matter how generous, are not an adequate substi­
tute for public schools. . . . "One's right to life, liberty, and 
property . . . and other fundamental rights, may not be submitted 
to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.' . . . This 
Is not the moment In history for a state to experiment with Ig­
norance. When It does. It must expect close scrutiny of the exper­
iment. (20) 
Frank W. Wilson, Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Sixth 
Circuit, In a majority opinion, In MAPP v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY 
OF CHATTANOOGA In 1973 stated that: 
We do not read (the Supreme Court's holding) . . . that the Consti­
tution requires that, black and white, a school child must now be 
denied the right to attend the school of his choice ... .(21) 
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Alfred T. Goodwin, Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals, 
Ninth Circuit, In a majority opinion. In BERKELMAN v. SAN FRANCISCO UN­
IFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT In 1974 stated that: 
Congress recognized that, because education provides access to 
jobs, sex discrimination In education Is potentially destructive to 
the disfavored sex. . . . Lowell High, as a conduit to better un­
iversity education and hence to better jobs. Is exactly that type 
of educational program with regard to which Congress Intended to 
eliminate sex discrimination when It passed Title IX. (22) 
J. Skelly Wright, Circuit Judge, United States District Court, 
District of Columbia, In H0BS0N v. HANSEN In 197! stated that: 
. . .(T)he court has concluded that both lower class size and 
greater teacher experience . . . contribute to the quality of a 
child's education. (23) 
. . . (T)he court's duty to scrutinize alleged discrimination 
against a racial minority ts especially high when the right of the 
minority affected Is the right to equal educational opportunity. 
(24) 
Harold D. Decker, Circuit Judge, United States District court, 
Northern District of Illinois, In a majority opinion. In MclNNlS v. 
SHAPIRO In 1968 stated that: 
Even If there were some guidelines available to the Judiciary, the 
courts simply cannot provide the empirical research and consultation 
necessary for Intelligent educational planning. (25) 
Illinois' General Assembly has already recognized the need for add­
itional educational funds to provide all students a good education. 
... If other changes are needed In the present system, they 
should be sought In the legislature and not In the courts. (26) 
The lower federal and state courts have presented a positive sup­
port for education as a constitutionally protected "right." The lower 
courts have maintained that education Is the province of state govern­
ments; however, many lower courts have held that education holds "fund­
amental Interest" status under color of the federal Constitution. (27) 
The state governments have given education a protected 'right' 
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status through explicit language In the state constitutions. (28) 
This legal recognition of education as a "fundamental right" emphasizes 
the Importance that state governments have placed upon It. 
Education Is an Issue that has occupied the Interest, anguish, 
and monies of the federal, state, and local governments over the span 
of years from 1642 to 1988. The ebb and flow of emotions and activity 
surrounding education speaks to the elevated position that various levels 
of government hold for education. 
Consideration of education as a constitutionally protected right, 
entitlement, and privilege requires an examination of the historical, 
social, economical, Intellectual, and political Impact and Importance 
that education holds for the Individual citizen. 
Educational specialists and authors, legal scholars and writers, 
and judicial members have wrestled with the legal position that educa­
tion should and does occupy. Although a great diversity and Intensity 
exists, education and legal communities generally recognize the vital 
link between a basic education and successful employment opportunities. 
With a modest beginning at the end of World War II and reaching 
fruition In the 1980s, the Japanese experiment has demonstrated that 
economic and financial success are closely linked to high levels of 
educational achievement by a majority of the population. (29) 
Adler stated that: 
. . .  ( A )  p o o r l y  s c h o o l e d  p o p u l a t i o n  w i l l  n o t  b e  a b l e  t o  p u t  t o  
good use the opportunities afforded by the achievement of the gen­
eral welfare. Those who are not schooled to enjoy the blessings 




This study focused on an examination of education as a constitu­
tionally protected right, entitlement, and privilege; tt Included an 
exploration of the conditions that education as a right, entitlement, 
and privilege could be considered to exist. The researcher examined 
United States Supreme Court decisions that addressed education as being 
equal to other unenumerated rights under the Constitution of the United 
States. In addition to United States Supreme Court decisions, lower 
federal and state court opinions were examined to determine the causal 
relationships between the three Judicial systems; this examination was 
limited to the area of education as a situational right, entitlement, and 
prlvllege. 
In Chapter I, a narrow scope for the examination was detailed. 
This design also Included several questions to be answered In the course 
of the research. A survey of pertinent literature was discussed In 
Chapter 2. An exploration was conducted of the historical place that ed­
ucation had occupied during the history of the republic. Chapter 3 fo­
cused upon a discussion of education as a right, entitlement, and a priv­
ilege. Chapter 4 examined relevant United States Supreme Court decisions 
as they applied to education. The chapter Included several lower feder­
al and state court opinions that support education as a constitutionally 
p rotected " f un damenta I I nterest.,T 
Chapter 5 contains four distinct sections. They are: Introduction 
to chapter; a summary of the findings to the study; using the questions 
proposed In Chapter I, conclusions to the study; and suggestions for 
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further research. 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
Education Is a right, an entitlement, and a privilege. It Is an 
Issue that may be analyzed from many perspectives. Interpretation and 
Implementation create complicated roles for both state and federal gov­
ernments; Interpretation that originates with the bureaucracies and 
Implementation being assigned to state and local units create a dilemma 
In understanding clear lines of responsibility and governing statutes 
of each government. The federal and state governments have overlapping 
responsibilities that make clear delineation of responsibility difficult. 
The Infusion of federal montes to special programs obscures an already 
complicated arrangement affecting performance and accountability. 
Education Is an Issue that has the attention of federal, state, and 
local governments. 
The 1980s have been characterized as a decade of platforms for ed­
ucational change. (31) 
Kurth-Schal suggested five reports released In 1983 by national task 
forces and commissions drawn from a wide spectrum of Interests that re­
flected these changes and acknowledged the Importance of education. (32) 
These reports addressed concerns and drew attention to the Importance of 
education from segments of the population that cut across wide diversit­
ies of American society. Education Is an Issue whose time has arrived. 
The summary of findings Is arranged around five topics. They are: 
a selected history of education, the federal Constitution, education as 
a right, education as an entitlement, and education as a privilege. The 
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topics represent a synthesis of Information and Ideas explored In prev­
ious chapters of this work. 
A SELECTED HISTORY OF EDUCATION. In 1642, education began a novel ex­
periment. As the young colonies grew to a period of Independence, the 
needs, demands, and goals for the new nation drew upon European educat­
ed Intellectuals to guide the transformation process - from colonies 
to nation. The public school movement begun In the colonial period, In 
diverse parts of the colonies, did not reach fruition until the 1830s. 
(33) 
From the 1830s to the 1860s, the public schools were primarily a 
local concern; as a result of this, schools were as good as the Inter­
est and monies Invested In them from local resources. 
During the 1860s, the Importance of education was primarily con­
centrated on trying to acclimate the waves of Immigrants entering the 
United States from Europe. (34) 
From the 1870s to the 1930s, public schools were considered local 
concerns with modest state support. State governments during this time 
assumed more responsibility for education. 
The years following the end of World War II brought massive amounts 
of federal monies to provide educational opportunities to millions of 
former servicemen and women and their children. (35) 
From the 1940s to the 1960s, state governments had assumed primary 
responsibility for the function of public schools. 
In 1957, the Space Age began; with It, the nation committed more 
federal dollars to public schools and colleges. The 1960s witnessed 
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the emergence of a vital and fundamental role for education; education 
was Important In keeping the United States scientifically, technologi­
cally, and economically competitive with the rest of the world. (36) 
The launch of the Soviet space satelltes, Sputnik I and II, signaled 
the joint state and federal responsibility for education; this position 
was similar to earlier efforts In the history of education when state 
and local school boards shared power over education. 
President Lyndon 3. Johnson In support of the Higher Education Act 
of 1964 stated that: 
Every child must be encouraged to get as much education as he has 
the ability to take ... . (E)ducation is no longer a luxury, 
but a necessity. (37) 
This Is an accurate analysis of the spirit that existed during the 1960s 
and 1970s toward education. Education was viewed as the path to success 
for anyone with the desire. 
The 1970s saw the impact of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. It saw 
Implementation of Title II, Title III, and Title IV of the Civil Rights 
Act as well as the Elementary-Secondary Education Act (ESEA). (38) 
With each congressional action, the Issue of acquiring an education 
moved from local concern to state level concern to national concern. 
The evolution of education, recognized as betng necessary to the future 
of the nation begun In the 1960s, arrived to a "fundamental rhterest" 
In the 1970s. (39) The scientific and technological advances made dur­
ing the 1970s recognized the need for education. Public schools were 
acknowledged as "pools of talent." 
Owing to the "new demands" of the Age of Technology of the 1980s 
and 1990s, education has arrived at "fundamental rights" status. 
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Survival of the national competitive edge In the world markets during 
this period will dictate greater amounts and qualities of an educated 
population at all levels of American society. (40) Cetron held that 
education was one of the keys to successful American competition In 
the world markets. 
From 1642 to 1988, education has moved In giant steps from Iso­
lated, one-room schools to large consolidated schools educating and 
Informing generations of Americans. Education In the United States has 
been one of the most novel experiments In the history of mankind; educa­
tion was made available to every citizen and non-cltlzen regardless 
of background, economical resources, abilities, or handicaps In a pub­
lic school setting. This experiment has not been attempted by any other 
nation on this planet on such a major scale as the American experiment. 
This experiment has been successful despite the difficulties encountered 
In Its establishment phase and In Its present continuation phase. 
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. The Constitution of the United States In Its 
own words states that It Is the "Law of the Land." Education as a "fund­
amental Interest" Is not contained In the language of the federal Consti­
tution. Voting (41), abortion (42), Individual privacy (43), criminal 
rights (44), Intrastate transportation (45), and free counsel for Indi­
gent prisoners (46) are not found In the words of the federal Constitu­
tion; however, these Issues have been elevated to "fundamental Interest" 
status by the United States Supreme Court. The United States Supreme 
Court has held In Its explicit Interpretation of the federal Constitu­
tion that education Is not a fundamental, protected "right;" the Court 
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also held that It could find no "fundamental Interest" through an Im­
plicit Interpretation. 
The omission of education as a protected "right" In explicit lang­
uage from the federal Constitution lends Itself to being Interpreted 
as a type of historical, purposeful error, or mystery. (47) Bolmeler 
suggested that during the period of the Constitutional Conventions In 
1787 -1789 few educational theories were developed, education was a 
controversial Issue, and the framer's own private educational biases 
considered education a private Issue. (48) 
A number of writers have written that the fifth, ninth, tenth, and 
fourteenth amendments hold promise for education being elevated to a 
fundamental Interest status; the keys to this movement rest with which 
branch of the federal government Interprets the Constitution and Its 
amendments, which method will be employed - explicit or Implicit, and 
what aspects of common law or historical precedents will be held by the 
federal government. 
I. UNDER COLOR OF THE CONSTITUTION, WHEN IS EDUCATION AT PUBLIC 
EXPENSE A "FUNDAMENTAL INTEREST?" 
The Constitution, In Its own language, Is the supreme "Law of the 
Land." The three branches of the federal government have an opportun­
ity to arrive at a meaning of the document. To arrive at this point 
requires that these branches of government Interpret the federal Consti­
tution from their own unique positions, power bases, and Information 
backgrounds. The process of Interpreting the Constitution employs the 
use of two methods of examination, explicit and Implicit. 
An "Interest" may be generally defined as a broad term for any 
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right In property. (49) "Fundamental" may be defined as a basic need, 
or requirement. (50) A "fundamental Interest" therefore may be defined 
as any basic need, or requirement for any right In property. Holmes de­
fined a "right" as the permission to exercise certain natural powers. 
(51) 
The establishment of a "fundamental Interest" resides In the Inter­
pretation derived from an Implicit and/or explicit examination of the 
wording of the federal Constitution. 
Explicit meaning of the Constitution exists In an exact language 
which spells out the presence of the "fundamental Interest." The first 
amendment stated, In part, that: 
Congress shall make no law . . . abrldglna the freedom of speech . 
. . . .  ( 5 2 )  
Freedom of speech Is a protected "fundamental Interest" owing to the ex­
plicit language of the Constitution. The language of the document add­
ressed directly the existence of the protected "Interest;" therefore, 
the "fundamental Interest" In freedom of speech Is determined by an ex­
plicit Interpretation of the federal Constitution. 
Implicit meaning exists In an Implied Intent of the language which 
Is open to varied meanings of the words of the federal Constitution. 
The Issue, education at public expense, Is a protected "fundamental 
Interest" by an Implicit Interpretation of the Constitution. The Issue 
assumes support from a consideration of Its common law usage. 
The Issue, education at public expense, has been established In an 
extended common law usage. Flrst, the Issue has a long history of ac­
cepted practice to firmly establish It as an acceptable common property 
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Interest" this Interest has existed from 1642 to 1988. 
Second, the Issue has existed In various forms In a majority of 
the geographical sections from the early days of the young republic to 
the present 1980s. Although there have been periods of Intermittent 
service, basically education has managed to continue to provide a ser­
vice relatively uninterrupted. This also recognizes the existence of 
poor and Intermittent educational services from 1642 to I960. (53) 
Third, the Issue has received recognition as a "fundamental Int­
erest" from the states In two separate areas; the state constitutions 
have cited the Issue as a protected "right," (54) and the population 
of the states have Imposed the use of tax revenues to support Its op­
erations. (55) 
Fourth, the Issue, on a grassroots level, provides a stronger common 
law practice than It does on a state or federal level. The Issue ex­
isted without formal state or federal fiscal support as well as any for­
mal or legal recognition for existence until the early part of the 
1800s. (56) 
Fifth, state governments have established the Issue as a protected 
"'right" In explicit constitutional language at the state level. 
Sixth, the federal government has given federal and national recog­
nition to the Issue throagh three methods: monies for special programs, 
congressional legislation regulating Its operation, and public support 
through political rhetoric. 
The Issue, education at public expense, assumes "fundamental Inter­
est" status under an Implicit Interpretation of the fifth, ninth, tenth, 
and fourteenth amendments to the federal Constitution. 
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The fifth amendment contains language that holds promise for sup­
port of the Issue. The amendment stated, In part, that: 
No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property 
w i t h o u t  d u e  p r o c e s s  o f  l a w  . . .  .  ( 5 7 )  
van Geel has maintained that public school employees have been able 
to secure property rights guarantee using the language of the fifth 
amendment. He stated that: 
. . .  b y  c l a i m i n g  t h a t  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  a n  I m p l i c i t  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
right to privacy protects them . . . .(58) 
3y establishing a common law usage property right to education at pub­
lic expense, the Implicit Interpretation of the fifth amendment provides 
strong support for this position. 
The ninth amendment holds the strongest argument for the support of 
the Issue through the exercise of the police power of the states. The 
ninth amendment states that: 
The enumeration In the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not 
be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people. 
(59) 
Addressing the Intent of the ninth amendment, Paust stated that: 
The alternative basis for the protection of fundamental human values 
Is the ninth amendment ... .Its utility lies ... In recogniz­
ing that basic human rights are already a viable part of the consti­
tutionally guaranteed rights of Americans. . . . (I)t Is true that 
our courts either have not recognized the existence of such a con­
stitutional protection or have been unwilling to use It . . . 
(60) 
Citing the works of Hamlin, Kelsey, and Rogge, Paust stated that: 
It seems clear from the language of the Ninth Amendment that cer­
tain rights exist even though they are not enumerated In the Con­
stitution, that these rights are retained by the people, and that 
by express command these unenumerated rights are not to be denied 
or disparaged by any governmental body. (61) 
The tenth amendment contains language that through an Implicit Inter 
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pretatlon may support the "fundamental Interest" status of the Issue. 
The amendment states that: 
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, 
nor prohibited by It to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people. (62) 
The amendment prevents Intrusion of the federal government Into the 
area of states' rights. It supports the premise that although education 
Is not explicitly mentioned In the federal Constitution; It Is a right 
that Is reserved to the people of the states. The states have exercis­
ed their prerogative by Inclusion of education as a protected "right" 
Into the language of the state constitutions. (63) 
The fourteenth amendment holds support for the Issue, generally. 
The United States Supreme court has rejected the use of the fourteenth 
amendment as an argument for the Inclusion of education as a protected 
"Interest." (64) The amendment. In part, states that: 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or Immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within Its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. (65) 
WHEN IS EDUCATION A "FUNDAMENTAL INTEREST?" 
Education exists as a "fundamental Interest" when a citizen becomes 
six years of age and attempts to pursue an education; or when the citizen 
becomes eighteen years of age and the state has failed to provide one. 
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2. WHEN IS EDUCATION AT PUBLIC EXPENSE A "RIGHT?" 
Education, to be considered as a right at the federal level, must 
demonstrate that It Is a protected Interest from an Implicit Inter­
pretation of the federal Constitution. Senator Joseph Blden, Jr., 
stated that: 
Do I have certain rights simply because I exist; or do I have 
these rights because the law says that I do? (66) 
Blden addressed Implicit Interpretation directly; thus the dilemma. 
Does the right exist as a 'right' from Interpretation, or does the 
right exist before the Interpretive attempt? Justice Holmes defined 
a bright" as: 
A legal right Is nothing but a permission to exercise certain 
natural powers, and upon certain conditions to obtain protection, 
restitution, or compensation by the aid of the public force. (67) 
van Alstyne, In analyzing Justice Holmes' nature of a legal right, 
stated that: 
(F)or legal purposes a right Is only the hypostasis of a prophecy-
the Imagination of a substance supporting the fact that the public 
force will be brought to bear upon those who do things said to con­
travene It . . . . One phrase adds no more than the other to what 
we know without. Thus Holmes himself readily admitted that to deny 
that a person had a 'right' to something was merely to announce the 
conclusion that a court would not give him any relief; but the den­
ial Itself provides no reason whatever why such relief should be 
demted. (68) 
The states have established education as a constitutionally pro­
tected "right." (69) The United States Supreme Court has held once a 
state has established a right to an education that It cannon arbitrar­
ily remove this right without demonstrating a "compelling state Interest" 
to do so. (70) The California supreme court held that educatton was a 
protected "right" (71); the Connecticut supreme court agreed (72), as 
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did the New Jersey supreme court (73) 
The United States Supreme Court ruled In a five to four decision 
In 1973 that education was not a "right" protected by the federal Con­
stitution either by explicit or Implicit Interpretation. (74) 
Justice Thurgood Marshall did not support the majority position of 
the Court In 1973; nor did he support this position In 1982. He stated 
that: 
I continue to believe that an Individual's Interest In education Is 
fundamental, and that this view Is amply supported 'by the unique 
status accorded public education by our society/ and by the close 
relationship between education and some of our basic constitution­
al values. (75) 
Justice William Brennan did not support the majority position of the 
Supreme Court In 1973; In a 1982 majority opinion, he stated that: 
Illiteracy Is an enduring disability. The Inability to read and 
write will handicap the Individual deprived of a basic education 
each and every day of his life. The Inestlmeable toll of that 
deprivation on the social, economic, Intellectual, and psycholog­
ical well-being of the Individual, and the obstacle It poses to 
Individual achievement. (76) 
Justice Harry Blackmun did not support the majority position In RODRIGUEZ 
In 1973; In a concurring opinion In 1982, he stated that: 
. . . (D)enlal of an education Is the analogue of denial of the 
right to vote ... . (77) 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes In a 1907 opinion supported education 
as a protected right; he stated that education was: 
. . . one of the first objects of public care. (78) 
The United States Supreme Court In a majority decision In PLYLER In 
1982 stated that: 
In sum, education has a fundamental role In maintaining the fabric 
of our society. We cannot Ignore the significant social costs borne 
by our Nation when select groups are denied the means to absorb the 
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vatues and skills upon which our social order rests. (79) 
But more directly, 'education prepares Individuals to be self-
reliant and self-sufficient participants In society. (80) 
de Tocquevllle, In commenting upon the relationship of education 
to the political process In the United States, stated that: 
. . . (I)n the United States, the Instruction of the people power­
fully contributes to the support of the democratic republic . . . 
(P)oiltlcs are the end and aim of education. (81) 
President Calvtn Coolldge, In a speech In 1926, stated that: 
Having In mind that education Is peculiarly a local problem, and 
that It should always be pursued with the largest freedom of 
choice by students and parents, nevertheless, the Federal Govern­
ment might well give the benefit of Its counsel and encouragement 
more freely In this direction. I do consider It a fundamental 
requl rement of National activity ... . (82) 
David I. Klrp, quoting from a United States Supreme Court decision 
decided In 1964, stated that: 
the fundamental Importance of public education compelled . . .the 
Court to the extroardlnary remedy of ordering the county to levy 
taxes sufficient to reopen the public schools. (83) 
Klrp stated that education was of "fundamental Interest;" however, 
Were one somehow free to select the branch of government best 
suited to resolve the problems of equality of educational oppor­
tunity, the Judiciary would not be the branch picked. Massive 
Inaction of the other two branches, however, makes the judiciary 
the Instrument of last resort for the assertion of fundamental 
constitutional rights. (84) 
If the judiciary accepts Its responsibility and acts with Imagin­
ation and sensitivity, It may be able to show the way to the begin­
nings of solution, to make good the American promise of an equal 
choice for all through public education. (85) 
Klrp proposed three questions to be pursued In any analysis of the 
establishment of a right. He stated that: 
FIRST, does the right bear directly on the Individual's effective 
participation In the political process? . . . SECOND, Is the pre­
servation of the right essential to the maintenance of the values 
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of the society? . . . THIRD, Is the right generally considered 
essential for the Individual's satisfactory life prospects? (86) 
Klrp attributes the "fundamental rights" analysis to Professor Frank 
I. Mlchelman of the Harvard University Law School; Mlchelman had rais­
ed similar points both In unpublished course materials and In discussions 
that he had conducted. (87) 
In reaching Its decision In SERRANO, the California Supreme Court 
had Included much of the content of Mlchelman's discussions. Address­
ing the three points raised by Mlchelman, the California court had dis­
cussed: 
(a) INDIVIDUAL INTEREST. The court held that education was an 
essential element to the Interests of the Individual citizen. Educa­
tion provided the tools necessary to provide an Individual with an op­
portunity to reach self-realIzatlon. The court recognized the utility 
of obtaining an education. 
(b) PUBLIC INTEREST. The decision recognized the value of having 
educated workmen to contribute to the success of the society. The 
public Interest was served by an educated work-pool to aid In management 
and operation of the American economy, political networks, and govern­
mental services. All elements are enhanced through education of the 
membership responsible for successful performance. 
(c) SOCIETAL INTEREST. Societal Interests was made by the court's 
statement that "... education Is unmatched In the extent to which It 
molds the personality of the youth of the society." (88) The nation's 
youth are the future of the society. Public schools provide Instruction 
In the values, goals, philosophy, and America's past. An education of 
the youth shapes the future of the nation. There Is no greater right 
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O P  fundamental Interest than ensuring that the nation survives with Its 
values and Constitution Intact. 
Education, as a protected constitutional "plght" In the federal 
arena, Is conditioned upon six points; these points are derived from 
an Implicit Interpretation of the United States Constitution. These 
points are similar to the argument presented In SERRANO v. PRIEST; 
they were of overwhelming evidence to theCallfomla supreme court In 
1971. Their Impact has diminished little over the Intervening seven­
teen years. 
FIRST, education Is essential In providing an Individual with op­
portunities despite disadvantaged background. (89) The key word that 
operates within the process of becoming educated Is opportunity. Ed­
ucation Is essential In possessing social, economical, and political 
mobility. It does not guarantee success; however, It does provide 
that opportunity. 
SECOND, everyone benefits from education. (90) An Individual may 
live a life time without requiring the services of a fire department, 
police protection, public assistance, public housing, or medical services; 
yet, In 1988, It Is rare that an Individual Is not required to use an 
education - shopping for food, employment, travel, or obtaining aid. 
THIRD, education continues over the period of an Individual's 
IIfe. (91) In all types, variations, and Interests, education opens 
Interest In learning more. No governmental service Is this assured for 
citizens of all ages In and out of the public schools and colleges 
settings. Education Is a process that grows with Increased use over 
the life of the Individual. 
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FOURTH. education fs unmatched In Its ability to Influence and 
shape the youth of America. (92) The Roman Catholic Church recogniz­
ed this early In the history of the church; many Jesuit priests have 
been heard to say "Give me a chlld*s mind for the first six years, and 
he will be a Cathollg forever." Saturday morning television, with 
cartoons and commercials, vividly demonstrate the power of education. 
An education Is unmatched in Its power to Influence. 
FIFTH, education Is so Important to the general welfare of citizens 
that fifty states have cited Its "fundamental Interest" In state consti­
tutions. (93) The United States Supreme Court In PLYLER v. DOE In 1982 
stated that: 
In sum, education has a fundamental role In maintaining the fabric 
of our society. (94) 
The supreme court In SERRANO v. PRIEST In 1971 stated that: 
. . . education Is unmatched In the extent to which It molds the 
personality of the youth of the Society. (95) 
The United States Supreme Court In BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION In 1954 
stated that: 
Education Is the most Important function of state and local govern­
ments . . . (96) 
SIXTH. education Is a protected "right" from established historical 
and common law tradition and practice. (97) Writers, politicians, Jurists, 
congressmen, and historians uphold the historical Impact and Importance 
that education has had upon the history of this nation. 
Education Is a protected "right" from an implicit Interpretation 
of the federal Constitution. Implicit Interpretation addresses and sup­
plies positive responses to an examination of Individual, public, and 
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societal Interests maintained by a "right" to an education. Two bran­
ches of the federal government have acknowledged the "fundamental" Im­
portance of education. The United States Supreme Court has not accepted 
education as a constitutionally protected "right." 
3. WHEN IS EDUCATION AT PUBLIC EXPENSE AN "ENTITLEMENT?" 
The answer to the posed question Is simple. The United States 
Supreme Court In GOSS v. LOPEZ held that an entitlement was a state 
created action; once the state had conferred the right through state 
statute, the Individual was clearly entitled to recleve the benefit of 
the state's action. 
The United States Supreme tourt In GOSS defined an entitlement to 
a public education as: 
. . . (T)here Is no constitutional right to an educatton at public 
expense. . . . The Fourteenth Amendment forbids the State to de­
prive any person of fife, liberty, or property without due process 
of law. Protected Interests In property are normally 'not created 
by the Constitution.' Rather, they are created and their dimensions 
are defined by an Independent source such as state statutes or 
rules entitling the citizen to certain benefits. . . . Here, on 
the basis of state law, appellees plainly had legitimate claims of 
entitlement to a public education. (98) 
Based upon the Court's explanation of an entitlement, the following 
conditions were present to create an entitlement to an education at public 
expense. These conditions are: 
(a) It must be a legally created Issue by the actions of the state 
government (99) 
(b) It must be the Intent of the state to create this Issue and 
entitle Its citizens to receive the benefit of this action (100); 
(c) the receiver of the action or benefit must understand the 
nature of the state's Intent (101) 
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(d) there must be established guidelines that create certain, 
specific limits to the state action. (102) 
(e) the state must share In the created action through a bureauc­
racy to manage the action (103); 
(f) the fiscal responsibilities associated with the action must be 
clearly delineated for all, and must be applicable to all (104); 
(g) there must exist methodology for accountability of both state 
and recelpent of the state action (105); 
(h) the state has anticipated longevity for education by legis­
lating laws, rules, and regulations to govern and regulate the functions 
of education and related services throughout the state (106); 
(I) once the state has provided the service, It can not arbitrarily 
end or remove the service. (107). 
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4. WHEN IS EDUCATION AT PUBLIC EXPENSE A "PRIVILEGE?" 
A privilege Is defined as "an advantage not enjoyed by all." (108) 
Education Is conferred by the states upon a special class of Individuals 
without a federal mandate to do so. The states have chosen to grant 
the privilege of an education to a special class of Individuals; the 
states, having chosen to grant the privilege, may select to terminate or 
remove this service. 
Under the broad and general police powers of the state, It may es­
tablish and remove any Institution that promotes and provides for the 
general welfare of Its citizens. (109) Education at public's expense 
Is one of these creations; the state has provided the action, public 
education, outside of federal consideration of a constitutional "fund­
amental Interest." 
Holmes maintained that an Individual possesses a rlght/prlvllege to 
a state-created action (110); he held that an Individual has a right or 
prlvllege: 
(a) to Improve oneself through being educated, or receiving educa­
tional Instruction (III) 
(b) to benefit from the expenditure of state monies for the main* 
tenance of the general welfare of the citizens of the state (112); 
(c) to require and expect prudent use of state tax revenues (113); 
(d) to anticipate that the state will provide services for the 
general welfare of the citizens of the state (114); however, an Individ­
ual does not have a right to receive an Individual education at the ex­
pense of tax revenues, or to attend a public school. 
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5. WHAT SITUATIONS MUST EXIST FOR EDUCATION TO BE CONSIDERED A 
RIGHT, AN ENTITLEMENT, OR A PRIVILEGE PROTECTED BY THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION? 
The situations that must exist to elevate education to a protected 
"interest" are that It: 
(a) receive a "fundamental Interest" status from an Implicit Inter­
pretation of the federal Constitution; 
(b) exists as an Interest so basic as to demand recognition of Its 
"fundamental Interest" status; 
(c) have established the historical recognition of the Importance 
of education. 
(d) must receive state elevation of education to a constitutionally 
protected "right"; 
(e) receive congressional recognition of the "fundamental Interest" 
status of education through explicit legislative language; 
(f) receive executive recognition and support for education as a 
national Issue; and 
(g) must have the United States Supreme Court's acknowledgment of 
the fundamental status of education. 
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EDUCATION AS A RIGHT. Education, to be considered as a constitution­
ally protected right In the federal arena, must demonstrate that It Is 
protected by an explicit or Implicit Interpretation of the federal Con­
stitution. 
The United States Supreme Court has held that, from an explicit In­
terpretation of the federal Constitution, education was not a protected 
"right." (115) -
Implicit Interpretation fo the federal Constitution proposes a 
difficult task. The judiciary has generally ruled that It will consider 
a right when a deprivation of the proposed right would result In a severe 
Impairment to the Independent functioning of the Individual (116); a de­
privation of the right would trigger 'Strict Judicial Scrutiny" by the 
United States Supreme court (117); the exercise of the proposed right 
would result In a significant alteration of the conduct of the Individ­
ual's life style and the ability to gain meaningful employment (118); 
and the exercise of the right contributes to an aberrant action In the 
conduct of the state government (119). 
The California Supreme Court proposed several conditions that could, 
from an Implicit Interpretation of the federal Constitution, elevate ed­
ucation to a "fundamental Interest." (120) First, education Is essential 
In maintaining an Individual's opportunity to succeed despite a disad­
vantaged background. (121) Second, everyone benefits from education. 
(122) Third, education, acquired during elementary and secondary school 
years, continues over the period of the Individual's life time. (123) 
Fourth, education Is unmatched In Its ability to Influence and mold young 
members of the American society. (124) Fifth, education Is so Important 
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that fifty states have made It compulsory. Fifty states have cited ed­
ucation as a fundamental "right" In explicit language In state consti­
tutions. (125) The Connecticut Supreme court stated that: 
It Is argued that If the State decides that a service shall be fur­
nished, the service should thereby become one of 'fundamental right.' 
(126) 
Sixth, education has established an historical and common law tradition 
that creates a "fundamental Interest." (127) The Connecticut court 
stated that: 
It Is urged that education was so dominated In BROWN v. BOARD OF 
EDUCATION where the Court said that 'Today, education Is perhaps 
the most Important function of state and local governments,' and 
that 'Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to pro­
vide It, Is a right ... .' (128) 
The United States Supreme Court In MEYER had stated a similar Idea thirty 
years prior; the Court stated that: 
The American people have always regarded education and acquisition 
of knowledge as matters of supreme Importance should be dellgently 
promoted. (129) 
Education Is a "right" and a "fundamental Interest" that has an est­
ablished historical precedent, support from state governments In consti­
tutional language, support of Congress through congressional policy 
statements and appropriations for educational programs, and Indirect 
support from the executive branch of the federal government through pos­
itive political rhetoric. Education has public support for the public 
schools. Education, as a "right," lacks only a statement by the United 
States Supreme Court that ft exists. 
EDUCATION AS AN ENTITLEMENT. The United States Supreme Court held In 
GOSS that a protected entitlement to an education rested with the explicit 
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language of the state constitution. (130) When a state has created a 
constitutionally protected "right" to an education, has required at­
tendance from a special class of Individuals (131), has provided the 
bureaucracy to regulate education, has appropriated tax revenues to 
finance educatton, the United States Supreme Court stated that this cre­
ated a "fundamental entitlement" to an education. (132) The Court also 
stated that any attempt to withdraw this protected state "right" would 
result In "Strict Judicial Review." (133) 
An entitlement to an education at public expense Is based upon: 
(a) the state's explicit constitutional provisions for a "fund­
amental Interest" status; 
(b) the state compelling the special class of Individual's at­
tendance at the state-created educational Institutions, or a state-
accepted alternative (134); 
(c) the state has established an anticipated longevity, contin­
uation of Instruction by providing bureaucracies to manage educational 
programs and established a system of tax-revenue collections to support 
education (135); 
(d) the historical support for education; this established a common 
law tradition that added strength to the state's actions (136). 
EDUCATION AS A PRIVILEGE. Under the color of the ninth and tenth amend­
ments to the federal Constitution, a state may create a service for the 
benefit of the citizens of the state, such as education at public expense; 
however, the state may withdraw the service. (137) Education Is a priv­
ilege granted by state government under Its police powers to provide for 
the general welfare of Its citizens. (138) The United States Supreme 
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Court has held that education Is not a federal right; therefore, It Is 
a state function. As a state function, the state has the power to 
create any service to promote and provide for the general welfare of 
Its citizens. (139) The State, having created access to an education 
at public expense, has the right to remove this service at the state's 
discretion; this may be accomplished by the state proving that It had 
a "compelling state Interest" In removing education at public expenses 
as a service. (I40) 
SUMMARY. Educatton, as a right, an entitlement, and a privilege, Is an 
Issue that Is Inextricably tied to the personal beliefs and profess­
ional backgrounds of the membership of the United States Supreme Court. 
The United States Supreme Court has held that education Is not a federal 
question. This recognition of education's position takes no notice of 
the societal, Individual, historical, and political Importance that 
education has demonstrated over the past three hundred years. Fifty 
states have stated In their constitutions that education was a protect­
ed "right." Under the present format of this study, exploring the 
question, "Is education a constitutionally protected 'right?', cannot 
be satisfactorily answered. 
The five selected periods In the history of education demonstrate 
a progression of the Importance of education as It developed and prog­
ressed to a higher level of Importance to the nation. 
Four periods of United States Supreme Court activity demonstrate 
four different approaches and holdings toward education. These range 
from education holding fundamental Importance In BROWN (141), MEYER (142), 
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and PLYLER (143) to education having no constitutional position at the 
federal level In RODRIGUEZ (144). The Court's activity, or lack of act­
ivity, directly affected the perception of education as a "fundamental 
Interest." 
CONCLUSIONS 
The conclusions to the study have been organized around the research 
questions proposed In chapter one and explored throughout this work. 
The following research questions have examined: 
1. UNDER COLOR OF THE CONSTITUTION, WHEN IS EDUCATION AT PUBLIC 
EXPENSE A "FUNDAMENTAL INTEREST?" 
2. WHEN IS EDUCATION AT PUBLIC EXPENSE A "RIGHT?" 
3. WHEN IS EDUCATION AT PUBLIC EXPENSE AN "ENTITLEMENT?" 
4. WHEN IS EDUCATION AT PUBLIC EXPENSE A "PRIVILEGE?" 
5. WHAT SITUATIONS MUST EXIST FOR EDUCATION TO BE CONSIDERED A 
RIGHT, AN ENTITLEMENT, OR A PRIVILEGE PROTECTED BY THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION? 
Each research question Is presented prior to findings reached In 
the study. 
I. UNDER COLOR OF THE CONSTITUTION, WHEN IS EDUCATION AT PUBLIC 
EXPENSE A "FUNDAMENTAL INTEREST?" 
Education as a "fundamental Interest" places the burden of receipt 
of the property Interest upon the citizen between the ages of six and 
eighteen years. Education, the process, Is an exchange between the 
citizen and the mandated state environment. Quality of the process may 
be varied by region, the wealth Involved, or the Inate Intelligence of 
the citizen; however, the protected "Interest" still remains. Education 
Is a federally, constitutionally protected "right." 
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. . . '(T)he public school Is at once the symbol of our democracy 
and the most Dervaslve means for promoting our common destiny. 
(145) 
2. WHEN IS EDUCATION AT PUBLIC EXPENSE A "RIGHT?" 
Education as a "right" Is premised upon: 
(a) the Implicit and expllfclt, historical Importance of education; 
(b) a critical function of education during the twentieth and twen­
ty first centuries; 
(c) fifty state constitutions have mentioned education as a "fund­
amental Interest" for the people of their respective state; 
Cd) the legislative branch of the United States government has 
recognized, promoted, and appropriated substantial amounts of money to 
support education and educational programs; 
(e) the present and past leaders of the executive branch have 
been the spokesperson for Increased levels of federal spending to aid 
education as well as encouraging higher levels of achievement from the 
school systems across the United States; the executive branch has pro­
vided especially high levels of political rhetoric on behalf of educa­
tion; 
(f) none of the other rights mentioned by the United States Sup­
reme Court as possessing "fundamental right" status have the amount of 
state and federal monies Invested In them, or the amount of attention 
that education arouses, or Involves as many of the state and federal 
citizens as does education; 
(g) education Involves almost one third of the state's population 
directly or Indirectly In the educational process; 
(h) every citizen Is directly affected by education; 
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(!) ©very Industry and business Is directly and Indirectly affect­
ed by the Issue and the process of education. 
3. WHEN IS EDUCATION AT PUBLIC EXPENSE AN "ENTITLEMENT?" 
The Implications for education at public expense as a federal ques­
tion of entitlement are contained In the Implicit Interpretation of the 
federal Constitution by the federal Judiciary. Using the logic present 
In the GOSS opinion, the states have created education as a protected 
property Interest through specific constitutional language; therefore, 
since the states have created education as a state "right" and property 
right; education must exist as a federal entitlement. 
4. WHEN IS EDUCATION AT PUBLIC EXPENSE A "PRIVILEGE?" 
It Is a privilege to receive an education at public expense. An 
Individual has a right to Improve oneself through educational Instruc­
tion; however, the state Is not obligated to use tax revenues to provide 
for the educational Instruction. A state may choose to provide monies 
for education however, the state, as a sovereign unit, may opt to with­
draw from the experience at a time that It deems to be advantageous. 
(146) 
A privilege Implies that a service Is given unequally to citizens 
of the state, and It may be arbitrarily administered and withdrawn at 
the discretion of the state government. (147) 
5. WHAT SITUTAIONS MUST EXIST FOR EDUCATION TO BE CONSIDERED A 
RIGHT, AN ENTITLEMENT, OR A PRIVILEGE PROTECTED BY THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION? 
A "fundamental Interest" protected by the federal Constitution re­
209 
quires that It receive standing through an Implicit Interpretation of 
the federal Constitution. 
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The federal Constitution made no explicit reference to education 
as a protected "fundamental right," nor does It make reference to crim­
inal rights, abortion, voting, and Interstate transportation. The Un­
ited States Supreme Court held that education was not a fundamental 
"right;" yet, the Court held that criminal rights, abortion, voting, 
and Interstate transportation were "rights" from the Court's Implicit 
Interpretation of the federal Constitution. Education, as a federal 
Constitutional "right," Is an Issue whose time has arrived. 
The following recommendations for further research and study are 
made. 
1. It Is recommended that a research study be conducted on the 
status of education as a state "right." 
2. It Is recommended that a research study be conducted on the 
status of education as a federal question. 
3. It Is recommended that a study be conducted on the United States 
Supreme Court's view of education as a federal, constitutionally protect­
ed "right." 
4. It Is recommended that a survey study be made of the states' 
view of education as a federal, constitutionally protected "right." 
5. It Is recommended that a comparltlve study be made of the Un­
ited States Supreme Court's view and the lower federal courts' view of 
the status of education as a federal constitutionally protected "right." 
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6. 1+ Is recommended that a study be made of education as a pro­
tected "right" from a view of the Congress of the United States. 
7. It Is recommended that a study of Presidential views on educa­
tion be made. 
8. It Is recommended that a study of the relationships between 
States-Rights views on education placed against United States Supreme 
Court views on education be explored. 
9. It Is recommended that a study be made of the United States 
Supreme Court's decisions on education examined from the four periods 
of the Court's activity covered In this study. 
10. It Is recommended that a survey study of regional views on ed­
ucation as a protected "right" be made. 
11. It Is recommended that a survey study be made of higher educa­
tion as a protected "right." 
12. It Is recommended that a research study be made on the pattern 
of federal financing of education spanning ten, fifty, one hundred, and 
two hundred years segments of time. 
13. It Is recommended that a statistical study be made of the fed­
eral and state monies allocated and expended to support education over 
the past one hundred years. 
14. It Is recommended that a study be made of the Impact of United 
States Supreme Court decisions on education and educational rights. 
15. It Is recommended that a study of the opinions on education 
that justices of the United States Supreme Court have delivered be ex­
plored. 
16. It Is recommended that a study of the leadership styles of the 
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